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Abstract 
This thesis examines the political space of Borno part of modern-day 
Nigeria from 1810 to 2010. It seeks to bridge the gap between precolonial, 
colonial and postcolonial history while studying the evolving concept of a 
Bornoan space in the longue durée. This research project highlights the continuity 
of the spatial framework of a nineteenth-century kingdom in colonial and 
postcolonial Nigeria. 
The aim of this study is to demonstrate that the Bornoan space survived 
the European colonisation as the British manipulated the concept of the territory 
of Borno in their competition against other Europeans in Africa. European 
imperialism did not always destroy African polities but, in the case of Borno, 
favoured the reconstruction of a nineteenth-century territory within the Nigerian 
colony. It will be argued that the quest for territorial legitimacy led the British to 
constantly adapt their colonial administration to the previous nineteenth-century 
space as the colonial administration recycled the kingdom of Borno within the 
Nigerian framework. The creation of the province  of Borno was thus based on 
the utilisation of some of its nineteenth-century borders and its concept of 
territoriality. Thus, Indirect Rule preserved the territory of Borno within colonial 
Nigeria. 
This last argument means that the Bornoan space was re-used and 
reconstructed by the colonial officials with the help of the Bornoan elite. The 
independent kingdom was no more but it could survive within British 
administration and scholarly writings. This attitude can explain why the British 
officials wanted to reunify German and British Borno in two United Nations 
plebiscites in 1959 and 1961. The Scramble for Borno which began at the end of 
the nineteenth century was thus not over before 1961. 
Postcolonial Nigeria directly inherited this administrative framework and 
territorial practices from its colonial predecessor. This last phenomenon can 
explain the creation of Borno State in 1976. However, this process came to an end 
in 1991 when Yobe State was carved out Borno. It will be argued that the 
Bornoan spatial identity is evolving and turning into a cultural phenomenon in 
the twenty-first century. 
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Résumé 
Cette thèse analyse l’espace politique de Borno (Nigeria) de 1810 à 2010. 
Elle se propose de s’affranchir des divisions entre histoire précoloniale, coloniale 
et postcoloniale en étudiant l’évolution de l’espace bornouan sur la longue durée. 
Cette recherche a pour ambition de souligner la continuité territoriale de Borno 
du royaume du dix-neuvième siècle jusqu’au Nigeria contemporain. 
Ce projet démontre que l’espace bornoan a survécu à la colonisation en 
démontrant que les Britanniques ont manipulé le concept du territoire de Borno 
dans leur compétition avec les autres Européens en Afrique. L’impérialisme 
européen n’a pas toujours détruit les organisations politiques africaines et, dans 
le cas de Borno, a favorisé la reconstruction d’un royaume du dix-neuvième siècle 
au sein-même de la colonie du Nigeria. La quête de légitimité territoriale a 
constamment conduit les Britanniques à adapter leur administration coloniale à 
l’espace bornoan. Ainsi, la provincialisation du Borno se basait sur certaines 
frontières et sur le concept de territorialité du Borno directement hérités du dix-
neuvième siècle. L’Indirect Rule a donc préservé le territoire du Borno au sein du 
Nigeria. 
Cet argument signifie que l’espace bornoan était réutilisé et reconstruit 
par les officiers coloniaux avec l’aide de l’élite bornouane. Le royaume 
indépendant n’était plus mais il pouvait survivre dans les écrits scientifiques et 
l’administration des Britanniques. Cette attitude explique pourquoi ces derniers 
désiraient réunifier les Bornos allemand et britannique dans les deux plébiscites 
de 1959 and 1961. Le partage de l’Afrique commencé à la fin du XIXe siècle ne 
s’est donc terminé qu’en 1961 pour Borno. 
Le Nigeria indépendant a directement hérité cette structure 
administrative et ces pratiques territoriales de son prédécesseur. Ceci peut 
expliquer la création de l’État fédéral de Borno en 1976. Cependant, cette 
dynamique a été rompue en 1991 avec la division de l’État de Borno entre Yobe 
et Borno. Cette thèse démontre donc que l’identité spatiale de Borno a largement 
évolué pour finir par devenir un phénomène culturel au début du XXIe siècle. 
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Resúmen 
Este trabajo analiza el espacio político de Borno (Nigeria) entre 1810 y 
2010. Se propone de encontrar los vínculos entre la historia pre-colonial, colonial 
y post-colonial a la luz del estudio de la evolución del espacio de Borno en la larga 
duración. 
Se pone al descubierto la continuidad territorial de Borno desde el reino 
que llevó su nombre en el siglo XIX hasta la República de Nigeria contemporánea. 
En esta tesis se da cuenta de la supervivencia del espacio de Borno durante la 
colonización y el por qué los británicos manipularon el concepto del territorio de 
Borno para competir con otros europeos en África. El imperialismo europeo no 
siempre destruyó las organizaciones políticas africanas y, en el caso de Borno, 
reconstruyó el reino del siglo XIX en la colonia de Nigeria. La búsqueda de una 
legitimidad territorial condujo a los británicos a adaptar su administración 
colonial al espacio político de Borno. De ese modo, la provincialización de Borno 
estaba basada en algunas fronteras y en el concepto del territorio de Borno 
directamente heredados del siglo XIX. La Indirect Rule consiguientemente 
conservó el territorio de Borno al reciclarlo en la colonia de Nigeria. 
Esto significa que el espacio de Borno fue reutilizado y reconstruido por 
los oficiales colonialistas con la ayuda de la élite borneana. El reino 
independiente ya no existía pero podía sobrevivir en los trabajos académicos y la 
administración de los británicos. Esta postura explica por qué éstos quisieron 
reunificar los Bornos alemán y británico en los plebiscitos de 1959 y 1961. El 
reparto de África iniciado al final del siglo XIX se terminó apenas en 1961 para 
Borno. 
La República de Nigeria heredó directamente esas estructuras 
administrativas y prácticas territoriales de su antecesor político. Esto puede 
explicar la creación del Estado federal de Borno en 1976. Sin embargo, este 
proceso se rompió en 1991 con la división del Estado de Borno entre Yobe y 
Borno. El objetivo final de este trabajo es el de demostrar que la identidad 
espacial de Borno ha evolucionado en un fenómeno cultural a principios del siglo 
XXI. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Diese Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit dem Königreich Borno, das im 
heutigen Nigeria liegt, als politischem Raum im Zeitraum von 1810 bis 
2010. Das Hauptziel dabei ist es, vorkoloniale, koloniale und 
postkoloniale Geschichte miteinander zu verbinden. Diese Dissertation 
behandelt die Vorstellung des Raums Borno im longue durée und 
untersucht den Fortbestand des Königreiches Borno als räumlicher 
Einheit vom 19. Jahrhundert über die Kolonialzeit bis hin in die Zeit nach 
der Unabhängigkeit Nigerias.  
Das Forschungsprojekt zeigt, dass Bornu als räumliche Einheit die 
europäische Kolonisierung überlebte,  da die britische Kolonialmacht 
aufgrund ihres Konkurrenzkampfes mit anderen europäischen Mächten 
auf dem afrikanischen Kontinent die territoriale Konzeption Bornos 
veränderte. So zerstörte der europäische Imperialismus  nicht unbedingt 
jedwedes afrikanische Gemeinwesen, sondern begünstigte unter 
Umständen, wie das Beispiel Borno zeigt,  sogar den Wiederaufbau eines 
nigerianischen Gebiets im 19. Jahrhundert.  
Die Suche nach räumlicher Legitimitation veranlasste die 
britische Konolialverwaltung, das Territorium Bornos dem Reich des 19. 
Jahrhunderts anzupassen. Die Aufteilung in Provinzen durch die 
britische Kolonialmacht orientierte sich dabei am antiken Königreich 
Borno und gründete sich auf einige Grenzen und der Konzeption der 
ursprünglichen Territorialität Bornus. Durch dieses Vorgehen 
konservierte die britische Indirect Rule den Raum Bornu in Nigeria. 
So fand sowohl von Seiten der Kolonialoffiziere als auch 
einheimischen  Eliten nicht nur eine Rückbesinnung auf Bornu als 
räumlicher Einheit, sondern seine regelrechte „Wiederverwendung“ und 
sein Wiederaufbau statt. Das unabhängige Reich existierte zwar nicht 
mehr, aber es konnte unter britischer Herrschaft und in 
wissenschaftlichen Schriften überleben. Diese Haltung erklärt, warum 
die britischen Beamten das in die Teile Deutsch- und Britisch-Bornu 
geteilte Gebiet während der Plebiszite von 1959 und 1961 wieder 
vereinigen wollten. Im Jahr 1961 endete dann aber der Wettlauf um 
Bornu, der am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts begonnen hatte. 
Das Erbe dieses aus der britischen Kolonialzeit stammenden 
administrativen Rahmens und dieser territorialen Praktiken wirkte aber 
noch deutlich bis in die Zeit nach der Unabhängigkeit Nigerias nach und 
führte 1976 zur Gründung des Bundesstaates Bornu. Jedoch endete 
dieser Prozess 1991, als ein Teil Bornus zum Bundesstaat Yobe wurde. 
Abschließend zeigt diese Arbeit, wie sich die räumliche Identität Bornus 
zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts in ein kulturelles Phänomen verwandelt.
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Note on terminology 
 
(1) The main subject of this thesis is spelt “Borno”. Before 1976 and the 
spelling adopted by the Borno Emirate Council, “Borno” was spelt “Bornu” 
in English and “Bornou” in French. Thus most sources will mention 
“Bornu” or “Bornou” instead of “Borno”. The adjective before 1976 was 
“Bornuese” whereas most academics tend to use “Bornoan” in 2011. 
Other places names will also follow the conventions used in 2011 unless 
directly quoted from primary sources. 
 
(2) This thesis will use “boundary” and “border” interchangeably when 
dealing with international or regional limits. The word “frontier” will not 
be employed as it can have a zonal meaning. 
 
(3) The German spelling of “Kamerun” will be used to refer to the German 
colony. “Cameroons” will be used to refer to the League of Nations 
Mandate and the United Nations Trust Territory. “Cameroon” will 
designate the independent Republic of Cameroon. 
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Introduction 
 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, most African international 
borders are still the result of European colonial history. This relatively short 
period of time fostered the division of the continent into colonies and later 
countries which directly inherited these borders from their colonial 
predecessors. This phenomenon is not original. The Europeans had already 
created colonial borders on a continental scale in America from the fifteenth 
century. In South-East Asia, they also started to conquer territories in the 
sixteenth century. African borders are therefore not an exception as they are the 
result of the European colonial expansion. However, these boundaries are treated 
differently by scholars for two main reasons. 
Firstly, most of them find their origin in a very short period of time from 
the 1890s to the 1910s when the Europeans conquered and divided the whole 
continent. This period known as “The Scramble for Africa” was in fact a series of 
different regional scrambles which led to the creation of colonies.1 Secondly, 
these boundaries became the symbol of the colonial arbitrary. It was not in 
America or South-East Asia that these borders were mostly criticised: it was in 
Africa. Explaining the historicity of this relatively recent geographic framework 
and its controversial dimension was one of the main objectives of this thesis. 
Paradoxically, at the time of writing this thesis, these colonial borders had 
rarely been modified except in the case of Eritrea which seceded from Ethiopia in 
1993 and South Sudan’s split from Sudan in 2011. This resilience of the colonial 
borders is mainly explained by three factors. Firstly, according to the historian 
Anthony Asiwaju, most African populations do not want to modify their 
boundaries as they are more enclined to profit from existing transborder 
exchanges.2 Secondly, the African political elite wanted to preserve their leading 
role in postcolonial Africa by keeping the borders of the newly independent 
                                            
1 John Parker and Richard Rathbone, African History: a Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), p. 94. 
2 Anthony Asiwaju, ‘Fragmentation ou intégration : quel avenir pour les frontières africaines ?’ in 
Boubacar Barry and Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, eds, Histoire Et Perception Des Frontières En 
Afrique Aux XIXe Et XXe Siècles: Les Problèmes De L’intégration Africaine (Bamako: UNESCO/CISH, 
2005), p. 78. 
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states intact. This was illustrated by the 1963 Charter of the Organisation of the 
African Unity where it was decided that the colonial borders should not be 
modified.3 Finally, former colonial powers saw an excellent tool to keep their 
influence in Africa in this administrative structure. This is an aspect of a general 
relationship that Felix Houphouët-Boigny supposedly called “Françafrique”.4 
This research project wanted thus to explore how these borders were 
solidified by choosing a precise case-study. Indeed, many studies such as Jeffrey 
Herbst’s tend to overgeneralise their vision of the African borders. According to 
him: “precolonial Africa was a world where the extension and consolidation of 
power meant something very different from the broadcasting of power in 
Europe”.5 The choice of a case-study was therefore to analyse the historicity of 
these borders at a local level in order to criticise this assumption. The Scramble 
for Africa was seen as the matrix for the division of the continent. One of the aims 
of this thesis was to retrace the whole historical process which led to the creation 
of these borders. If it had been demonstrated that modern-day borders originate 
from colonial borders, where do colonial borders come from? 
The choice of a case-study interrogating both colonial and pre-colonial 
borders was thus necessary. In addition, this study had to focus on a territory 
relatively well-documented which had not been widely studied by scholars of the 
colonial period. My previous studies of Nigeria had led me to conclude that the 
eastern border of the country had been understudied so far.6 It came to me as a 
surprise because the competition between the British, French and Germans had 
led to the production of an extensive diplomatic correspondence between the 
three countries. This thesis thus aimed at using colonial sources in three different 
languages. Moreover, in the north-eastern part of the country, Borno had not 
been the subject of many academic enquiries for its colonial period. 
                                            
3 Organisation of African Unity Charter, Addis-Ababa, 1963 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/OAU_Charter_1963.pdf [consulted 22 May 2012]. 
4 Quoted by Thomas Deltombe, Jacob Tatsitsa and Manuel Domergue, Kamerun : Une Guerre 
Cachée Aux Origines De La Fran afrique, 1948-1971  Paris: De couverte, 2011), p. 133. 
5 Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control  
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 35. 
6 Vincent Hiribarren, ‘Les Frontières Du Biafra De La Colonisation { 1970’  Unpublished Masters, 
Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, 2007). 
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In a 2011 article, Richard Reid stressed how precolonial history had 
become increasingly “marginalised”.7 Contrary to some other African areas 
mostly known for their colonial history, Borno has been more studied for its 
precolonial past than for its colonial and postcolonial history. In the firmament of 
African History, Borno finds its place next to the empires of Ghana, Songhai or 
Great Zimbabwe. What happened to the kingdom of Kanem-Borno after its 
sixteenth-century apogee? Did it fall into oblivion once invaded by the 
Europeans? After 1900, Borno seemed to be particularly insignificant: but was 
this simply a consequence of the exceptional wealth of its medieval sources?8 
 It is true that this study begun with the simple remark that the name of 
Borno had survived on the African map until 2010. It would seem that the 
European Scramble for Africa of the late nineteenth century did not destroy 
everything in the Lake Chad area. However, should this study mistakenly take the 
survival of a name as proof of the resilience of Borno against time? After all, the 
kingdom of Kanem-Borno and its successor the kingdom of Borno can trace their 
history back to the eighth century; it would seem logical that the millenary 
kingdom could survive 58 years of colonisation.9 
Nonetheless, it seems obvious that the ancient kings of Kanem-Borno 
would not recognise their Nigerian offspring. This research was not based on the 
teleological assumption that the borders and territory of Borno have always 
existed. Its aim is to critically assess the latter without assuming an essentialist 
position which would fossilise Borno into the Lake Chad basin. 
The main objective of this study is thus to demonstrate that the survival of 
Borno was not fortuitous by stressing the “on-going relevance of earlier spatial 
                                            
7 Richard Reid, ‘Past and Presentism: The “Precolonial” and the Foreshortening of African 
History’, The Journal of African History, 52 (2011), 135-155, (135). 
8 A recent example of this interest in ancient Borno can be found in the School of Oriental and 
African Studies of London and at the Asian-Afrika Institut at Hamburg University. For example, 
Dmitry Bondarev studies early Qur’anic manuscripts written in Tarjumo a variant of sixteenth-
century Kanuri-Kanembu. Dmitry Bondarev, ‘An Archaic Form of Kanuri/Kanembu: A Translation 
Tool for Qur’anic Studies’, Journal of Qur’anic Studies, 8 (2006), 143-153. 
9 Dierk Lange, ‘Ethogenesis from Within the Chadic State: Some Thoughts on the History of 
Kanem-Borno’, Paideuma, 39 (1993), 261-277. For a political approach from the eleventh to the 
nineteenth century see Nur Alkali, ‘Kanem-Borno Under the Sayfawa: A Study in the Origin, 
Growth and Collapse of a Dynasty’  Unpublished PhD: Zaria, Ahmadu Bello University, 1978). 
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patterns” as Allan Howard and Richard Shain put it.10 Consequently, this thesis 
will retrace the evolution of the territory and boundaries of Borno from 1810 to 
2010 and will try to bridge the gap between precolonial, colonial and 
postcolonial history. 
The position of Borno in the north-east of Nigeria furthermore means that 
the current borders of Nigeria also constitute the borders of Borno. The origin 
and nature of these colonial borders will be interrogated. Once again, this study 
was not written with the benefit of hindsight in order to criticise or legitimise the 
current borders of Nigeria. Its ambition is to establish the history of the spatial 
framework of Borno from 1810 to 2010. This thesis, thus, does not deal with 
geographical accuracy but with the transmission of spatial concepts. Its aim is to 
create a cultural history of the Bornoan space over the last two centuries. 
 Its starting point is the beginning of a new dynasty in Borno. Indeed, at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, after more than seven centuries of 
domination under the Sayfawa dynasty11, Borno had to face an invasion, the 
Fulani jihad.12 Even if Borno did not become a part of the Sokoto Caliphate, the 
position of its Sayfawa kings was compromised.13 Shehu Muhammad al-Amin El-
Kanemi helped the king repel its Fulani opponents and became the de facto ruler 
of Borno at the end of 1809.14 By choosing 1810 as a starting point, this thesis 
takes into account not only the new political situation in Borno but also the 
recent developments of the Fulani jihad in Western Africa. 
 The ending point of this thesis, 2010, does not correspond to any political 
turning point. This artificial division only depends on the time this research was 
undertaken (2008-2011). However, the time length covered by this study reveals 
the ambitions of this project as it will be suggested that the borders and territory 
                                            
10 Allen Howard and Richard Shain, eds., The Spatial Factor in African History: The Relationship of 
the Social, Material, and Perceptual (Leiden: Brill, 2005) or see his latest work: Allen Howard, 
‘Actors, Places, Regions and Global Forces: An Essay on the Spatial History of Africa Since 1700’, 
in Respacing Africa, ed by Ulf Engel and Paul Nugent (Boston: Brill, 2009), pp. 11-44. 
11 Dierk Lange, ‘The Kingdoms and Peoples of Chad’, in General History of Africa, ed. by Djibril 
Tamsir Niane (London: Unesco, Heinemann, 1984), pp. 238-265 (238-240). 
12 Murray Last, The Sokoto Caliphate (London: Longman, 1977), p. 55. 
13 Louis Brenner, The Shehus of Kukawa: a History of the al-Kanemi Dynasty of Bornu (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1973), introduction. 
14  John Lavers, ‘The Al- Kanimiyyin Shehus: a Working Chronology’, Berichte Des 
Sonderforschungsbereichs, 268 (1993), 179-186 (180). 
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of 1810 Borno have survived to a certain extent in 2010 Nigeria, an argument 
which explains the title: “From a Kingdom to a Nigerian State: the Territory and 
Boundaries of Borno 1810-2010”. This study is thus interested in spatial 
continuity but will not underplay the role of European colonisation in the spatial 
framework of Borno. 
 The first caveat is that primary sources available for such a study are 
mostly available on the colonial period. Nineteenth-century sources on Africa 
such as the narratives of explorers are sparse and contain a very strong 
European bias. Postcolonial studies have emphasised how these documents did 
not provide any faithful descriptions of the studied environment as they only 
depicted the desire for fame of these men whose perception was flawed because 
of racism, sexism, chauvinism or imperialism. 15  However, the wealth of 
information provided on Borno cannot totally be neglected. Compared to other 
African regions, the nineteenth-century history of the Lake Chad area is rather 
well-documented. Travellers such as Heinrich Barth or Gustav Nachtigal wrote 
insightful analyses of Borno. Oral sources collected by Louis Brenner16, Graham 
Connah17, John Lavers18, Wilhelm Seidensticker19, Bosoma Sheriff20 or Thomas 
Geider21 confirm that these narratives can be trusted to a certain extent. Thus 
                                            
15 This bias was often denounced by postcolonial literary studies, see for example the analysis of 
Patrick Brantlinger, ‘Victorians and Africans: The Genealogy of the Myth of the Dark Continent’, 
Critical Inquiry, 12 (1985), 166-203. 
16 Brenner, The Shehus of Kukawa. 
17 Graham Connah, Three Thousand Years in Africa: Man and His Environment in the Lake Chad 
Region of Nigeria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
18 John Lavers never published many books or articles. However to have an overview of the 
latter’s erudition, it is still possible to use his papers in Kaduna, Arewa House. 
19 As in the case of John Lavers, Wilhelm Seidensticker did not publish many of his papers. 
However, it is possible to find examples of his work in Wilhelm Seidensticker, ‘“The Strangers, 
However Are Numerous” - Observations on the People of Borno in the 19th Century’, in Advances 
in Kanuri Scholarship, ed by Norbert Cyffer and Thomas Geider  Ko ln: Ru diger Ko ppe, 1997), pp. 
1-16 and Wilhelm Seidensticker, A Bibliographical Guide to Borno Studies, 1821-1983 (Maiduguri: 
University of Maiduguri, 1986). 
20 I am grateful to Bosoma Sheriff for his time and for his invitation to attend a lecture at the 
University of Maiduguri on oral literature. For an example of his work see his contribution 
Bosoma Sheriff, ‘Introduction to Kanuri Poetry’, in Advances in Kanuri Scholarship, ed by Cyffer 
and Geider, pp. 115-142. 
21 Thomas Geider, ‘The Universe of Kanuri Oral Literature and Documentary Texts’, in Advances 
in Kanuri Scholarship, ed by Cyffer and Geider, pp. 157-224. 
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with the help of European narratives and recorded oral sources, this study hopes 
to reconstruct the nineteenth-century territorial framework of Borno. 
 This study is completed by the analysis of classical colonial sources, such as 
annual reports, censuses or administrative correspondence. Conventional 
archival material from Kaduna, Oxford, London and Berlin was thus used to 
uncover the history of the colonisation of Borno. French archival material about 
this area is scarce, and unfortunately, due to the lack of time and funding, this 
study will not assess material available in the archive centres of Niamey and 
Dakar. The fact that a part of Borno was a Mandate of the Leagues of Nations and 
later a Trusteeship Territory also ensured that numerous documents were 
published by the British colonisers. As during the nineteenth century, it would be 
necessary to recognise that the colonial era records are especially rich. In 
addition, the particularity of the colonial sources for Borno remains in the 
presence of scholarly studies undertaken by colonial agents themselves. After 
collecting oral evidence, officials such as Charles Temple22 or Herbert Palmer23 
produced monographs on the history of Borno. The phenomenon of the scholar-
administrator is not unique to Borno but it seems to have begun earlier than in 
most other parts of Africa. It goes without saying that the European bias present 
in the nineteenth-century sources did not disappear in the twentieth-century 
sources. It could even be argued that colonial sources were perhaps more 
constrained by the imperative to support policy. 
 In addition, oral sources were also collected in 2010 to obtain a clearer 
picture of the manner in which colonial rule was remembered. The main idea was 
to compare the information obtained from my informants with the written 
sources collected in Nigeria and Europe. Interviews with border-dwellers on the 
Nigerien and Cameroonian border, moreover were particularly useful as a source 
for understanding the sense of territoriality or belonging. 
                                            
22 Charles Temple, Notes on the Tribes, Provinces, Emirates and States of the Northern Province of 
Nigeria (London: Cass, 1965). 
23 An excellent example is the publication of a royal chronicle of Borno in Herbert Palmer, ‘The 
Bornu Girgam’, Journal of the Royal African Society, 12 (1912), 71-83. 
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Ethical clearance was thus necessary to interview people in Borno and to 
ensure that their testimony would not be used against their will.24 Usual 
precautions were also taken when analysing this kind of source.25 For example, 
oral sources dealing with the past of Borno could have been largely influenced by 
the Nigerian political debate. Talking about the specific history of a Nigerian 
region could also evoke the secession of Biafra from 1967 to 1970. Historical 
research on Borno could thus be politically loaded. Nonetheless, it is hoped that 
the collection of different written and oral sources will permit to have a clearer 
picture of the colonial period. 
 Postcolonial Borno sources were in comparison more difficult to obtain as 
most independence-era archives were not easily accessible to researchers. 
Moreover, there have never been any local newspapers in Maiduguri, the capital 
of Borno. Sources were thus collected from very different origins such as 
Nigerian grey literature or Nigerian newspapers mostly available in British 
archives. 
 As this thesis is principally a historical study of spatial phenomena, 
numerous maps were analysed to assess the construction of the borders and 
territory of Borno. For every period, it will be suggested that the Europeans 
never ceased to rebuild the territory of Borno with the help of cartographic tools. 
Malcolm Lewis argued that Europeans never totally invented new territories 
when they mapped North-America in the sixteenth century. Indeed, the colonial 
maps of America were influenced by precolonial concepts of space. According to 
Lewis, colonial names and administrative patterns were slightly influenced by 
some precolonial societies.26 Could this also apply to Borno? 
Colonial maps will obviously constitute important sources and will be 
assessed along the criteria set by John Harley27 or Matthew Edney.28 Both 
                                            
24 Ethical clearance, University of Leeds, AREA 09-088, 2010. 
25 Robert Perks, The Oral History Reader, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 2006). 
26 Malcolm Lewis, Cartographic Encounters: Perspectives on Native American Mapmaking and Map 
Use (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1998), introduction. 
27 John Harley, ‘Deconstructing the Map’, Cartographica: The International Journal for Geographic 
Information and Geovisualization, 26 (1989), 1–20. 
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authors applied the linguistic turn of historiography to cartography. For example, 
they stressed how maps could be analysed as a type of discourse. Lines, points, 
areas and keys were all part of a wider discourse on the nature of power. For 
these authors, maps are therefore a language which can be used to transmit a 
visual message to their readers. More than a simple and neutral description of 
space, maps reveal the religious, social and political context of their production. 
Studying the European maps of Africa under this angle can thus highlight the 
patterns behind the European exploration and colonisation of the continent.29 
Each chapter of this study will attempt to analyse critically the importance 
of cartography in the creation of the borders and territory of Borno. I will 
highlight how the colonial and postcolonial State has used instruments such as 
maps and geographical knowledge to control people and territory. In this sense, 
this thesis is directly inspired by the theories developed by Michel Foucault 
stressing the relationship between power and knowledge.30 Foucault wrote 
about concepts of space and his ideas were often re-used by geographers.31 With 
the help of Foucault’s theories, I will attempt to articulate the relationship 
between knowledge and power in Borno. Did the systems of thought of 
territoriality, space and borders change over time in Borno? Were concepts 
shared across the Mediterranean Sea by African and Europeans alike? Would it 
be possible to talk about a universal concept of space or should we still refer to 
two different European and Africans systems of thought? Could shared concepts 
of territoriality explain the survival of Borno during the colonial era? Foucault’s 
theories on the archaeology of systems of thought will be explored. Human 
sciences in general will be analysed in this thesis in order to deconstruct the 
origin of geographic knowledge. The aim of this project will be to find the “order 
                                                                                                                             
28 Matthew Edney, Mapping an Empire: The Geographical Construction of British India, 1765-1843 
(University of Chicago Press, 1997). 
29 For an analysis of the relationship between African cartography and power, see Vincent 
Hiribarren and Robin Seignobos, ‘Introduction: Construction, Transmission Et Circulation Des 
Savoirs Géographiques Du Moyen Âge Au XIXe Siècle’, Cartes & Géomatique, 210 (2011), 11–17. 
30 Michel Foucault, L’Archéologie Du Savoir (Paris: Gallimard, 1969). 
31 Jeremy Crampton and Stuart Elden, eds., Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007). 
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of things” to highlight continuities and discontinuities in nineteenth-century and 
twentieth-century Borno.32 
The Europeans never neglected to gain more knowledge on their newly-
conquered-territories. Indeed, it will be demonstrated that geographical 
knowledge was particularly sought after by the Europeans whose political 
legitimacy partially derived from the territory and the spatial knowledge of 
Borno. 
In 1978, Edward Said stressed in the very first chapter of his book 
Orientalism that colonial knowledge was entirely subordinated to the imperial 
project.33 Using Said’s ideas, scholars of imperial India have often highlighted 
how the British captured precolonial knowledge to assert their rule. This thesis 
will re-assess the relationship between colonial knowledge and imperialism in 
Borno. It will attempt to show that colonial knowledge was not entirely at the 
service of colonial rule as it will highlight the complexity of the links between 
knowledge and power in colonial Borno. 
This thesis will analyse a specific kind of scholar in Africa. Indeed, the 
main subjects of this thesis were not professional anthropologists, ethnologists 
or historians but colonial officers. By focusing on Borno in modern-day Nigeria, 
this thesis will show the role of European colonial officers in the survival of an 
African precolonial territory during the colonial era (1902-1960). 
Furthermore, Max Weber’s ideas34 on the modern State also inform this 
research as this thesis will argue that the colonial and postcolonial State 
manipulated the territory of Borno to establish their power. Territorial 
legitimacy is thus key in the authority the colonial or postcolonial State is trying 
to establish. This research will consequently highlight the permanent exchange 
between territory and authority. In this sense, this dialectic is at the centre of the 
concept of statehood in colonial and postcolonial Nigeria. Weber’s work will be 
                                            
32 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: 
Routledge, 1970). 
33Edward Said, 'Knowing the Oriental' in Orientalism (London: Penguin, 2003), pp. 31–49. 
34 Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, International Library of Sociology and Social 
Reconstruction (Routledge & Kegan Paul) (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1947). 
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used to determine whether the bars of his “Iron Cage” were strong enough for the 
British and German colonisers to capture the legitimacy of nineteenth-century 
Borno. By focusing on the small territory of Dikwa a former part of German 
Kamerun, this thesis will reveal this relationship between territory and 
legitimacy. It will be suggested that the modernism of the colonial State can easily 
be exaggerated and that its power was still dependent on personal relationships 
rather than bureaucratic systems in Borno. The modern colonial state made the 
rational decision to appropriate the useful territorial legitimacy of Borno to suit 
its own ends. 
In 1998, James Scott’s book revealed the relative failure of most of the 
centralised and authoritarian attempts to control societies. His example of 
Nyerere’s Tanzania was supposed to prove that any attempt from the modern 
State to control societies was doomed to failure.35 Scott analysed how the State 
tried to make a society “legible”36 in order to control it. Strikingly, the author 
showed the “indispensable role of practical knowledge, informal processes and 
improvisation in the face of unpredictability”.37 This is exactly this path that this 
thesis will follow.38 Did the nineteenth-century kingdom of Borno try to control 
its territory? Did its colonial and postcolonial successors follow the same road? 
Could this thesis also try to apply some of Weber’s concepts on the 
modern State to colonial and postcolonial Borno? It is certain that the 
cartography of the territory was an endeavour of the colonial state to impose its 
authority. From the nineteenth to the twenty-first century, maps of Borno have 
embodied this relationship between the State and the territory. This thesis will 
thus explore their relevance to assess the history of spatiality in Borno. 
                                            
35 James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). For his chapter on Tanzania, see Scott, Seeing 
Like a State, pp.223-261. 
36 Scott, Seeing Like a State, p.2. 
37 Scott, Seeing Like a State, p.6. 
38 In a very different context, Keith Breckenridge analysed the attempt of the Ghanaian State to 
control the country’s economy by introducing the “world’s first biometrically regulated money 
supply”. See Keith Breckenridge, ‘The World’s First Biometric Money: Ghana’s e-Zwich and the 
Contemporary Influence of South African Biometrics’, Africa: The Journal of the International 
African Institute, 80 (2010), 642-662. 
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It will be suggested that Weber’s ideas on Western-style bureaucracy 
could also be applicable in Northern Nigeria. Indeed, origins of territorial 
practices of modern-day Nigeria can be found in the attempts of control initiated 
by the colonial State. By consequence, one of the aims of this thesis is to excavate 
the origin of these practices. The study of borders and territoriality will thus 
interrogate the origins of statehood and territorial practices in modern-day 
Nigeria. 
The primary sources analysed in this thesis are marked by their 
unevenness. It is necessary to acknowledge the imbalance between the colonial 
period and the rest of the study with far more sources being available for the 
1890s to the 1950s compared to other periods. It should be noted that the very 
richness of the documentation available for the colonial era proves the point that 
the study of Borno should not be limited to its precolonial past. 
If there is a certain unevenness between primary sources, the same can be 
said about the secondary sources for this study. On the one hand, material about 
Borno is quite rare or difficult to obtain, whereas on the other hand, English or 
French secondary sources on the Nigerian borders is widely available. 
It is true that very few historians have tried to investigate colonial Borno 
as most of them focused on its precolonial past. However, writing that the 
colonial historiography of Borno is non-existent would not be correct either. 
Many historians currently working at the University of Maiduguri have chosen to 
analyse the colonial history of Borno. For example, Yakubu Mukhtar tried to 
assess the transformation of the Bornoan economy during the colonial period.39 
Ibrahim Waziri also evaluated the changing economy of the Northern Nigerian 
province.40 In general, the Borno Museum Society Newsletter edited by Gisela 
Seidensticker-Brikay is renewing the historiography on Borno. 
                                            
39 Yakubu Mukhtar, ‘Trade, Merchants and the State in Borno c.1893-1939’  Unpublished PhD, 
SOAS, University of London, 1992). 
40 Ibrahim Waziri chose to focus his studies on specific commodities: Ibrahim Waziri, ‘Purchase 
and Export of Reptile Skins, 1932-1939: A Neglected Theme in the Study of Colonial Trade of 
Borno’, Educational Forum: A Journal of Educational Studies, 2004, 73-82 or Ibrahim Waziri and 
Muhammad Sani Imam, ‘Fish Production, Dried Fish or Banda and Dried Meat Marketing in Borno 
Province, 1919-1945’, Maiduguri Journal of Historical Studies, 3 (2005), 18-28. 
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Even if not dealing directly with Borno, the literature about the Nigerian 
borders is very developed. Two main themes of research about Nigerian 
boundaries emerged: the concepts of suffocation and dismemberment. The first 
one, suffocation, emphasised the populations who were grouped in the same 
Nigerian envelope. Pierre Englebert stressed how “suffocation” characterised 
national borders which encompassed heterogeneous and potentially hostile to 
each other ethnic groups.41 
The second one, “dismemberment” stressed the effects on the populations 
split by the European boundaries. By splitting homogenous ethnic groups in 
different countries, the colonial powers created meaningless states without any 
political, religious or socio-economic coherence. These general concepts 
influenced a general historiography about the African boundaries where the 
latter were generally depicted as being intellectual creations of European 
diplomats in their office.42 This approach was dubbed the “tea-and-macaroon” 
partition of Africa.43 
However, not every scholar believed in the sole “tea-and-macaroon” 
approach. As early as 1966, an article by Saadia Touval tried to assess the 
historicity of African borders.44 This thesis will be partly based on the same 
assumption that Africans were not passive in the creation of borders. The 
question of agency will thus be in the centre of this study. 
Moreover, part of this historiography compares the effects of colonisation 
on numerous countries. Therefore, a comparison between Nigeria and India was 
                                            
41 Pierre Engelbert, Stacy Tarango, and Matthew Carter, ‘Dismemberment and Suffocation: A 
Contribution to the Debate on African Boundaries’, Comparative Political Studies, 35 (2002), 
1093–1118. 
42 For a study of the French historical and political discourse about the artificiality of the African 
borders between 1940 and 1960, see Camille Lefebvre, ‘La Décolonisation D’un Lieu Commun. 
L’Artificialité des Frontières Africaines : un Legs Intellectuel Colonial Devenu Étendard de 
l’Anticolonialisme’, Revue d’Histoire Des Sciences Humaines, 24 (2011), 77-104 or Camille Lefebvre, 
‘We Have Tailored Africa: French Colonialism and the “artificiality” of Africa’s Borders in the 
Interwar Period’, Journal of Historical Geography, 37 (2011), 191-202. 
43 For a perfect illustration of this historical conception of the partition of Africa, see Garth 
Abraham, ‘Lines Upon Maps: Africa and The Sanctity of African Boundaries’, African Journal of 
International and Comparative Law, 15 (2007), 61-84. 
44 Saadia Touval, ‘Treaties, Borders, and the Partition of Africa’, The Journal of African History, 7 
(1966), 279-293. 
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possible as their boundaries were both the result of the British colonisation and 
each country had a Muslim majority living in the North. In 1978, Crawford Young 
analysed the effects of the British boundaries and compared the new states of 
Biafra and Pakistan and Bangladesh.45 Since Nigerian independence in 1960, 
these comparative and political approaches have been present in the study of the 
Nigerian boundaries particularly in Anthony Asiwaju’s numerous publications.46 
To a certain extent, these studies can explain the mechanisms behind the creation 
of borders. However, they tend to over-generalise their conclusions. 
These two general trends largely influenced the border studies in Nigeria. 
At the Nigerian scale, the first approaches to understand Nigerian boundaries 
were undertaken by a Nigerian historian, Joseph Anene47 in 1970 and by an 
American geographer, John Prescott48 in 1971. Both authors tried to understand 
the evolution of the Nigerian borders in their totality. Anene focused on 
diplomatic treaties whereas Prescott tackled the processes of allocation, 
delimitation and demarcation to understand the evolution of these boundaries 
from a technical point of view. These two general studies complement each other 
as they provide the creation of the borders with a precious historical and 
geographical background. However, these general studies were the last regarding 
Nigeria as a whole. Moreover, Anene only wrote a few paragraphs about Borno. 
As for Prescott, his study is not totally accurate as he trusted only a handful of 
diplomatic documents available in the British archives. Moreover, this first 
period of border studies in Nigeria corresponded to the independence of Nigeria. 
Quite understandably, scholars were interested in the origin of the “framework of 
an emergent nation” if one would like to paraphrase Anene.49 This thesis will be 
                                            
45 Crawford Young, The Politics of Cultural Pluralism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1976). 
46 Anthony Asiwaju and Peter Adeniyi, Borderlands in Africa: a Multidisciplinary and Comparative 
Focus on Nigeria and West Africa (Lagos: University of Lagos Press, 1989). 
47 Joseph Anene, The International Boundaries of Nigeria, 1885-1960: the Framework of an 
Emergent African Nation (New York: Humanities Press, 1970). 
48 John Prescott, The Evolution of Nigeria’s International and Regional Boundaries: 1861-1971 
(Vancouver: Tantalus Research, 1971). 
49 This subtitle clearly depicts Anene’s argument as the latter is clearly willing to foster a Nigerian 
national identity. See his introduction in Anene, The International Boundaries of Nigeria. For a 
more general historiographical context about Nigerian History, see Toyin Falola and Saheed 
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based on some material made available by these publications but will, however, 
try to avoid the nationalist tone of Anene and the technical point of view of 
Prescott. 
From the 1970s, Nigerian border studies adopted an ever more detailed 
focus on a regional scale. Indeed, in the 1970s, most studies about Nigerian 
boundaries have been undertaken at a segment-scale with studies on the Niger-
Nigeria and Benin-Nigeria boundaries. In 1975, Thom contradicted the idea that 
the boundaries were created haphazardly in Northern Nigeria as had supposedly 
been the case elsewhere in Africa.50 Indeed, Thom published a book which 
studied the origins of the border between Niger and Nigeria and revealed the 
modalities of the creation of this boundary by the European powers but also by 
the pre-European states. Before colonisation, the local populations were already 
divided by a boundary. Even if they belonged to the Hausa or Fulani ethnic 
groups, the populations living on the northern side of the boundary were those 
who had refused to be incorporated into the Sokoto Caliphate created by Usman 
dan Fodio’s jihad in the 1800s. Thus, Europeans from 1890 to 1906 adapted their 
boundary to this former limit created a century before. Thom demonstrated that 
far from being totally invented by the Europeans, the boundary between France 
and the United Kingdom was an actualization of a former border. This study 
constituted a seminal work not only for the study of the Northern Nigerian 
boundary but for the African boundaries in general. Paul Nugent also 
subsequently discovered that precolonial “geopolitical logic” was also taken into 
account in the creation of the Ghana-Togo border.51 This thesis will thus ask the 
same questions about the north-eastern borders of Nigeria. Did they follow a 
nineteenth-century pattern? 
In 1976, the early research on the Northern segment of Nigerian 
boundaries was supplemented by a comparative approach of the dismembered 
Yoruba ethnic group. The boundary created between 1885 and 1906 by the 
                                                                                                                             
Aderinto, Nigeria, Nationalism, and Writing History (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 
2010). 
50 Derrick Thom, The Niger-Nigeria Boundary 1890-1906: a Study of Ethnic Frontiers and a 
Colonial Boundary (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1975). 
51 Paul Nugent, Smugglers, Secessionists & Loyal Citizens on the Ghana-Togo Frontier: the Lie of the 
Borderlands Since 1914 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002), p. 46. 
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British and French authorities was studied by Anthony Asiwaju.52 This Nigerian 
scholar focused on the effect of the boundary on the populations on both sides of 
the border rather than its historicity. In his book, he stressed the heavier taxation 
and forced labour in French Dahomey which provoked Yoruba emigration to the 
British colony of Nigeria. Thus, this work underlined the artificial aspect of the 
newly created boundary which separated the Yoruba. However, Asiwaju did not 
only criticise the European boundaries but also studied the effects of the newly 
created boundary. He also compared British and French colonisation in 
Yorubaland, leading, thus, to a more inclusive colonial history. Asiwaju’s work 
can thus be considered as seminal in African border studies. William Miles used 
the same method when he stressed the differences between Hausa villages in 
Niger and Nigeria in 1994. 53  For Miles, the colonial border did have a 
demographic, institutional and economic impact on the Hausas. Though Miles 
studied postcolonial mentalities, writing about the effects of the borders still 
meant writing about the consequences of the British and French colonisation. 
This tendency to focus on a segment of the boundary was reinforced once 
most scholars narrowed their field of study to an aspect of border life. For 
example, John Collins in 1976 argued that the populations living along the border 
were using it in order to smuggle groundnut into Nigeria.54 For Collins, the 
border was not rejected but used by the population. It is possible to observe a 
multiplication of case-studies on various segments of the Nigerian boundaries. 
These studies are not isolated and tend to follow a general pattern across the 
continent. Boundary studies have a tendency to focus more on borderlands and 
underline the fact that these boundaries are accepted rather than criticised by 
the different populations. In their book African boundaries: barriers, conduits, and 
opportunities, historians Paul Nugent55 and Anthony Asiwaju56 clearly proved 
                                            
52 Anthony Asiwaju, Western Yorubaland Under European Rule, 1889-1945: a Comparative 
Analysis of French and British Colonialism, Ibadan History Series (London: Longman, 1976). 
53 William Miles, Hausaland Divided: Colonialism and Independence in Nigeria and Niger (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1994). 
54 John Collins, ‘The Clandestine Movement of Groundnuts Across the Niger-Nigeria Boundary’, 
Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines, 10 (1976), 259-278. 
55 Paul Nugent, ‘National Integration and the Vicissitudes of State Power in Ghana: the Political 
Incorporation of Likpe, a Border Community, 1945-1986’  Unpublished PhD: SOAS, University of 
London, 1991). 
28 
 
that borders could be used by African populations. Their other main argument 
was that postcolonial national identities also mattered. Being Nigerian or 
Beninese was thus also relevant. This thesis will follow their argument and will 
not take for granted that African populations either totally reject or accept 
colonial borders. By consequence, national identities should also be taken into 
account. 
In Nigeria, illegal trade, born with the boundary, benefits both Nigeriens 
and Nigerians as a study for Kano by Yahaya Hashim and Kate Meagher in 1999 
proves.57 An illegal borderland economy exists despite the discourse promoting 
regional integration in the Economic Community Of West African States 
(ECOWAS). Miles in 2005 referred to a feeling of “shared borderlandness” in the 
Nigerien village of Yekuwa and in the Nigerian village Yardaye which are thirteen 
kilometres apart.58 Thus despite having a different colonial and postcolonial 
history, populations in Hausaland still share a border with all the opportunities 
offered by it. Scholars stress the fact that more than separating people, these 
boundaries encourage development along them. Thus instead of dealing with 
spatial discontinuity, these studies emphasise the similarities between the 
populations when confronted to the border and how the border connects them. 
Identically, for the western Nigerian boundary, Flynn, who trained as an 
anthropologist, quoted a Nigerian man saying in 1997: “We are the border”.59 
Indeed, the boundary between Benin and Nigeria becomes “a corridor of 
opportunity”60 for all the gains available from the other side. Therefore, the 
boundary is not seen as an obstacle. Miles’s and Flynn’s studies consider the 
Nigerian boundaries at a local scale and confirm a tendency of Nigerian boundary 
studies to focus on a particular case study. Therefore, most boundary studies in 
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Nigeria are undertaken with methods borrowed from political sciences and 
anthropology and expand their focus from the boundary to the borderland. Thus, 
as Stephen Jones put it as early as 1945: “A boundary is much more than a line on 
a map. Boundary-making [is] not a science of lines but of regions”.61 Therefore, 
studying boundaries means studying entire borderlands including both sides of 
the border. 
Moreover, by only analysing precise case-studies, this borderland 
approach is more a comparative than a theoretical conceptualisation about the 
African boundaries. For example, Asiwaju compares the US-Mexico borderland 
and the Nigerian borderlands.62 He argues that the populations living along the 
Mexican border, the fronterizos, use and subvert it. For Asiwaju, the Nigerian and 
Mexican borders have some common points. Thus, the Nigerian boundaries 
which were first studied in a general colonial framework are now studied at a 
local scale with a more comparative approach. Most of these studies show that 
African boundaries are more accepted than criticised by the populations who 
share a certain “borderlandness”. Indeed, this shared feeling of belonging, creates 
at the same time a common identity for the “fronterizos” but also leads to the 
creation of different national identities. This apparent paradox could be 
considered as the key to understand borderlands in general. This dominant 
historiographic approach will be tackled with the question of the town of Dikwa 
which was once part of the German colony of Kamerun. However, what mainly 
constituted Borno in the nineteenth-century is nowadays in Nigeria. This thesis 
will not deny the importance of “borderlandness” and will especially focus on the 
historical relevance of the borders. 
Therefore, Nigerian boundaries can be understood as the legal basis for 
the creation of the Nigerian State as well as the “opportunities and conduits” for 
West African integration. This is the reason which makes a multi-scalar and 
comparative approach possible in the study of the role of the Nigerian 
boundaries. 
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However, this new interest in borderlands was not limited to Nigeria as 
other African borders were also the subject of enquiry. For example, Gregor 
Dobler analysed the border between Namibia and Angola and discovered that 
Ovamboland populations had a sense of territoriality before the European 
colonisation.63 The list of case-studies could be long but it could be worth 
noticing that historical and especially economic border studies have been 
flourishing in the last decade. The creation of the African Borderland Research 
Network (ABORNE) in 2007 in Edinburgh follows this logic.64 
In addition, a last phenomenon can explain the rise of border studies in 
Nigeria as a conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria aroused interest in this 
particular boundary’s history. Thus, in the 1990s and the 2000s, numerous 
scholars chose to study the origins of this dispute for the Bakassi peninsula. 
Along with a historiography considering the border as bringing “opportunities 
and conflicts”65, a whole diplomatic and legal history studied the Cameroon-
Nigeria boundary on its own. The interest in Bakassi in particular led to 
numerous articles on the origin and delimitation of the boundary.66 However, 
this historiography did not concern the “borderlandness” described above. Was it 
because Bakassi was a very wealthy peninsula that an idea of shared identity 
could not be analysed on both sides of the border? 
Furthermore, the question of maritime boundaries became important in 
the case of the dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon. Akintola-Arikawe argued 
that as early as the end of the 1970s, Nigeria was interested in the question of the 
delimitation of its maritime boundary and claimed a 200 miles Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ).67 Thus, the Bakassi conflict led to a new wave of legal 
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research on issues which beforehand had concerned historians, geographers and 
anthropologists. This legal approach to the Bakassi dispute was reinforced by the 
fact that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) had to settle the case. The latter 
(1994-2008) provoked an inflation of research and commentaries on the viability 
of the Bakassi and African boundaries in general.68 Scholars interested in political 
science focused again on Nigeria and its neighbours.69 This research will 
obviously benefit from the material made available by these studies but will not 
directly follow the legal aspects of the dispute. Indeed, most of these studies use 
historical sources as legal evidence against political opponents. Some arguments 
about the sovereignty of Bakassi and the Cameroonian-Nigerian border could 
thus be inadequate for a historical study. 
While this introduction has primarily attempted to retrace the evolution 
of the English-speaking scholarship about Nigeria, it should be noted that French-
speaking academics did not exactly follow the same pattern. For historical 
reasons, only a handful of French scholars have developed an interest in Nigeria. 
Moreover, as most borders were colonial creations, many French sciences sociales 
academics with a strong anti-colonial tradition criticised these boundaries. 
Border studies were in appearance more politicised when the new African states 
became independent. The French perception of the boundaries as being artificial 
prevented any further discussion about their origins and their political influence 
in the newly independent states. Thus, a general discourse about the colonial 
African borders had an influence on the study of the boundaries in particular. 
This political approach to African boundaries is still present in the historiography 
and constitutes a permanent framework for the discussion about the African 
boundaries as they are held responsible for many of the problems of the “Third 
World” in general. For many 1950s and 1960s French geographers, international 
borders only cut through pre-existing ethnic and cultural boundaries. In other 
words, for academic and political reasons, French geographers were interested in 
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cultural spaces or terroirs. 70  Studying the African national borders was 
tantamount to neo-colonialism. This perception of the African boundaries in 
general is more a political perception than a historical one and it can be 
suggested that this theory gives more credence to the idea of African 
exceptionalism.71 
The interest in international borders was however renewed by the French 
school of geopolitics spearheaded by Yves Lacoste.72 It was not under a historical 
but under a geopolitical or geographical angle that these borders were analysed. 
In 1988, geographer Michel Foucher published his comparative book called 
Fronts et Frontières.73 In a typically French attempt to write a Universal 
Geography, Foucher tried to compare the origin of the African borders and put 
them into perspective at a world scale. 
French historians were less interested in the question of the borders than 
geographers. However, in 1975, Daniel Nordman analysed the borders in 
Northern Africa in his PhD.74 In 1981, Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch tried to 
renew scholarship on the history of the African borders.75 Her attempts to write 
about the history of the African borders were completed by her joint UNESCO 
publication of 1999 with Boubacar Barry.76 In 1996, Burkina Faso’s borders were 
also analysed by Pierre Claver Hien.77 Even if not totally depoliticised the 
question of the borders of Africa could become historical again. Thus, under the 
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impulse of geographic and geopolitical discourse, a new revisionist and historical 
discourse about the African borders is currently being developed in French 
historiography. The project “FrontAfrique” created in Paris in 2006 is the proof of 
the vitality of border studies.78 For example, Camille Lefebvre studied the history 
of the Nigerien boundaries in her thesis and revealed the spatial origins of the 
Nigerien State.79 In 2011, Simon Imbert-Vier analysed the borders of Djibouti and 
examined how the French invented this country.80 Similarly, I analysed the 
boundaries of the secessionist State of Biafra (1967-1970) for my Masters.81 It 
was argued that the borders of the Biafran State were genuine colonial 
inventions which became so widely accepted that the Biafran insurgents felt that 
they could become the borders of their new state. Research on the borders and 
territory of Borno was thus a logical step which would assess the survival of the 
borders of Borno within Nigeria.  
This thesis also attempted to tackle the literature of the other side of the 
Bornoan borders. In Nigerien historiography, only Zakari Maïkorema has 
contributed to the history of the border populations in the south-east of the 
country.82 Two factors contribute to the academic isolation of this region: the 
sparse population of this area and the geographic distance from the capital, 
Niamey. On the Cameroonian side of the border, the situation is radically 
different. With a much denser population and an active academic community, the 
Extreme-Nord is more widely studied than the Nigerien south-east. Scholars such 
as Saïbou Issa at the University of Maroua have developed a full interest in the 
history of the border regions. More specifically, Abdouraman Halirou analysed 
the question of the borders of the Extreme-Nord.83 Thus, it will be possible to 
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compare these studies with the Nigerian analyses in order to obtain a clear 
picture of the Bornoan borders. 
 
Chapter Summaries 
 
 As the main point of this thesis was to demonstrate the continuity of the 
spatial framework of Borno, a chronological division was adopted to analyse a 
200 year period. Thus, this thesis was divided into six chapters which closely 
follow the political history of Borno. 
 The first chapter will deal with the spatial framework of Borno from 1810 
to its invasion by Rabih, in 1893. Its main argument is that Borno had a relatively 
structured territorial framework in the nineteenth century. Contrary to Jeffrey 
Herbst’s assumption that political domination was not territorial in precolonial 
Africa,84 this first chapter emphasises the territorial singularity of Borno by 
analysing its borders and the spatial structure of the kingdom. It will be argued 
that Borno was a bounded territory with a codified relationship with its vassal 
states. The chapter will try to establish a conceptual framework for the territory 
of Borno. 
 The second chapter deals with foreign invasions at the end of the 
nineteenth century. In 1893, Borno was invaded by Rabih, a Sudanese warlord 
and then in turn from 1899 to 1902 by the French, the British and the Germans. It 
will be suggested that every time an invader sought to occupy Borno, they reused 
the nineteenth-century spatial framework to legitimise their conquest. Similarly, 
the Europeans had to put the former reigning family of Borno, the Kanemi, on the 
throne to occupy Borno. Thus, Rabih’s invasion and the Scramble for Africa did 
not totally destroy the borders and territory of Borno. Very pragmatically, the 
Europeans reused it. 
The third chapter will analyse the early colonial period in Borno from the 
actual beginning of colonisation in 1902 to the First World War. This chapter will 
investigate how the Germans treated their part of Borno as a duplicate of core of 
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the kingdom of Borno. It will be argued that the British also recycled the 
structure of Borno to turn it into one of the Northern Nigerian provinces. This 
provincialisation led to a permanent redefinition of the regional Bornoan borders 
as the British administration was eager to recreate Borno within its nineteenth-
century borders. This chapter thus deals with another form of pragmatism within 
the colony of Northern Nigeria. It will be suggested that the British needed the 
borders and territory of Borno to implement Indirect Rule in Northern Nigeria. 
 The fourth chapter deals with the permanent reconstruction of the 
territory of Borno by the British officials from the beginning of colonial rule in 
1902 to the end of colonisation in 1960. It will be argued that the British colonial 
officers intellectually recreated the kingdom of Borno in their double position as 
scholars and administrators of Borno. This chapter will suggest that the interest 
in precolonial Borno in general had a direct consequence on the way colonial 
Borno was administered. In other words, colonial officials tried to recycle the 
territory of Borno after the image they had contributed to create. 
 The fifth chapter of this study focuses on the north-eastern part of Borno 
which was under German colonial rule. This small area known as the Emirate of 
Dikwa became a League of Nations Mandate in 1921 within a part of the German 
colony of Kamerun called Northern Cameroons. The British never ceased to 
consider the Emirate of Dikwa as Borno and therefore as Nigeria. Once again, the 
British desired to rebuild Borno as it was before the colonisation. Here 
pragmatism is fundamental if one wants to understand the British policy. Their 
final aim was to annex the Emirate of Dikwa and Northern Cameroons within 
Nigeria. Thus the territory of Borno was used to pursue territorial objectives at a 
colonial level. This chapter will study the two plebiscites of 1959 and 1961 which 
ultimately led to the reunification of Borno. 
 Finally, the sixth and last chapter analyses postcolonial Borno and the 
transformation of the territory and borders of Borno within independent Nigeria. 
Firstly, the federal fragmentation of Nigeria will be analysed as the latter led to 
the creation and to the division of the State of Borno respectively in 1976 and 
1991. Thus, the provincial framework created by the British was consecutively 
recycled and then destroyed by the Nigerian government. Consequently, the 
spatial identity studied in the previous chapters is evolving into a cultural 
phenomenon at the onset of the twenty-first century. 
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1. The Boundaries and Territory of Borno in the 
Nineteenth Century (1810-1893) 
 
1.1. Conceptualising a precolonial African space 
 
In the nineteenth century, when describing polities in Western Africa, 
European explorers and scholars often tended to enumerate their numerous 
deficiencies: statelessness, the lack of an organised army or the absence of 
precise borders. Obviously, these categorical classifications were often influenced 
by the European-centred vision of what a genuine polity should be or should aim 
at. 
A more recent scholarly tradition has emphasised the different 
conceptions of statehood present in Africa before colonisation. For example, to 
understand Igbo precolonial societies, one has to analyse the religious and 
cultural ties existing between the various Igbo communities.1 In other words, in a 
stateless society, cultural links are more important than political ones as Afigbo 
argued in 1972.2 South of Borno, the Chamba did not have a notion of a bounded 
territory as Richard Fardon wrote in 1988: “they only saw the world at eye 
level”.3 
However, not all the ethnic groups of 2010 Nigeria were cultural rather 
than political communities in the nineteenth century. In modern-day southern 
Nigeria, city-states were an example of organised polities having the potential to 
become larger-scale kingdoms such as sixteenth-century Benin. The case of the 
Hausa-Fulani city-states conquered and unified by the caliphate of Sokoto is the 
largest example of state creation in nineteenth-century Africa. Thus, Borno as a 
state was no exception in nineteenth-century Western Africa.  
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Raising the question of boundaries and statehood in nineteenth-century 
Africa can thus lead to the view that African polities did not differ from European 
states before the colonisation. Such a statement seems to contradict Afrocentrist 
scholarship. Indeed, if a European-centred view of the world prevailed in the 
nineteenth century and during the colonisation, an Afrocentrist perception of 
Africa was the work of postcolonial African historians such as Cheikh Anta Diop.4 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the perception of Borno as an authentic 
African State without any Afrocentrist perception. 
Dierk Lange in a long essay published in 1984 found the origins of the 
Bornoan State in sixth-century Kanem.5 He also mentioned that Kanem-Borno 
was territorially organised without giving more details. The lack of historical 
evidence should not hide the fact that such a spatial structure evolved 
throughout the history of Kanem-Borno. Moreover, this organisation of Borno 
during the nineteenth century, even if based on a previous framework, was still 
evolving. Thus, the picture of the spatial organisation of Borno in the nineteenth 
century should not be static. 
 
1.1.1. Boundaries and Bornoan Statehood 
When El-Kanemi rose to power after the Fulani jihad, he did not 
reorganise the ancient kingdom of the Sayfawa dynasty territorially: he only tried 
to insert his men in the existing framework of the Sayfawa territorial fiefs, the 
chima chidibe.6 Indeed, according to Dierk Lange, it would be possible to call the 
Sayfawa kingdom a centralised state as early as in the sixteenth century.7 
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Ronald Cohen argued that the main political organisation of nineteenth-
century Borno was based on personal relationship and that El-Kanemi initiated a 
more formal patron-client relationship.8 Indeed, Africanist scholarship frequently 
focused on personal links between rulers and subjects rather than administrative 
or territorial organisation of kingdoms. Anthropologists and sociologists often 
referred to the role of lineages in African polities. Ethnologist Barrie Sharpe 
emphasised how this perception of African societies had a strong consequence on 
scholarly literature of northern Nigeria.9 This could be considered as an 
anthropological bias.10 However, this chapter does not intend to contradict this 
conception of nineteenth-century Borno. The associational fiefs, the chima jilibe 
were arguably the most important ones as Louis Brenner argued.  
In 2000, Sara Berry published a book revealing that at a local scale chiefs 
knew the boundaries of their domains in Asante.11 Twenty-five years before, Ivor 
Wilks had already suggested that this analysis could be applied to the whole 
kingdom in the nineteenth century.12 Could it be possible to argue the same at the 
scale of the Bornoan State? Questionably, Borno was different from Asante. 
However, this section will try to demonstrate that a conceptual territorial 
framework also existed in nineteenth-century Borno. 
Rather than contradictory, this vision of territoriality is complementary. 
Murray Last described the existing territorial framework as a system directly 
inherited from the Sayfawa dynasty reusing the quadrant system of the kings or 
mais of Borno.13 Thus, the territory of Borno was divided into four subdivisions 
representing the four cardinal points. Each territory had at their head an officer. 
According to Herbert Palmer, the North was supposedly the territory of the 
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Yerima, the South being for the Kaigama, the East for the Mustrema and the West 
for the Galadima.14 These territories were considered as fiefs for the mais and the 
Shehus of Borno after 1810. However, as Last mentioned, we still have little idea 
to what extent El-Kanemi was dominating the whole territory of Borno after the 
Fulani jihad. Was he only at the head of a personal principality as Last suggested, 
or did he totally overthrow the power of the mai?15 This process which may have 
been longer than Brenner suggested is not very well documented.  
Oral history and European explorers’ narratives only retain El-Kanemi’s 
irresistible rise to power. In this version of early nineteenth-century history, El-
Kanemi assumed power in the 1810s without any competition from the Sayfawa 
mai Dunama before 1820.16 The Shehu was not a usurper but a saviour. However, 
the competition between the ruling dynasty of the Sayfawa would not end before 
the middle of the nineteenth century. Brenner documented how El-Kanemi 
created a new dynasty but the transition between the Sayfawa and the Kanemi 
dynasty does not appear as clear-cut as thought previously.17 
Thus, even if not in great number, nineteenth-century sources dealing 
with the spatial structure of Borno exist. Letters exchanged between the Sultan of 
Sokoto and the Shehu of Borno during the 1810s are an often-quoted example of 
diplomatic correspondence between African rulers before the colonisation.18 
Secondly, a few letters exchanged between the Ottoman authorities in Fezzan, 
Tripoli, Istanbul and Borno are also available. Thirdly, Kanuri descriptions of 
Borno were recorded by a German linguist, Sigismund Koelle in Sierra Leone.19 
Finally, the European explorers’ narratives also examine the question of the 
territory and borders of Borno. 
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15 Last, ‘Le Califat De Sokoto Et Borno’, 599-646. 
16 At this date, mai Dunama and king Burgomanda of Bagirmi plotted to get rid of El-Kanemi. This 
foreign intervention in Bornoan politics was a failure and mai Dunama was replaced by mai 
Ibrahim. See Brenner. 
17 Brenner, The Shehus of Kukawa, p. 18. 
18 Elizabeth Isichei, A History of African Societies to 1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), pp. 318-320. 
19 For a precise description of Koelle’s linguistic work see Thomas Geider, ‘The Universe of 
Kanuri Oral Literature and Documentary Texts’, in Advances in Kanuri Scholarship, ed. by Norbert 
Cyffer and Thomas Geider  Ko ln: Ru diger Ko ppe, 1997), pp. 157-224. 
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1.1.2. The Sokoto-Borno correspondence 
 
The Fulani jihadists of Sokoto, led by Usman dan Fodio tried to conquer 
Borno in 1808. They partly succeeded. They burnt the capital, N’Gazagarmo and 
defeated the main army of the mai of Borno. The latter called for the help of El-
Kanemi to repel his Hausa-Fulani opponents. Son of a Kanembu father and an 
Arab mother, El-Kanemi was a Muslim scholar born in Murzuq in modern-day 
Libya who already had a large religious following when he assisted the mai of 
Borno. El-Kanemi was a learned-man who had undertaken a pilgrimage to Mecca. 
He waged this war not only with weapons but also with letters as he desired to 
thwart dan Fodio’s jihad with the same ideological weapons which had been used 
to create the Sokoto Caliphate. 
The correspondence of Dan Fodio has been under the scrutiny of scholars 
for many years. As a Muslim scholar and a military leader, his correspondence 
with the Shehu of Borno created a religious rivalry between the two learned men, 
a rivalry which still exists in 2010 between their descendants.20 However, these 
letters did not only deal with religion. They also focused on the delimitation of 
territory between both polities as they established precise boundaries and buffer 
zones. 
We profess the same religion, and it is not fitting that our subjects 
should make war on each other. Between our kingdoms are the 
pagan Bedde tribes, on whom it is permissible to levy 
contribution: let us respect this limit: what lies to the east of their 
country shall be ours: what lies to the west shall be yours. As for 
Muniyo, Damagaram and Daura, they will continue to be vassals 
of the Sultan of Bornu, who in return will surrender to you all his 
claims to Gobir and Katsina.21 
                                            
20 The bibliography dealing with Usman dan Fodio is very rich: see for example, M. Hiskett, The 
Sword of Truth the Life and Times of the Shehu Usuman Dan Fodio, 2nd edn (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press,, 1994) and Murray Last, The Sokoto Caliphate (London: Longman, 
1977). For a more recent analysis, see Seyni Moumouni, Vie Et uvre Du Cheik Uthm n Dan Fodio 
1754-1817: De l’Islam Au Soufisme (Paris: Harmattan, 2008). 
21 Letter from the Sultan of Sokoto to the Sultan of Borno in Palmer, p. 269. 
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 Thus, boundaries were easily imaginable between Muslim states in central 
and western Africa in the nineteenth century. Different rulers had been able to 
demarcate their own territory since at least the sixteenth century when the Mai 
of Borno Idris Alooma negotiated a boundary agreement with the Ottomans.22 
Thus, boundaries as lines between different central African polities are not 
recent. 
Moreover, historian Richard Shain proved that the Sokoto Caliphate had a 
genuine spatial policy when the jihadists invaded the Middle Benue region in 
modern-day Nigeria.23 Indeed, the conquerors modified the spatial structures of 
the Apa regional identity. Before the conquest, the latter “lacked identifiable 
boundaries and a spatial focal point.”24 After the Fulani invasion, the Apa space 
was reconfigured along Islamic lines were cities and trade networks became 
preponderant. Thus, a genuine sense of territoriality existed in what would 
become Northern Nigeria. 
Borders and space could thus be manipulated by Islamic states. For 
example, the Bornoan borders with ethnic groups practising an African 
traditional religion were also defined neatly as between the Bedde and Borno. 
The respect of these boundaries was essential in an international political context 
as a letter from Shehu Umar of Borno to Muazz ben Mohammed Bello of Sokoto 
demonstrates: 
We have to inform you that our son Abu Bakr, has notified us 
of the outbreak of disturbances between him and your 
Minister, the Lord of Katagum, in the matter of the 
boundaries which exist between us and you; and if you 
confirm what the two agreed upon, and if you are satisfied 
with it, then the matter is settled, and the torrent has 
receded to its source. Now if Allah the Exalted wills, there 
                                            
22 Bawuro Barkindo, ‘Kanem-Borno: Its Relations with the Mediterranean Sea, Bagirmi and Other 
States in the Chad Basin’, in UNESCO General History of Africa: Africa from the Sixteenth to the 
Eighteenth Century, ed. by Bethwell Ogot (Oxford: James Currey, 1999), 248-258. 
23Richard Shain, ‘The Salt That Binds: The Historical Geography of a Central Nigerian Regional 
Identity’, in The Spatial Factor in African History: The Relationship of the Social, Material, and 
Perceptual, ed. by Allen Howard and Richard Shain (Leiden: Brill, 2005), pp. 245-259. 
24 Shain, ‘The Salt That Binds: The Historical Geography of a Central Nigerian Regional Identity’, 
p. 248. 
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shall be from our side nothing but good, and reliance on the 
treaty, and security upon the former basis.25 
 According to the Islamic law, the differentiation between Muslim states is 
not possible. As believers of the same faith, the Bornoans and their Muslim 
neighbours belong to the community of believers, the umma.26 This argument can 
explain the strict separation between Borno and the Bedde who were not even 
dhimmī, people of the Book. This could justify why the two Muslim states 
belonging to dâr al-Islâm used this pagan region of dâr al-harb as a buffer zone 
between them. Based on religious conceptions of the world, the legal differences 
between regions were the justification of the possible contributions leaders could 
levy. However, this legal notion existed more between people than between 
territories.27 The Bedde territory became a reservoir of slaves for this reason. 
This example would tend to show that both Borno and Sokoto had a frontier 
policy concerning the pagan regions. Thus, they tended to consider the borders of 
their respective territory as being the borders of Islam.  
However, the fact that these boundaries coincided was an example of a 
pragmatic frontier policy. In the Sokoto caliphate, all the foreigners, including the 
non-Muslim Hausa, giving their allegiance to the Caliph were considered as 
dhimmī.28 In other words, the borders of the Muslim community of believers, the 
jamâ'a, were irrelevant for Sokoto. Indeed, their shared Islamic faith did not 
prevent Borno and Sokoto from creating stable borders through diplomatic 
treaties where a majority of Muslims lived. Yet, border skirmishes such as the 
one appearing in the last letter were not uncommon and it was still necessary to 
exchange letters to obtain “security” in the borderland.  
By consequence, it would be possible to argue that Sokoto and Borno 
respected the Islamic laws concerning dâr al-harb. As for dâr al-Islâm, both 
                                            
25 A. D. H. Bivar, ‘Arabic Documents of Northern Nigeria’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and 
African Studies, University of London, 22 (1959), 324-349 (333). 
26 John Trimingham, Islam in West Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), p. 139 quoted by 
Robert Smith, ‘Peace and Palaver: International Relations in Pre-Colonial West Africa’, The Journal 
of African History, 14 (1973), 599-621 (612). 
27 Hiroyuki Yanagihashi, The Concept of Territory in Islamic Law and Thought (London: Kegan 
Paul International, 2000). 
28 Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 67. 
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polities divided their territories along the fault lines of the Fulani jihad. The 
military frontier of the beginning of the nineteenth century played this role. 
Encroachments on the border could lead to other treaties and correspondence 
between the rulers. As a result, the two Muslim polities did not reserve a special 
treatment of each other when negotiating between themselves.  
Rivalries between Muslim polities were often stressed in Northern Africa 
as most authors underlined the paradoxical situation of a Muslim state claiming 
its universal link with the umma while pursuing an aggressive conquest agenda 
against other Muslim states. When Usman dan Fodio attacked Borno, his main 
justification was that he wanted to reform lax Muslims. Thus, facing a Muslim 
opponent did not prevent El-Kanemi from counter-attacking on the same 
religious basis. The ideological battle between both leaders proved that dan 
Fodio’s casus belli against Borno lacked religious grounds. 
Thus, Borno’s territory was defined in diplomatic terms. Indeed, official 
correspondence sanctioned the evolution of a military frontier between Sokoto 
and Borno. This boundary, as proved by the 1877 letter was precise enough to 
enable Borno to formally complain about Sokoto’s encroachment.29 Obviously, 
the degree of accuracy of such a border is always debatable and correspondence 
between both polities must have contained discussion about the different 
possible interpretations of the boundary. The lack of primary sources prevents 
this argument from being more categorical. 
Nonetheless, Borno organised its frontier policy on its western border for 
two reasons, the presence of the caliphate of Sokoto and the existence of the 
galadima. Firstly, a fief-holder, the galadima was the title officially given to the 
man in charge of what could be considered as a march for Borno.30 His presence 
on the western border of the kingdom showed the historical importance of this 
borderland. In addition, the fact that El-Kanemi had to subdue him twice 
demonstrates the strategic role of the western borderland for the rulers of Borno. 
Kachellas, military leaders of servile origin, were also posted along the 
                                            
29 Bivar, 'Arabic documents of Northern Nigeria', p. 333. 
30 Bala Usman and Nur Alkali, Studies in the History of Pre-colonial Borno (Zaria: Northern 
Nigerian Publishing, 1983). 
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boundaries to assure the security of Borno. For instance, in 1835, El-Kanemi 
posted three kachellas to the western provinces of Gujba, Biriri and Borsari.31 
Hence, the Shehu of Borno managed his boundaries through galadimas and 
kachellas from the capital. 
Indeed, the proximity of Kano and the Sokoto Caliphate forced the 
Kanemis to organise their frontier policy as Sokoto could be considered as 
Borno’s main enemy in the nineteenth century before the arrival of Rabih in 
1893. The absence of organised states waging war across the northern and 
southern boundary was one of the reasons justifying this focus on western 
frontier policy. 
It would be by consequence difficult to argue that the western boundary 
of Borno was a clear-cut boundary line during the nineteenth century. However, 
this section argues that boundary-making between two Western Sudanese 
polities was not uncommon. The El-Kanemi dynasty had a genuine frontier-policy 
to control this boundary and have it respected by their neighbours. 
When considering Borno’s boundaries, one needs to examine the 
relationship with the Sokoto tributary, the Adamawa Emirate and the degree of 
control that Borno exercised over its southern territories. 
The Adamawa Emirate was officially an extension of the Sokoto Caliphate 
as Usman dan Fodio had given a banner to Modibbo Adama. In 1809, the latter 
tried to conquer Mandara and after his failure established himself in Yola.32 The 
different rulers of Adamawa enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy from the 
Caliph of Sokoto. Diplomatic correspondence between the ruler of Adamawa and 
Borno was never discovered. Is it because the documents contained information 
which revealed the ambiguous diplomacy led by the rulers of Adamawa? Far 
from the centre of the Sokoto Caliphate, were they leading a semi-autonomous 
policy? Did these documents simply not survive the European colonisation? 
                                            
31 Brenner, The Shehus of Kukawa, p. 72. 
32 Sa'ad Abubakar, The L mīb e of Fombina: a Political History of Adamawa, 1809-1901 (Zaria: 
Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1977), Martin Njeuma, Introduction to the History of Cameroon: 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989) and Eldridge Mohammadou, 
Peuples Et Royaumes Du Foumbina (Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of 
Asia and Africa, 1983). 
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Indeed, ‘neutral territories’ stood between Borno and Adamawa. As in the 
previous example of the territory of Bedde, relatively small buffer-states were 
used by the rulers of Borno to maintain a stable borderland and to provide 
slaves. This other type of frontier policy was implemented throughout the 
nineteenth century as the Europeans’ narratives proved. 
 
1.2. Borno as a Nineteenth-Century State? 
1.2.1.  Borno as a European Medieval Kingdom 
 
How would it be possible to argue that Borno was a territory in the 
nineteenth century without understanding its internal structure? The existing 
divisions of Borno have already been studied by Palmer and Alkali.33 Their 
analyses asserted the territorial complexity of this relatively centralised state. 
The vocabulary used to describe nineteenth-century African polities was often 
borrowed from European medieval terms. Chrétien already noticed this 
phenomenon in nineteenth-century Eastern Africa.34 The Eurocentric perception 
of the world in the nineteenth century could be perceived as the main reason for 
the use of this medieval lexicon. For example, Borno was supposed to be divided 
into fiefs and ruled over vassals such as Zinder. The education of the European 
sailors, explorers and missionaries who first described the African polities could 
be partially held responsible for this perception. The nineteenth century can be 
seen as the century for the rediscovery of the Middle-Ages.35  Moreover, 
nineteenth-century analysts tended to perceive Sub-Saharan African polities as 
being at an early stage of development. This Hegelian perception of African 
history partly justified the European colonisation of Africa.36 However, would it 
                                            
33 Palmer, The Bornu Sahara and Sudan, p. 159 and Bala Usman and Nur Alkali, Studies in the 
History of Pre-colonial Borno (Zaria: Northern Nigerian Publishing, 1983), pp. 101-127. 
34  Jean-Pierre Chretien, ‘Vocabulaires Et Concepts Tirés De La Féodalité Occidentale Et 
Administration Indirecte En Afrique Orientale’, in Science De L’homme Et Conquête Coloniale. 
Constitution Et Usages Des Sciences Humaines En Afrique, ed. by Daniel Nordmann and Jean-Pierre 
Raison  Paris: Presses de l’Ecole Normale Superieure, 1980), pp. 47-64. 
35 Personal communication with Ian Wood: 29/09/2009. 
36 Georg Hegel, The Philosophy of History (New York: Cosimo, Inc., 2007), p. 93. 
46 
 
be possible for this reason to totally disqualify the usage of European medieval 
terms to describe nineteenth-century African polities? To what extent was this 
description appropriate? 
Textbooks and essays written about African history often use these 
medieval terms. For example, Iliffe in Africans mentions the chivalry of Borno: 
“Perhaps, like their counterparts in France, the chivalry of Borno came to see 
firearms as the grave of honour.”37 Brenner, Kirk-Greene, Last, Alkali and Tijani 
recognise that these terms were borrowed from European languages, however, 
they also stress that they corresponded somehow to nineteenth-century Bornoan 
realities.38 In Kanuri, the concepts of vassals and fiefs exist and correspond to a 
certain extent to the European concepts. This analysis of the Bornoan territorial 
structure is completed by the linguistic study undertaken by Koelle in the 
nineteenth century. This linguist from Württemberg was sent as a missionary to 
Sierra Leone in 1847 by the Church Missionary Society. He collected information 
from Kanuri freed slaves about their culture, history and grammar in two 
books.39 He revealed that a word such as “border”, dategaram already existed in 
nineteenth-century Borno. 40  Koelle also recorded oral history from his 
informants who stressed the struggles of the “kings” of Sokoto and Borno and the 
role of the “priest” El-Kanemi who opposed the Fulani and became “Sheik”, Shehu 
of Borno.41 
This would tend to show that the usage of European medieval terms, if not 
adequate, is not too far from the nineteenth-century geopolitical realities of 
Borno. This short analysis does not intend to dismiss the fact that the Europeans 
                                            
37 John Iliffe, Africans: The History of a Continent, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), p. 77. 
38 I personally interviewed these scholars in 2009 and 2010; Louis Brenner: 15/12/2009, 
Anthony Kirk-Greene: 04/05/2010, Murray Last: 04/05/2010, Nur Alkali: 8/07/2010 and Kyari 
Tijani: 8/07/2010. 
39 Sigismund Koelle, Kanuri Grammar (London: Church Missionary House, 1854) and Sigismund 
Koelle, African Native Literature, or Proverbs, Tales, Fables, and Historical Fragments in the Kanuri 
or Bornu Language. To Which Are Added a Translation of the Above and a Kanuri-English 
Vocabulary (London: Church Missionary House, 1854). 
40 Koelle, African Native Literature, p. 279. 
41 Koelle, African Native Literature, pp. 237–41. 
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had a biased perception of Borno. However, their own understanding of Borno 
corresponded to a certain extent to the Bornoan realities.  
 
1.2.2. Enter the Europeans 
In the nineteenth century, many European expeditions aimed at 
discovering Borno for three main reasons. Firstly, the Europeans wanted to visit 
the kingdom of Borno to establish diplomatic and commercial ties with the 
Shehu. Secondly, the Lake Chad area was arousing interest among geographers 
and explorers willing to reach and “discover” the lake’s shores. Finally, the 
Europeans intended to obtain scientific information about the fauna, flora and 
mineral resources of the region. 
This interest in the kingdom of Borno comes from the Arabic oral and 
written sources which depicted the kingdom of Kanem-Borno as a rich and 
influential central African kingdom. Indeed, since its conversion to Islam in the 
eleventh century, the kingdom of Kanem-Borno has been linked to the Islamic 
world through trade, pilgrimage and diplomatic correspondence.42 In 1850, the 
British explorer, James Richardson rejoiced when he reached Borno and 
perceived a territory of sharply defined boundaries. 
When we reached the camping-ground a pleasant 
announcement was made. We were at length upon Bornou soil! 
I could hardly believe my ears. Oh, marvel, after all our dangers 
and misgivings! Thanks to Almighty God for deliverance from 
the hands of lawless tribes! I shall never forget the sensation 
with which I learned that I was at length really in Bornou, and 
that the robber Tuarick was in very truth definitively left 
behind.43 
Thus, Borno was the main objective of a consequent number of 
expeditions which were funded by the European governments and in particular 
                                            
42 Correspondence with the Ottoman Sultan quoted by Palmer, The Bornu Sahara and Sudan, p. 
269. 
43 James Richardson and Bayle St. John, Narrative of a Mission to Central Africa: Performed in the 
Years 1850-1851 Under the Orders and at the Expense of Her Majesty’s Government (London: 
Chapman and Hall, 1853), p. 155. 
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by the British government. One of the objectives of these expeditions was the 
publication of a narrative, usually, in the form of a diary. As early as 1798-1799, a 
German explorer, Horneman probably journeyed to Borno.44 When explorers 
visited the country during the nineteenth century, they discovered a new dynasty 
ruling over a diminished kingdom of Borno. However, this does not seem to have 
lessened its attraction as the number of expeditions sent to Borno was 
considerable. Indeed, Denham, Clapperton, Oudney, Tyrwhitt and Toole travelled 
to Borno in 1822-1824, Overweg and Richardson in 1850-1851, Barth in 1850-
1855, da Segni in 1850, Vogel in 1854-1855, Beurmann in 1862-1863, Rohlfs in 
1865-1867, Nachtigal in 1870-1871, Matteucci and Massari in 1880, Monteil in 
1890 and finally Macintosh in 1891. 
Unfortunately, only Horneman, Denham, Clapperton, Richardson, Barth, 
da Segni, Rohlfs, Nachtigal and Massari left narratives whereas Vogel only wrote 
letters to The Times’s editor. In part, this was because exploring the Sahara and 
the “Sudan” was dangerous as only half of the explorers survived  Denham, 
Barth, da Segni, Nachtigal and Monteil). 
However, the remaining narratives contain precious information about 
the State of Borno during the nineteenth century as they precisely describe its 
political and economic situation. Thus, their interest is threefold. Firstly, it is 
possible to grasp in these narratives, the explorers’ conception of the Bornoan 
boundaries. Secondly, this conception, even if Eurocentric indirectly reveals the 
Bornoan perception of their own boundaries and territory. Finally, this 
conception of limits leads to the idea of a Bornoan territory. 
The most important authors for the nineteenth century are Denham, Barth 
and Nachtigal. These three explorers stayed in Borno for sustained periods 
respectively in 1822-24, 1850-1855 and 1870-1871 as the kingdom was one of 
the main aims of their expedition. Wilhelm II, the Prussian king even sent 
Nachtigal to offer presents to the Shehu of Borno. Thus, their observations cover 
a span of fifty years in the nineteenth century. 
                                            
44 Hornemann died in Nupe but had time to send his journal beforehand. Friedrich Hornemann, 
The Journal of Frederick Horneman’s [sic] Travels, from Cairo to Mourzouk, the Capital of the 
Kingdom of Fezzan, in Africa. In the Years 1797-8 (London: printed by W. Bulmer and Co. 
Cleveland-Row, St. James’s; for G. and W. Nicol, Booksellers to His Majesty, 1802). 
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This phenomenon was not original to the nineteenth century. When the 
Europeans colonised America and Asia, they also sent explorers who 
subsequently wrote about their own experience. Scholars such as Ivo Kamps and 
Jyotsna Singh have already analysed the literature about these encounters in the 
Ottoman Empire, Africa and Asia.45 Africa was not neglected by scholars either. In 
1974, Paul Hair and Albert van Dantzig both criticised the genre of travel 
narratives. Hair revealed the inaccuracy of Western sources for Sierra Leone46 
while van Dantzig stressed the translation issues between the Dutch and English 
primary sources for seventeenth-century Ghana.47  
Later historians have also analysed the distortion between African 
societies depicted in these narratives and oral history. In other words, they tried 
to define the role of African agency in these accounts. John Hanson, Kathryn 
Barrett-Gaines and Gérard Chouin have emphasised to what extent these 
narratives were directly influenced by local interpreters. The European explorers 
made local enquiries about their itineraries as to which would be the rapidest 
and safest way to reach their destination. Thus, their own knowledge was limited 
to their guides’ experience as well as their predecessors’ narratives. Geographic 
information was thus transmitted indirectly from guides who had their own bias. 
Thus, Hanson stressed that oral history recorded by two French explorers of 
nineteenth-century Western Africa was only the history of the victors. Thus, 
historians should not take at face-value oral history recorded by nineteenth-
century explorers.48 In addition, Barrett-Gaines revealed the amount of African 
information present in the account of Richard Mohun who travelled to the Congo 
                                            
45 Ivo Kamps and Jyotsna Singh, Travel Knowledge: European “Discoveries” in the Early Modern 
Period (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2001). For a specific focus on India, see Jyotsna Singh, 
Colonial Narratives  Cultural Dialogues: “discoveries” of India in the Language of Colonialism  
(London: Routledge, 1996). 
46 Paul Hair, ‘Barbot, Dapper, Davity: A Critique of Sources on Sierra Leone and Cape Mount’, 
History in Africa, 1 (1974), 25–54 (27). 
47 Albert van Dantzig, ‘Willem Bosman’s “New and Accurate Description of the Coast of Guinea”: 
How Accurate Is It?’, History in Africa, 1 (1974), 101-108 (102). 
48 John Hanson, ‘African Testimony Reported in European Travel Literature: What Did Paul 
Soleillet and Camille Piétri Hear and Why Does No One Recount It Now?’, History in Africa, 18 
(1991), 143–158 (143). 
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Free State from 1898 to 1901.49 The same argument was repeated by Chouin who 
analysed the presence of Dutch and African voices in the narrative of Dutchmen 
who traded on the littoral of modern-day Ghana in the seventeenth century.50 In 
other words, narratives written by nineteenth-century explorers contain useful 
information about Borno but they must be read critically. Even if an African voice 
is discernable, it should also be perceived as biased. 
Moreover, explorers often quoted their predecessors in their writings. 
Barth frequently referred to Denham’s narrative whereas Nachtigal mentioned 
both Denham’s and Barth’s narratives. The empirical knowledge of the Bornoan 
territory and its limits was built by every explorer who provided in his narrative 
and maps his own perception of the Bornoan territory. However is this truncated 
perception a consequence of the travellers’ ignorance? This question is relevant 
as Denham could not explore the whole region and therefore it was obvious that 
his description of the Bornoan territory and boundaries was in part 
extrapolation. The later explorers “filled” the map and were able to determine 
more precisely the localisation of different Bornoan boundaries. 
Their own perception of the boundaries was that of a traveller. As they 
were journeying through these regions with caravans, they conceptualised the 
boundaries in terms of barriers and checkpoints: 
On the 10th we reached the komadugu; and after some lively 
negotiation with the governor or shitima, who resides in the 
town of Yo, I and my companion were allowed to cross the 
river the same afternoon; for it has become the custom with 
the rulers of Bornu to use the river as a sort of political 
quarantine, a proceeding which- of course they can only adopt 
as long as the river is full. During the greater part of the year 
everybody can pass at pleasure. Even after we had crossed, we 
were not allowed to continue our journey to the capital, before 
the messenger, who had been sent there to announce our 
                                            
49 Kathryn Barrett-Gaines, ‘Travel Writing, Experiences, and Silences: What Is Left Out of 
European Travellers’ Accounts: The Case of Richard D. Mohun’, History in Africa, 24 (1997), 53–
70. 
50 Gérard Chouin, ‘Seen, Said, or Deduced? Travel Accounts, Historical Criticism, and Discourse 
Theory: Towards an "Archaeology” of Dialogue in Seventeenth-Century Guinea’, History in Africa, 
28 (2001), 53–70. 
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arrival, had returned with the express permission that we 
might go on.51 
 It is important to notice the fact that this “quarantine” barrier was not 
permanent throughout the year which means that the boundary was totally 
porous when the streambed was dry. Still, the river whether it be dry or not 
represents Bornoan authority, therefore Barth acknowledges the existence of 
boundary-lines for Borno and the need to “knock” on Borno’s door.  
 
 
Figure 1: Extract from Clapperton's map of Borno.52 
 
 Denham in his map, among other topographic and ethnographic 
information, reveals the existence in Borno of two boundaries. The eastern 
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border of the kingdom of Borno goes from the shores of Lake Chad to the river 
Chari.53 The western border is supposed to separate Borno from the Bedde, who 
were not Muslim. This first European attempt to localise the Borno kingdom 
gives an approximate idea of the position of Borno on the African map.  
One of the main aims of the explorers was to establish ties with African 
rulers and to produce a geopolitical map of the visited territories. For example, 
Denham gathered geographical information about Borno in his “Supplemental 
chapter about Bornou”.54 
BORNOU, a kingdom of Central Africa, is comprehended, in its 
present state, between the 15th and 10th parallel northern 
latitude, and the 12th and 18th of east longitude. It is bounded 
on the north by part of Kanem and the desert; on the east by 
the Lake Tchad, which covers several thousand miles of 
country, and contains many inhabited islands ; on the south-
east by the kingdom of Loggun and the river Shary, which 
divides Bornou from the kingdom of Begharmi, and loses itself 
in the waters of the Tchad ; on the south by Mandara, an 
independent kingdom, situated at the foot of an extensive 
range of primitive mountains; and on the west by Soudan.55 
This description of Borno reveals the names of the neighbouring states. 
Thus, Denham provides his reader with a geographical description of an area in a 
style typical of the nineteenth century. Indeed, this geographic introduction to his 
chapter reveals as much about Denham’s perception of this African territory as 
about Borno. His vision of Africa divided into neatly bounded kingdoms reveals 
his European perception of the continent. Thus, as there are clear boundaries in 
Europe, there are clear boundaries in Africa. As there are kingdoms in Europe, 
there are kingdoms in Africa. 
It also reveals the progress of geography as a science in the nineteenth 
century.56 Denham as an educated officer tries to introduce the results of his 
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discoveries in a suitably scientific way. Thus, Borno is presented as any other 
European kingdom would be portrayed. 
Although the boundaries are described in a European manner, Denham 
unveils geographical data unknown in Europe until then. This is precisely why 
these narratives are useful sources. Richardson also added: 
I have obtained a list of the names of the principal sultans in 
this part of Africa: Bornou—The Sheikh Omer, the son of the 
sheikh who reigned in the time of the first expedition. He has 
now reigned fourteen years. He has a good character. 
Sakkatou—Sultan of the Fellatahs, Ali. He is not so great as his 
father Bello, celebrated in the time of the first expedition. 
Asben, or Aheer—Abd-el-Kader. Maradee—Binono. Gouber—
Aliou (Ali)...57 
While travelling, the Europeans gathered information about travel conditions. 
They would therefore ask their different informants about the feasibility of their 
journey. Consequently, they would learn about the wars recently waged in the 
area. 
Zinder has always enjoyed much liberty as a province, though 
it has fallen successively under the influence of Bornou and 
Haussa princes. Anciently it was ruled by the former; then it 
lapsed to the Haussa princes and the Fullans, and finally it was 
again recovered by Bornou.58 
This is the reason for which they wanted to discover the different routes 
possible for their journey. For example, Richardson in his diary took notes of the 
route from Kuka, then capital of Borno to Mandara. 
TERRITORY OF BORNOU. 
From Kuka, south-east, to 
 Gornu, half a-day; a walled town, larger than Zinder. 
 Gulum, three hours; small village. Here is a river. 
 Yaidi, four hours; large walled town. 
 Martai, four hours; large walled town. 
                                                                                                                             
Pierre Singaravélou, Territoires Impériaux: Une Histoire Spatiale Du Fait Colonial (Publications de 
la Sorbonne, 2011). 
57 Richardson and St. John, Narrative of a mission, p. 189. 
58 Richardson and St. John, Narrative of a mission, p. 200. 
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 Ala, three hours; large walled town. 
 Diwa, eight hours; large walled town, and residence of a 
sultan. Here is a river. 
 Abagai, two hours; small village. 
 Kuddaigai, one hour; small village. 
 Sokoma, one hour; a large walled town. 
 Millehai, two hours; a small place. 
 Magarta, three hours; a large walled town. 
 Dellehai, half a day; a large place. 
TERRITORY OF MANDARA. 
 Muddebai, a long day; a large walled town. 
 Dulo, eight hours; a large walled town. 
 Mandara, three hours; a city about the size of Mourzuk. 
A day's journey from Mandara is sufficient to make a razzia of slaves. 
Muzgu, a great Kerdi country, is three days' journey from Mandara.59 
According to Richardson, the town of Dellehai is situated on the Bornoan 
side of the border with the kingdom of Mandara. Richardson certainly enquired 
about this route with an unknown informant who had a clear idea of the journey 
and who was familiar with both territories of Borno and Mandara. The border 
here clearly lies between the two cities of Dellehai and Muddebai but this 
description fails to be more precise. However, this route reveals the conception 
of the territory as a network of cities and roads but also as a territory where the 
time of travel is as important as space, an aspect that Ivor Wilks already noticed 
for the Asante kingdom in the nineteenth century.60 In modern-day Namibia, 
Gregor Dobler also analysed the importance of the territorial structure of 
Ovamboland.61 According to the author, this territory seemed to have a pre-
colonial territorial structure. Would it be possible to find these frameworks in 
nineteenth-century Borno? 
                                            
59 Richardson and St. John, Narrative of a mission, p. 342. 
60 Ivor Wilks, ‘On Mentally Mapping Greater Asante: A Study of Time and Motion’, The Journal of 
African History, 33 (1992), 175–190. 
61 Gregor Dobler, ‘Boundary Drawing and the Notion of Territoriality in Pre-colonial and Early 
Colonial Ovamboland’, Journal of Namibian Studies, 3 (2008), 7-30. 
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In the nineteenth century, the main aim of the expeditions was to open trade 
routes and establish diplomatic ties with African rulers. This is the reason for 
which, Heinrich Barth signed a treaty with the Shehu of Borno in 1851. 
The following year, the British government signed a commercial treaty with 
the Shehu of Borno. Both treaties have been studied by Kirk-Greene and 
underline the contemporary importance of establishing links between European 
powers and African kingdoms.62 The bilingual 1852 treaty states:  
The Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, 
being desirous of forming amicable relations with the Chiefs of 
the Interior of Africa, for the purpose of interchanging 
reciprocally the merchandise of Africa with that of Europe, has 
empowered Doctor Henry Barth to make Treaties in her name, 
and on her behalf, for the purpose above expressed; and the 
Sovereign of the Kingdom of Bornoo being also desirous of co-
operating with Her Majesty the Queen of England, with the 
view of establishing and effecting what is proposed; Her 
Majesty has, therefore, named the said Doctor Henry Barth, as 
her Agent, to conclude the following Treaty, on behalf of Her 
Majesty, her heirs and successors.63 
The third article of the treaty states clearly: 
The communications between the country of Bornoo and other 
places shall be safe, so that English merchants may, without 
obstacle, import their merchandise of lawful commerce, of 
whatever kind, and bring them for sale in Bornoo and 
elsewhere; and it shall be equally free for them to export from 
Bornoo such merchandise of lawful commerce.64 
 Thus, commercial interests between the United Kingdom and Borno were 
in the centre of the travellers’ interests as both treaties were signed between 
“sovereign” rulers of their own kingdom. The 1851 Borno treaty underlines the 
fact that Borno is an “empire”, a “country”, a “state” which possesses its own 
                                            
62 Anthony Kirk-Greene, ‘The British Consulate at Lake Chad: a Forgotten Treaty with the Sheikh 
of Bornu’, African Affairs, 58 (1959), 334-339. See Appendix A for the original documents. 
63 National Archives, Kew Gardens, United Kingdom. FO 97/13/2. 
64 FO 97/13/2. 
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“territory”. Would it be possible to understand Borno as a clearly bounded 
territory according to this document? Au contraire, the translator only over-
translated the same Arabic word bilâd for “empire”, “country”, “state” and 
“territory” whereas it is only a generic term for “country”. Thus, European 
conceptions of statehood were applied to Borno even though most explorers 
were aware of its political situation. 
The explorers’ attitude towards Bornoan history reveals a genuine 
interest in the events of the Fulani jihad at the time. When the Europeans 
travelled to Central Africa after the Napoleonic wars, they discovered that Usman 
dan Fodio, a Fulani religious teacher, had created a large state, known as the 
sultanate of Sokoto. The aftershocks of the early nineteenth century are still 
visible at a local scale as: 
Katagum, the capital of a province of the same name, is in lat. 
12° 17' 11" north, and in long- about 11° east. This province 
formed the frontier of Bornou before the Felatah [Fulani] 
conquest. At present it includes the subject provinces of 
Sansan and Bedcguna. It extends nearly one day's journey to 
the northward, and five days' journey to the southward, where 
it is bounded by an independent territory, called after the 
inhabitants Kurry- kurry. On the east it is bounded by the 
kingdom of Bornou, and on the west by the neighbouring 
province of Kano.65 
Thus, the explorers’ narratives describe the geopolitical situation of Borno at 
the kingdom scale but also at the province scale. Their description as seen before 
reveals as much about their own perception as about Borno itself. 
In addition, the map inserted at the end of Clapperton and Denham’s book, 
reveals the position of the Bedde between Sokoto and Borno. The Bedde were the 
people living in the buffer zone created by the treaty between Borno and Sokoto. 
                                            
65 Denham and others, Narrative of travels, p. 246. 
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Figure 2: Extract from Clapperton's map of Borno.66 
These two clearly delimited boundaries isolate the “Bedee Territory” 
revealing that they are not Muslims “(Kafirs)”. The boundaries present on the 
map, as in the narrative, do not delimitate precisely the territory. However, this 
map reveals that they can be perceived by an outsider as Clapperton; this 
perception of the limits between these territories is typically European as these 
limits are only lines drawn around the towns belonging to the Bedde. As 
Clapperton and Oudney travelled to Kano, they had to cross this territory and 
determine which town belonged to Borno. Thus, the map is a simple topographic 
map trying to represent the different political powers. Still, without totally 
dismissing his representation of the boundaries, Clapperton tried to give a 
precise account of geopolitical situation of Borno. 
Barth describes the northern border of Borno as being dangerous because 
of the Tuareg incursions. Therefore, he considered that he could advise the 
“vizier” of Borno: 
                                            
66 Denham, Missions to Niger, end of volume. 
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I pressed upon the vizier the necessity of defending the 
northern frontier of Bornu against the Tuarek by more 
effectual measures than had been then adopted, and thus 
retrieving, for cultivation and the peaceable abode of his 
fellow-subjects, the fine borders of the komadugu67, and 
restoring security to the road to Fezzan. Just about this time 
the Tuarek had made another expedition into the border-
districts on a large scale, so that Kashella Belal, the first of the 
war chiefs, was obliged to march against them.68 
The case of the northern boundary as perceived by Barth is emblematic. 
The Europeans defined the boundaries as lines which can be closed if needed. 
They apply their own vision of the boundaries to the kingdom of Borno. Barth by 
this comment revealed his own pre-conception of the boundaries but also 
patronised the “vizier” of Borno who, according to Barth, could not properly 
manage the northern boundary. 
Nachtigal, a few years later judges the African boundaries in the following 
manner: 
Where there is no sharply defined natural frontier, such as the 
Chad and Shari, these boundaries are indeterminate, as 
towards the desert, or arbitrary and fluctuating, as in the 
regions of Pagan and semi-Pagan tribes who have not been 
brought completely under control. Where the Muhammadan 
inhabitants of two such comparatively well-ordered states as 
Bornu and the Hausa country are adjacent, the boundary can 
be fixed fairly exactly, though encroachments on either side 
and boundary disputes are not lacking. Where, however, 
between the two lie more or less independent regions, as along 
a great pan of the western and southern frontier of Bornu, the 
contours of the empire fluctuate according to the measure of 
military success against tribes which are kept in subjection 
only by force- This is the situation especially with the regions 
of the Bedde, Ngizzem, Kerrikerri, Babir and Musgo, while the 
position in the Margin country, where the proximity of 
Adamawa to the south has a decisive influence, is somewhat 
more stable. Because of their more solid state organisation, 
                                            
67 Means “river” in Kanuri. Used in this case for the river Yo. 
68 Barth, Travels and discoveries, p. 403. 
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Mandara and Logon are also in a more regular relationship of 
dependence upon Bornu.69 
This extensive comment about the boundaries of Borno uncovers different 
aspects of Nachtigal’s perception of Borno. Firstly, Nachtigal, as Rohlfs before 
him70, subscribed to the idea of the natural boundaries being determinate 
whereas the remaining boundaries are indeterminate. The theory of the natural 
boundaries which emerged mainly in France at the end of the seventeenth 
century, was widely spread throughout the nineteenth century: 
The limits of empires are controlled by two causes: the 
physical geography of the soil and the power of man. The first 
is durable; the last is variable and thus in examining history we 
find that the first produces the most permanent effect.71 
 The explorers were eager to find which boundaries were natural, in other 
words “durable”. The others only depended on the “power of man”. This is the 
reason for which Nachtigal underlined the fluctuation of the other boundaries 
which are not permanent. As a German from Saxony, he would have been aware 
of the efforts of Emperor Wilhelm II to expand the Prussian boundaries in the 
1860s and early 1870s. The boundaries made by the “power of man” were more 
recent and had a less permanent effect according to him. However, Nachtigal 
neglected the fact that the so-called “natural boundaries” were only the result of 
a choice by the different political powers. For example, in the case of the kingdom 
of Borno, the Chari river boundary was the result of the competition between 
Borno and its neighbour Bagirmi. Far from being only natural, the boundary was 
as much the result of political decisions. This deterministic view of the 
boundaries prevented Nachtigal and the other explorers from giving a fully 
detailed account of the Bornoan boundaries. 
                                            
69 Gustav Nachtigal, Sahara and Sudan (London: C Hurst and Co, 1980), p. 123. 
70 Gerhard Rohlfs, Quer Durch Afrika: Reise Vom Mittelmeer Nach Dem Tschad-See Und Zum Golf 
Von Guinea (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1874), p. 36. 
71 John Finch, The Natural Boundaries of Empires: and a New View of Colonization (London: 
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 In addition, Nachtigal stressed the fact that the boundaries between 
Muslim states could be “fixed fairly exactly”.72 For every explorer, the Muslim 
states were “comparatively well-ordered states” whereas pagan states were 
inherently disorganised. Most of the explorers subscribed to the theory of the 
Nilo-Hamitic origin of State in Africa. In other words, concepts of “State” and 
“boundaries” did not originate from sub-Saharan Africa but from Northern 
Africa.73 Black countries can be “well-ordered” only if they adopt Islam.  
This is the reason for which an area can be considered a buffer zone. For 
example, the border zone separating Borno from its former vassal was described 
by Richardson. According to him: 
Our encampment was near a little village of twenty huts, called 
Daazzenai, placed under a rock of red stone. The country of 
Damerghou, in this direction, is separated from Bornou by 
about eleven hours of forest, or some thirty miles English—a 
sufficient distance to divide two countries, especially in 
Africa.74 
Thus the author recognises the forest as being the boundary between 
“Damerghou” and “Bornou”. His comments about the distance separating the two 
countries reveal his conception of African territories divided by uninhabited 
areas. The image of Western Africa as an under-populated area was frequent in 
the nineteenth century.75 
Moreover, the author underlines the length – eleven hours – to travel 
thirty miles. The boundary is based on an uninhabited area and communication is 
harder through the thick of the forest. Therefore, the networked territory is 
interrupted by this empty forest which consequently constitutes the boundary. 
Far from being a natural boundary, the forest is only the limit of the powers of 
                                            
72 Nachtigal, Sahara and Sudan, p. 123. 
73 Dierk Lange, ‘The Kingdoms and Peoples of Chad’, in General History of Africa, ed. by Djibril 
Tamsir Niane (London: Unesco, Heinemann, 1984), pp. 238-265. 
74 Richardson and St. John, Narrative of a mission, pp. 175–6. 
75  Especially among the French. See Monica van Beusekom, ‘From Underpopulation to 
Overpopulation: French Perceptions of Population, Environment, and Agricultural Development 
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“Damerghou” and “Bornou”. Indeed, for Richardson their rulers controlled 
populations not territories. As the populations of Damerghou are not submitted 
to the Shehu of Borno, the boundary lies in the space before the first cities of 
Damerghou. 
Thus, the power of Borno does not seem to fade towards its borderland 
with Damerghou. Wilks’s theory applies to this part of the Bornoan boundary.76 
Rohlfs evokes the same buffer boundaries in Southern Borno: 
Between Bama and the Wandala boundary, one has to go 
through a forest, in which pagan Gamergu often rob the 
passers-by, and take revenge for the razzias led against them 
by their enemies, the Mohammedan Bornuese. Under the same 
conditions, furthermore, insecurity is wide-spread in all the 
frontier zones in black countries, which explains why they are 
hardly or not inhabitated.77 
Hence, the assumption that Borno only exercised power over populations 
and not its territory is merely hypothetical. The Bornoan territory seems to be 
bounded by buffer areas defined by treaties or by a status quo. Is it possible to 
evoke a strong Bornoan authority over the entirety of its territory as in pre-
colonial Buganda?78 
European travellers’ narratives took partially into account the fact that 
boundaries were known to the local people. As soon as 1798 Horneman 
mentioned: 
As to what the inhabitants themselves call Haussa, I had, as I 
think, very certain information. One of them, a Marabut, gave 
me a drawing of the situation of the different regions 
bordering on each other, which I here give as I received it. The 
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77 Rohlfs, p. 35.Translation by the author: „Zwischen Bama und der Grenze von Uándala hat man 
einen Wald zu passieren, in dem oft heidnische Gámergu die Hindurchziehenden überfallen und 
für die Rasien, die gegen sie angestellt werden, an ihren Feinden, den mohammedischen 
Bornuern, Wiedervergeltung üben. Unter gleichen Verhältnissen herrscht übrigens in allen 
Grenzgebieten der Negerländer grosse Unsicherheit, weshalb sie auch meist schwach oder gar 
nicht bewohnt sind.“ p.35. 
78 Richard Reid, Political Power in Pre-colonial Buganda: Economy, Society and Warfare in the 19th 
Century (Chicago: Ohio University Press, 2002). 
62 
 
land within the strong line is Haussa; my black friend had 
omitted Asben. 
These regions are governed by Sultans, of whom those of 
Kashna and Kano are the most powerful; but they all, (either 
by constraint or policy) pay tribute to Burnu, except Kabi or 
Nyffé, their districts being at too great a distance. Guber pays, 
moreover, a tribute to Asben. Zamfara is united with Guber; 
the Sultan of the latter having taken possession of it, killed the 
Sultan, and sold all the prisoners he could take.79 
 
 
Figure 3: Map drawn by a “Hausa marabut” for Hornemann.80 
 
This sketch map is clearly a Hausa representation of space as it is centred 
on the Hausa cities. However, the kingdom of Borno is clearly depicted as a 
dominating eastern power encompassing within its grasp the different territories 
on the map. On the one hand, this sketch map does not reveal the precise location 
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of boundaries or rivers, but on the other hand, the marabout conceptualised the 
boundaries and territory of Borno. Far from showing any geographical reality, 
this map reveals the geopolitical situation of this part of Africa. Notions of “space” 
and “limits” were therefore present in Borno and Hausaland as much as in 
Europe in the nineteenth century. Thus, even if the explorers had a Eurocentric 
vision of the African continent, the Bornoan boundaries could have been very 
much similar to some European ones. Indeed, the whole kingdom of Borno was a 
territory imagined not only by its inhabitants but also by the European travellers. 
Nachtigal mentioned: 
The approximate boundaries indicated give the Bornu empire 
an area of around 150,000 square kilometers (about 58,000 
square miles).81 
As mentioned earlier, the kingdom of Borno inherited a millenary statist 
tradition from its predecessor the kingdom of Kanem-Borno. The explorers 
depicted the landscape of Borno with its different historical layers. 
But at present all this district, the finest land of Bornu in the 
proper sense of the word, which once resounded with the 
voices and bustle of hundreds of towns and villages, has 
become one impenetrable jungle, the domain of the elephant 
and the lion, and with no human inhabitants except a few 
scattered herdsmen or cattle-breeders, who are exposed every 
moment to the predatory inroads of the Tuarek.82 
This nostalgic tone reminds the readers the splendour of ancient Borno 
which is comparable, in this era of literary romanticism, to the splendour of 
classical European civilisations. Indeed, most explorers tried to give a historical 
perspective to their “discoveries”. Thus, Barth himself brought back to Europe 
the Girgam, a list of kings who reigned in Kanem-Borno from the eleventh 
century on. The nineteenth-century territory of Borno was perceived as a 
historical space. Therefore, it is possible to speak of an existence of a Bornoan 
territory at this time. For example, Barth and Nachtigal refer to the tombs of the 
ancient kings that they have visited. In a sense, these explorers consider Borno as 
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a nation under construction. The core province of the kingdom known as “Borno 
proper” reinforces this idea.  
I had now entered Bornu proper, the nucleus of that great 
Central African empire in its second stage, after Kanem had 
been given up. It is bordered towards the east by the great sea-
like komadugu the Tsad or Tsade, and towards the west and 
north-west by the little komadugu which by the members of 
the last expedition had been called Yeou, from the town of that 
name, or rather Yo, near which they first made its 
acquaintance on their way from Fezzan. I had now left behind 
me those loosely attached principalities which still preserve 
some sort of independence, and henceforth had only to do with 
Bornu officers.83 
Thus, Borno proper would be the heart of this “empire”. This last 
statement shows the conception of Borno as a territory and not as a collection of 
different ethnic groups. Principalities had therefore to pay tribute to the sultan of 
Borno. The question of tributes is an important question as it may be misleading. 
Some regions , such as Zinder, had to pay a tribute because Borno dominated 
them economically or militarily. Some other regions paid tribute to obtain a 
certain kind of autonomy from Borno such as the Hausa cities at the start of the 
nineteenth century.84 The nature of the relationship of Borno and its vassals is 
thus in question. For example, the Shehu of Borno had to agree with the ascent of 
a new ruler. 
Northwest of Borno proper, in Muniyo (see Fig. 7), Ibrahim, pretender to 
the throne killed all of his brothers to gain power. The Shehu could not approve 
such actions and sent an army against him. After each murder, Ibrahim ironically 
wrote to the Shehu “I am under God and you”.85 A hierarchical relationship 
nominally existed but as proved in this case a vassal state could always decide 
not to follow the Shehu of Borno. 
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Africa: Studies in Incorporation Processes (Scranton: Chandler, 1970), p. 157. 
65 
 
Cohen quoted the case of the ruler of Zinder who was nominally under the 
domination of the rulers of Borno but who rebelled in the 1830s and 1840s. 
Every time, the Shehu of Borno had to re-establish his authority with an army. He 
even left a consul in Zinder to represent the Bornoan power.86 In the 1870s, 
however, the ruler of Zinder annexed another vassal of Borno, Muniyo. 
Maïkorema argued that this invasion was possible because of the weakness of 
Borno at the end of the nineteenth century.87 Thus, the relationship between 
Borno and its vassals depended also on the political situation in the capital of the 
kingdom, Kukawa. The distance between ‘proper Borno’ and its vassals certainly 
played a role but was not essential. The political situation in Kukawa seemed to 
be altogether more important. 
As for Bagirmi on the eastern borderland, it was paying tribute to Borno 
but was also paying tribute to Wadai. This situation illustrates the limitation of 
the word ‘vassal’ to qualify such states. Historically, Bagirmi was more linked to 
Borno but the power of Wadai made it choose this precarious balance between 
the two powerful states.88 
The State of Mandara to the south-east was considered as a vassal of 
Borno as it used to pay tribute in the nineteenth century. However, authors 
disagree on the nature and the frequency of this tribute. Was Mandara a vassal 
state at all? Historians such as Brenner and Hallam mentioned the vassal link 
between the two states.89 Denham who visited the region in 1821 never 
mentioned any tribute given by Mandara to Borno. He mentioned more the 
alliances that were possible between both countries. Authors such as Vincent, 
Mohammadou and Barkindo on their side stressed the fact that Mandara was 
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independent from Borno in the nineteenth century.90 One fact is certain, the word 
‘vassal’ seems to be too strong to apply to Mandara at this period.  
The map created by Barth after his travel revealed that the explorers were 
very much aware of the existence of these states surrounding Borno and 
politically depending on it. 
 
 
Figure 4: Map of Part of Africa (Eastern Sheet) showing Dr. Barth's Routes, 
1850-1855 and native itineraries collected by him.91 
 
A constellation of states orbited around Borno. These non-Muslim buffer 
states around Borno were heavily taxed. Therefore, it is possible to suggest that 
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the buffer-states were coherently organised by Borno. On the one hand, they 
would furnish tribute and taxes; on the other hand, they would be a military 
frontier. This constitutes only a generalisation of the status of the buffer-states as 
buffer states as Bagirmi and Logone differently depended on Borno. For instance, 
the map quotes “Marghi  claimed both by Borno and Adamaua)”, “Loggene 
 tributary to Borno)”, Daura across the border with Katsina  “Katshna”) 
“consisting of about 1000 towns & villages, 400 of which belong to the Fulahs and 
600 to Borno”. 
Moreover, the capital played a very important role in the rather 
centralised kingdom of Borno. Kuka or Kukawa was the place where the Shehu 
lived and from which he controlled the whole State. Taxes were levied in 
different provinces under modalities defined by the Shari’a and brought to Kuka. 
Rohlfs mentioned import taxes levied upon goods when he crossed the Bornoan 
southern boundary with Gongola: 
At the same time, a small caravan under our armed protection 
had crossed the boundary because they needed to sell salt and 
cattle. They were staying close to us so that people could 
believe they belonged to my followers in order not to pay 
import taxes for their goods. Usually imported Bornuese 
products were taxed, 20 cowries for a horse or a head of cattle, 
10 cowries for a sheep or a goat, a certain amount of salt for 
each sold measure92 
These import taxes were highly regulated as the precise figures given by 
Rohlfs reveal. Even if they were not decided by Borno but by Gongola, the import 
taxes reveal the conception of a recognised commercial Borno territory by the 
borderland dwellers. If Borno exported goods, it meant that was possible to 
conceive the existence of a Bornoan territory. 
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Quantum in natura.“ 
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Conclusion 
In consequence, this chapter argues that Bornoan administration exerted 
its power over a territory as much as people. Indeed, the explorers revealed the 
importance of the Bornoan space during the nineteenth century. Borno was 
territorially organised at this time and its boundaries were recognised not only at 
a local level but also by the Ottoman Empire, the Sokoto Caliphate and other 
states of the Chad basin.93 This last point differs from the traditional viewpoint of 
African polities being ill-defined and being only constructed on personal 
relations. In the case of Borno, Urvoy, Cohen and Brenner have underlined the 
importance of the personal relations in the territorial organisation of the 
kingdom.94 According to Brenner, territory was only  
one basis for administrative relationship; very often ethnic and 
personal relationships were more important.95 
The different sources allege the fact that ethnic and personal relationships 
were fundamental. However, were they more important than the Bornoan 
territory? This chapter however argues that the Bornoan territory played a 
structuring political role for the kingdom. Indeed as mentioned above, the 
representation of a Bornoan space, especially in the inter-statist relations, was 
largely influenced by Islam as Nachtigal put it. Furthermore, Borno in the 
nineteenth century inherited from the kingdom of Kanem-Borno a strong 
administrative and territorial organisation which recognised a Bornoan territory 
and acknowledged the existence of Bornoan boundaries. Thus, far from being 
vague, Borno’s boundaries were known to its inhabitants with all their 
fluctuations during the nineteenth century. 
This representation of space and territoriality in nineteenth-century 
Borno is a hypothesis. Indeed, this chapter argued that conceptions of boundaries 
existed in the travellers’ narratives as well as in the Bornoan mentalities. 
                                            
93 Barkind' Kanem-Borno', pp. 248-258. 
94 Yves Urvoy, Histoire De L’empire Du Bornou, Me moires De l’Institut Français d’Afrique Noire 
(Paris: Larose, 1949); Cohen, The Kanuri of Bornu; Louis Brenner and Ronald Cohen, ‘Bornu in the 
Nineteenth Century’, in History of West Africa, ed. by Michael Crowder (Harlow: Longman, 1984), 
pp. 93-128. 
95 Brenner, The Shehus of Kukawa, p. 19. 
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Admittedly, the different travellers had a Eurocentric perception of Borno and 
conceived Bornoan boundaries as a mixture between lines and undefined zones; 
however, the Bornoans seem to have conceived their own territory clearly and 
had a sense of belonging to a specific territory demarcated by boundaries. The 
territorial organisation of Borno proper and its satellite-states on the one hand, 
and the management of the borders through agents such as the galadimas and 
the kachellas on the other hand, clearly indicate that Borno can be defined as a 
territory. 
Thus, in the nineteenth century, is it possible to argue that the nineteenth-
century Bornoan conception of boundaries and territory was not significantly 
different from the European conception? In nineteenth-century Europe, the 
Westphalian boundaries were clear-cut boundaries delimiting each State’s 
sovereignty.96 Did such boundaries exist in nineteenth-century Central Sudan? If 
one defines such boundaries as clearly delimiting the sovereignty of Borno, yes, 
these Westphalian boundaries existed in Borno.97 For these boundaries to exist, 
the Bornoan political territory had to exist. This last argument leads to the debate 
between time and distance in pre-colonial Africa. Did Africans have a 
representation of their own political space according to their territory as in as in 
Wilks’s Asante98, Reid’s Buganda99 or Dobler’s Ovamboland?100 This chapter 
would tend to follow Reid’s and Dobler’s argument as Borno’s conception of 
territoriality had much in common with the Bugandan creation of their own 
political space through warfare or with nineteenth-century Ovamboland.  
The Kanemi dynasty did “reign within the reach of one’s arm” according to 
the Kanuri proverb. Indeed, all the satellite-states around Borno had to be 
                                            
96 For a full discussion about the limits of this term, see Derek Croxton, ‘The Peace of Westphalia 
of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty’, The International History Review, 21 (1999), 569-591. 
97 David Newman, ‘Boundary Geopolitics: Towards a Theory of Territorial Lines’, in Routing 
Borders Between Territories, Discourses, and Practices, ed. by Eiki Berg and Henk van Houtum 
(Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2003), pp. 277-292. 
98 Ivor Wilks, Asante in the Nineteenth Century: The Structure and Evolution of a Political Order 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). 
99 Reid, Political power in pre-colonial Buganda. 
100 Dobler, ' Boundary drawing and the notion of territoriality in pre-colonial and early colonial 
Ovamboland', 7-30. 
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permanently reminded of their allegiance to Borno. However, this does not mean 
that the territory of Borno was purely abstract. If these vassal states had to rebel 
against the authority of the Shehu, it meant also that their leaders were aware of 
being a part of a wider geopolitical framework. 
According to Ibrahim Waziri, it would be possible to create a typology of 
the different territories in nineteenth-century Borno.101 At the centre of Borno, 
stood “Borno proper” under the direct control of the Shehu. This is what could be 
considered as the core of Borno. On the edge of Borno proper, the vassal states 
were under effective control of their own ruler who was under the Shehu himself 
or more often a noble at the Shehu’s court. In addition, the degrees of control 
over the vassals greatly varied as seen previously: the Shehus of Borno had more 
control over Bagirmi than Zinder in the nineteenth century. It could be argued 
that this relationship was permanently renegotiated. Finally, at the edge of the 
vassal states stood buffer states such as the Bedde territory mentioned above or 
the city-state of Fika.  
 In theory, the territory could be structured as such: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
101 Ibrahim Waziri, Head of the History Department, University of Maiduguri, interview 
6/07/2010, Maiduguri. 
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Figure 5: Simple cartogram - The spatial structure of Borno in the 
nineteenth century 
 
These three different degrees of control over territory could correspond 
to the perception of African polities being less powerful when far from the 
political centre. However, this classical historiographical appraisal of the sub-
Saharan polities does not correspond to Borno. 
First of all, this conception does not correspond to Borno proper. 
According to Kopytoff, the frontier zones in sub-Saharan African reproduced the 
main cultural traits of their metropole while adapting to the local cultural 
specificities.102 This theory would enable Borno to be in close cultural contact 
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with its frontier zones. However, would Kopytoff’s theory be enough to ensure 
the Bornoan political sovereignty over its vassal states? Kopytoff’s model cannot  
easily explain relatively stable political units such as Borno.103 Cohen gave an 
anthropological answer to this political question. Indeed according to the latter, 
Borno was an organised state capable of integrating border societies within its 
political organisation, through the double fief system of chima chidibe, territorial 
leaders and chima jilibe, population leaders. Even semi-nomads and nomads 
were incorporated within Borno proper thanks to the personal relationship 
between the headmen of the nomadic populations and a Bornoan noble who 
became their patron.104 It would thus be possible to argue that the spatial 
structure of Borno as theorised above would not be loose but would tend to be 
quite rigid because of the double fief system present in Borno.105 
Thus, to conclude this chapter, it would be possible to argue that Borno 
was a bounded territory in the nineteenth century. Official diplomacy between 
nineteenth-century rulers and their neighbours and the European observations 
clearly demonstrated that Borno was politically structured at this period. In 
Borno proper, the relationship between the core and the periphery was clearly 
codified through the double-fief system. The relationship between Borno and its 
vassals depended on the political situation in Kukawa but also on the personal 
relationship between the rulers. By consequence, a spatial conception of the 
Bornoan territory existed in the nineteenth century.  
Furthermore, it could be considered that the existence of ‘Borno proper’ 
reveals the existence of a territorial conception not entirely different from the 
European perception of territory. Westphalian borders did exist such as the 
western border with Sokoto but also the northern border, the Komadogu Yobe or 
even the Shari River with the vassal state of Bagirmi. The fact that these borders 
were not always geographical features reveals the fact that Borno was thought as 
a political entity and not as a purely geographical entity. However, it would be 
                                            
103 Francis Paine Conant criticised Kopytoff for this cultural bias. See Francis Paine Conant, 
‘Review: Igor Kopytoff, The African Frontier: the Reproduction of Traditional African Societies by 
Igor Kopytoff’, American Anthropologist, 91 (1989), 1074-1075. 
104 Cohen, ‘Incorporation in Borno’, p. 152. 
105 This, to a certaint extent, can be compared with Jan Vansina, Nyiginya Kingdom in Ancient 
Rwanda (Oxford: James Currey, 2005). 
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difficult to apply the term of Westphalian border to all the different borders of 
Borno. Indeed, the southern boundary seemed to be more elusive and the 
populations living there were more or less living in buffer zones between Borno 
and Adamawa. 
The following cartogram and map (fig. 8 and fig. 9) are two different 
attempts to summarise this spatial structure without systemising the links 
between Borno and its vassal states. As cartographic representations of 
nineteenth-century states, they take into account the specific spatial structure of 
Borno. These visualisations are more helpful representations of the territory and 
boundaries of Borno than the previous one (fig. 7). However, they are only 
schematised representations of Borno and, as such, they should not be 
understood as rigorous and definitive maps of Borno in the nineteenth century. 
For example, the lack of primary sources concerning some southern border zones 
would prevent any scholar from generalising the nature of the territory and the 
borders in this area. In the following cartogram and map, the border lines are 
ambiguous and do not mean that all the borders of Borno were clear-cut lines. 
While bearing this imprecision in mind, it is hoped that they will offer a better 
analytical tool to understand the Bornoan spatial structure. 
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Figure 6: Cartogram representing the spatial structure of Borno in the 
nineteenth century 
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Figure 7: Borno in the first half of the nineteenth century. 
 
As mentioned above, these maps should not be understood as definite 
answers to the question of territoriality in Borno. However, it is hoped they can 
provide a relatively accurate spatial framework for the kingdom in the 
nineteenth century. The next chapter will assess how the territory and borders 
present on these maps were reused by the different invaders. It will be argued 
that Rabih in 1893, the French in 1900, the Germans and the British in 1902 
partly recycled the territory and borders of Borno to ensure the viability of their 
conquest. The above maps could thus be considered as the territorial basis of the 
Scramble for Africa in Borno. 
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2.  All Paths Lead to Borno1 
 
The end of the nineteenth century was the beginning of the colonial 
“episode” according to Ajayi or the colonial “parenthesis” for Piault.2 Competing 
for the colonisation of Africa, the Europeans supposedly never encountered 
major military obstacles. However, in the academic tradition of “resistance” 
against the invaders, different schools of thought have provided extensive 
narratives of Africans fighting against the invaders during the “Scramble for 
Africa”. 3  This African perspective tended to emphasise the sophisticated 
organisation of African societies against the previously biased European account 
of the conquest of Africa.4 
Borno was invaded by three different colonial powers: the British, the 
French and the Germans. However, Borno’s invasion of 1899 was not the first 
one of the decade. In 1893, six years before the arrival of the Europeans, a 
Sudanese warlord, Rabih, had conquered Borno and had added it to his other 
possessions of Dar-Kuti, Wadai and Bagirmi. When the Europeans decided to 
attack Rabih, they faced an imperialist African warlord. This case was not 
isolated during the colonisation of Africa as the British and the French, for 
example had also to compete against the Ethiopian Negus Menelik II in Eastern 
Africa.5 
Moreover, the particularity of Borno in this period is that numerous 
primary sources are available not only in Nigeria but also in Europe. That the 
                                            
1 I would like to thank Murray Last, Camille Lefebvre, Daouda Marte and Olukoya Ogen for their 
help. I am especially grateful to Kyari Mohammed who took the time to read this chapter. 
2 J. F. Ade Ajayi, ‘The Continuity of African Institutions Under Colonialism’, in Emerging Themes of 
African History, ed. by Terence Ranger, Heinemann (London: Heinemann, 1968), pp. 189-200 and 
Marc Henri Piault, La Colonisation: Rupture Ou Parenthèse  Paris: L’Harmattan, 1987). 
3 Frederick Cooper, ‘Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History’, The American 
Historical Review, 99 (1994), 1516-1545 (1516-1520). 
4 John Lonsdale, ‘The European Conquest and Scramble in African History’, in The Cambridge 
History of Africa, ed. by John Fage and George Sanderson (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1975), VI, 680-766. 
5 Harold Marcus, The Life and Times of Menelik II: Ethiopia 1844-1913 (Lawrenceville: Red Sea 
Press, 1995). 
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documentary wealth of this area contrasts with the relative lack of sources for 
other parts of Africa conquered by the Europeans is because the Lake Chad basin 
was already a source of interest in the nineteenth century. Researching this 
period is thus methodologically an exceptional – in both meanings of the term - 
case-study. Oral testimonies about Rabih are still available in Borno as the 
invader is still renowned for his cruelty. In addition, the battles between the 
French forces and Rabih’s armies were as documented as the struggle between 
the British and the Mahdi in Sudan. 
For purposes of clarification, the following chapter will be divided into 
two different parts. The first part will deal with the invasion and rule of Borno by 
Rabih. The second section will give an account of the first division of Borno as 
carried out in Europe before the effective conquest. This chapter will illustrate 
the connection between the first invasion of Borno by Rabih and the subsequent 
European conquest. It will be argued that Rabih and the Europeans shared the 
same concept of Borno as a spatial tool for their invasion. In addition, this section 
will demonstrate that the pre-existing structure of the kingdom studied in the 
previous chapter, even if diminished, was the framework for the invasions of the 
late nineteenth century. 
 
2.1. The Scramble for Borno 
2.1.1. The Europeans and Borno before Rabih’s Invasion 
 
In their first boundary agreements, the Europeans never considered 
Rabih’s role in the political framework of Central Sudan. The first 1890 Franco-
British agreement was simply designated to carve out “spheres of influence” 
according to contemporary vocabulary. Rabih’s invasion of Wadai, Dar-Kuti, 
Bagirmi and Borno was not even mentioned in the 1890 negotiations as the 
Europeans relied heavily on indirect sources coming from the nineteenth-century 
explorers.6 
                                            
6 Obaro Ikime, ‘The Fall of Borno’, in The Fall of Nigeria: The British Conquest (London: 
Heinemann Educational, 1977), pp. 178-184. 
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Indeed, after their first 1891 agreement and before Rabih’s 1893 invasion, 
the British and French separately attempted to sign treaties with the Shehus of 
Borno in order to secure their position and claim the whole of Bornoan territory 
for their future negotiations. In 1892, the Royal Niger Company sent MacIntosh 
to sign a treaty with the Shehu. However, this expedition failed as MacIntosh was 
dismissed by the Shehu after spending two months in Kukawa. The latter hoisted 
the Ottoman flag as a symbol of his non-recognition of British authority. Did this 
mean that the Shehu saw himself as dependant of the Sublime Porte? It seems 
more logical to suggest that the Bornoan preferred to recognise a distant 
authority than the more commercially threatening Royal Niger Company.7 
The French similarly sent expeditions which aimed, among other goals, at 
signing a treaty with the Shehu of Borno. In 1891, Mizon failed to reach Lake 
Chad because of the Royal Niger Company’s actions which tried to prevent him 
from accessing the navigable parts of the Benue.8 In the same year, Crampel was 
assassinated in Wadai by Rabih’s army. Finally a few months after McIntosh’s 
visit, Monteil met the Shehu of Borno in 1892. In his narrative, Monteil described 
his letter for the Shehu of Borno as “a letter for the Sheikh of Borno written by 
Vizier Etienne in the name of King Carnot for Captain Monteil”.9 The French 
authorities such as President Sadi Carnot were eager to counter the British 
influence in Borno. This is the reason why Monteil established a diplomatic 
relationship with the Shehu of Borno to open the Bornoan markets to French 
products.10 
Nonetheless, when the Europeans sought to occupy their new paper 
acquisitions, they discovered that Borno was now ruled by Rabih and that their 
                                            
7 See a description of this expedition in John Flint, Sir George Goldie and the Making of Nigeria 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 171–172. 
8 See his description of Borno in Louis Mizon, ‘Les Royaumes Foulbe Du Soudan Central’, Annales 
De Géographie, 4 (1895), 346-368. 
9 Parfait Monteil, De Saint-Louis à Tripoli Par Le Lac Tchad Voyage Au Travers Du Soudan Et Du 
Sahara, Accompli Pendant Les Années 1890-1892 (Paris: Germer Baillière, 1895), p. 333. 
http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k30859f [accessed 14 December 2011]. 
10 See the introduction of Monteil’s book by Melchior de Vogüé in Monteil, De Saint-Louis à 
Tripoli, p. III–X. 
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intelligence about Sudan was obsolete. Thus to understand the recent dynamics 
of this region, they tried to acquire as much information as possible.  
In 1997, Kanya-Forstner and Lovejoy published French intelligence 
reports which dealt with Sokoto and Borno.11 In 1892 in Tunis, the French 
interrogated Adem Mahanna a Bornoan travelling back to Kukawa after his 
pilgrimage to Mecca. On his way to Mecca, he had already been interrogated by 
the British in Suakin.12 His interrogation in Tunis lasted twelve hours and 
revealed two conceptions of Borno in the nineteenth century. Firstly, according 
to Adem Mahamma, Borno proper was the core province of the kingdom 
“immediately to the west of the lake”. According to the pilgrim: 
The name of Borno was extended to the whole Empire of the Dunama 
which consisted for the rest, in separated states, governed by vassal 
dynasties; the vassality link becoming looser when these states were 
situated far from the centre of the Empire.13 
Thus, as seen in the previous section, it is possible to argue that the 
Bornoans, such as Adem Mahanna, had a territorial conception of Borno as both a 
province and as an Empire. In addition, the Bornoan pilgrim evoked the 
boundary of Borno with the Mahdist state founded by Hayatu ibn Sa’id in 
Adamawa.14 Thus, Adem Mahanna may have had a concept of a neat boundary 
between Borno and its most recent neighbours. This shows the extent to which 
the Europeans expected to benefit from the newest geopolitical updates in the 
Lake Chad basin. 
Moreover, Adem Mahamma’s report was translated from Arabic and 
written down by a French officer, Major Francis Rebillet. Rebillet’s perception of 
Borno was deeply influenced by his own education. For example, he constantly 
used European medieval concepts to refer to Borno. Borno was the core-province 
                                            
11  Alexander Kanya-Forstner and Paul Lovejoy, Pilgrims, Interpreters, and Agents: French 
Reconnaissance Reports on the Sokoto Caliphate and Borno, 1891-1895 (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1997). 
12 No archival records remain of this latter interview. 
13 El Hadj Adem Mahamma in Kanya-Forstner and Lovejoy, Pilgrims, Interpreters, and Agents, p. 
111. 
14 See Gabriel Warburg, Islam, Sectarianism and Politics in Sudan Since the Mahdiyya (London: 
Hurst & Company, 2003). 
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which gave its name to the whole “Empire of Borno”.15 Major Rebillet mentioned 
as well Borno vassals and its suzerainty over them and compared the last kings of 
the Sayfawa dynasty to the last kings of the Merovingian dynasty. Indeed, Major 
Rebillet evoked their role as “do-nothing kings” a phrase used by nineteenth- and 
early twentieth-century French historians to describe the late Merovingian 
kings.16 He even compared the Kanemi dynasty to the Carolingian dynasty when 
he qualified El-Kanemi as “mayor of the palace”.17 This illustrates the French 
perception of Borno as being in a medieval stage of development. The description 
of Borno provided by Adem Mahamma through Major Rebillet is a blatant 
example of social Darwinism applied to Borno. Jean-Louis Triaud showed how 
this perception was common among French colonial agents when considering 
Muslim societies in the nineteenth century.18 
This perception also corresponds to the way History was taught in Europe 
at this time. More precisely, the European perception of late nineteenth-century 
Borno found its origins in the nineteenth-century understanding of the European 
Middle-Ages. The Bornoan boundaries and territory would thus be equivalent to 
those of the European medieval states. For example, the nineteenth century 
history books described the European medieval states as pyramidal feudal 
monarchies ruling over their vassals through a personal link.19 To nineteenth 
century European eyes, Borno was nothing but medieval England or France. 
This bias from this French agent is not really surprising. It could also be 
argued that the perception of the boundaries and territory of Borno was largely 
influenced by direct witnesses such as Adem Mahamma. For example, the French 
authorities had a map traced according to local testimonies in order to obtain a 
                                            
15 The same phenomenon happened in France as the region around Paris was called France 
because it constituted the personal domains of the Frankish king. Subsequently, the name France 
was extended to the whole kingdom. 
16 Major Rebillet uses the term “rois fainéants” meaning literally “lazy kings” in Kanya-Forstner 
and Lovejoy, Pilgrims, Interpreters, and Agents, p. 102. 
17 Major Rebillet uses the term “maires du palais” meaning “mayor of the palace” or “majordomo”. 
The last Merovingian kings’ power was only a façade. Actual power in eighth-century CE Austrasia 
was retained by the ancestors of the Carolingian dynasty. 
18 Jean-Louis Triaud, ‘Islam in Africa Under French Colonial Rule’, in The History of Islam in Africa, 
ed. by Nehemia Levtzion and Randall Pouwels (Oxford: James Currey, 2000), pp. 169-188. 
19 James Bright, A History of England, 5th edn (London: Longmans, Green, 1897). 
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better understanding of the geopolitical status of the region. This logical 
gathering of geographical intelligence was undertaken to facilitate the conquest 
of Africa in general and Borno in this case. Not surprisingly the circulation of 
geographical knowledge for this period was crucial for European appetites. 
 
 
Figure 8: “The Empire of Borno”20 
 
                                            
20 Map in Kanya-Forstner and Lovejoy, Pilgrims, Interpreters, and Agents,p. 180. Reproduced with 
permission of the University of Wisconsin-Madison African Studies. 
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As the maps were created by the previous nineteenth-century explorers, 
they were mainly localisation maps. The most striking elements of the maps are 
the bold lines representing the communication axis between the different cities 
of Borno and Kano, the entrepot of Central Sudan and through the Sahara. In 
addition, the route to Mecca at the east of Lake Chad shows the importance of the 
east-west axis. This emphasis on the travelling conditions of the region is 
understandable as the sources for this map are explorers and travellers whether 
they are European or Bornoan. 
The caption provides an explanation of its creation as a mix between 
Captain Régnault de Lannoy’s map and the information brought by explorers and 
Adem Mahamma’s intelligence reports. The boundaries of Borno are stressed by 
the “+++” used by the cartographer who gave the maximum extent of the “empire 
of Borno” in the nineteenth century. However, this extent is only nominal as the 
provinces of “Kanem” and “Tebous” around Lake Chad were not part of the 
empire of Borno anymore. 
Does this exaggeration come from the image of Borno conveyed by the 
European explorers? Or does it come from the information provided by Adem 
Mahamma? The boundaries of Borno traced on this map are an idealised image of 
Borno in the nineteenth century. This representation is the result of the 
cartographic representation of Borno in the nineteenth century and does not take 
into account the evolution of the boundaries after the Fulani jihad. Adem 
Mahamma, coming from Borno himself, furnishes a biased image of his own 
country and shows its supposed strength to his interrogators. Thus, this 
cartographic representation of the boundaries of Borno is a melange of two 
biased representations of Central Sudan. 
 Thus, between 1890 and 1893, the British and the French failed to 
establish a durable diplomatic relationship with the Shehus of Borno but 
gathered more intelligence about the Chad basin. These three years can be 
considered as marking a direct change in European policy towards this region. 
Indeed, the boundary treaty signed in 1890 and the importance of the French 
colonial group accelerated the pace of the European interest in this region. This 
change has to be considered at a West African scale. In the same years, the British 
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defeated the Jibe and the French sought to conquer the kingdom of Amory and 
Dahomey.21 
 
2.1.2. Rabih’s concept of the territory and borders of Borno. 
 
In 1893, Rabih conquered Borno, was declared Shehu and ruled over 
Borno for seven years until his defeat at Kusseri in 1900. In 1893, the conqueror 
crossed the eastern border of the kingdom, the Shari river, and defeated two 
Borno armies. Shehu Hashimi flew westwards but was assassinated by his own 
nephew, Kyari, son of the next to last Shehu, Shehu Bukar (1880-1884).22 The 
new Shehu Kyari partially defeated the invader but finally lost the war against 
Rabih. The latter executed Shehu Kyari, and plundered and burnt Kukawa.23 In 
general, Rabih’s seven year rule is remembered as cruel and brutal as Rabih 
imposed heavy taxation and the bearing of a facial mark on his subjects.24 
Due to a lack of primary sources, the organisation of Rabih’s territories 
remains partially imprecise even if the conquest of Borno, on the one hand, and 
Rabih’s dark legend, on the other hand, provided a relatively large scholarship 
about his political legacy.25 As an heir to the Kanemi, Rabih tried to maintain the 
                                            
21 J. D. Hargreaves, ‘Western Africa, 1886-1905’, in The Cambridge History of Africa, John Fage and 
George Sanderson, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), VI, p. 268. 
22 Michael Horowitz, ‘Ba Karim: An Account of Rabeh’s Wars’, African Historical Studies, 3 (1970), 
391-402. 
23 Ronald Cohen, ‘From Empire to Colony: Bornu in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries’, in 
Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960: Vol. 3: Profiles of Change: African Society and Colonial Rule, ed. by 
Peter Duignan, L. H. Gann and V. Turner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 74-
126. 
24 Sydney Hogben and Anthony Kirk-Greene, The Emirates of Northern Nigeria: a Preliminary 
Survey of Their Historical Traditions (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 336 or Nina 
Stojanov, ‘L’image Du Tchad Dans La Littérature Coloniale 1891-1902’, Recherches En 
Anthropologie Et En Histoire De l’Afrique, 2005 <http://www.cemaf.cnrs.fr/IMG/pdf/16-clio.pdf> 
[accessed 16 December 2011]. 
25 For nearly contemporary sources, see Max von Oppenheim, Rabeh Und Das Tschadseegebiet 
(Berlin: D. Reimer, E. Vohsen, 1902), Emile Gentil and Alfred Mézières, La Chute De L’empire De 
Rabah (Paris: Hachette & Cie, 1902). For more recent scholarship see William Hallam, The Life 
and Times of Rabih Fadl Allah (Ilfracombe: Stockwell, 1977), William Hallam, ‘Rabih: His Place in 
History’, Borno Museum Society Newsletter, 15-16 (1993), 5-22, Kyari Tijani, ‘Borno, Rabih and the 
Challenge and Response of History’, Borno Museum Society Newsletter, 15-16 (1993), 23-30 and 
Kyari Mohammed, ‘Borno Under Rabih Fadl Allah, 1893-1900: The Emergence of a Predatory 
State’, Paideuma: Mitteilungen Zur Kulturkunde, 43-44 (1997), 281-300. I would like to thank 
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boundaries of Borno. Indeed, Rabih sent messengers to Zinder in order to ensure 
the submission of Damagaram as it constituted a vassal state to Borno. The sultan 
of Zinder refused to offer his submission as the territory had been nearly 
independent since the 1870s. According to Captain Jean Tilho, the former 
satellite-states situated in the west and north of Borno escaped Rabih’s grasp. 
Indeed this French officer explored the Chad basin area in 1904, 1907 and 1908 
and confirmed the fact that Zinder was now considered as independent.26 The 
province of Zinder, also known as Damagaram even succeeded in conquering 
Borno’s former dependencies, Gummel and Machina. 27  However, Rabih 
conquered some of Borno’s former tributary states such as Logone and ruled 
Bornoan former satellite-states south of Lake Chad as separate provinces.28 In 
addition, Rabih’s lieutenant Shehu Dab effectively occupied Bedde, a territory 
which only paid tribute to Borno in the nineteenth century.29 Military expeditions 
were sent against the former tributary states on the western boundary of Borno 
in order to secure trade routes and military security on the western marches of 
his kingdom.30 By attacking these states, Rabih behaved as his predecessors had. 
A range of buffer-states were supposed to assure his military security and 
provide him with the commercial links he needed. As the Shehus of Borno had 
tried in the nineteenth century, Rabih tried to ensure the submission of the 
western satellite-states. The same method was applied to Mandara which became 
Rabih’s vassal after Rabih sent his spy Faki Na’im to Shehu Umar.31 Located to the 
west of Borno, Katagum, even if not directly invaded, opened its markets to Rabih 
especially for the gunpowder Rabih needed. Therefore, the frontier politics 
applied by the Kanemi was reiterated by Rabih. 
                                                                                                                             
Murray Last who lent me his book: Kyari Mohammed, Borno in the Rabih Years, 1893-1901: the 
Rise and Crash of a Predatory State (Maiduguri: University of Maiduguri, 2006). 
26 Jean Tilho, ‘The French Mission to Lake Chad’, The Geographical Journal, 36 (1910), 271-286. 
27 Jean Tilho, Documents Scientifiques De La Mission Tilho (1906-1909) (Paris: Imprimerie 
Nationale, 1910), p. 450 and Anene, The International Boundaries of Nigeria, 1885-1960, p. 261. 
Tilho affirms that Zinder could not conquer Gummel whereas Anene stresses the contrary. 
28 Oppenheim, Rabeh Und Das Tschadseegebiet, p. 51. 
29 Kanya-Forstner and Lovejoy, Pilgrims, Interpreters, and Agents,p. 117. 
30 Hallam, The Life and Times of Rabih, pp. 151–2. 
31 Hallam, The Life and Times of Rabih, pp. 196–7. 
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By creating a range of buffer states around the territories directly 
administered from the capital of his kingdom, Dikwa, Rabih simply consolidated 
his power. The Bornoan boundaries did not disappear as Borno’s political legacy 
was too important to neglect for the new ruler. Thus, Rabih by his conquest of 
metropolitan Borno used the former boundaries of the kingdom as a framework 
for his ambitions. The main territorial differences between the Kanemi’s Borno 
and Rabih’s Borno were the definite loss of Zinder but the gain of Bedde and 
Mandara. 
According to Cohen, far from being cataclysmic, Rabih’s conquest led to 
the renewal of the leadership of Borno in the region.32 Weakened during the 
short reigns of Shehu Bakar (1880-1884), Shehu Ibrahim (1884-1885) and Shehu 
Hashimi (1885-1893), Borno was already losing its grasp on its satellite-states as 
Rabih reasserted the rights of the Borno leader over all the former vassal states 
but Zinder.33 
However, a question remains. The defeat of the Kanemis must have left a 
certain political vacuum that Rabih filled. Did Rabih conquer Borno former 
vassals to ascertain his rights as the new ruler of the country or did he simply 
invade all these former dependencies because they were weakened by the fall of 
the Kanemi dynasty? In other words, were these conquests due to the Bornoan 
legacy or were they purely circumstantial? The fact that Rabih withdrew from 
Western Borno in 1897 supports the latter hypothesis, though it is likely both 
factors were significant. Indeed as French expeditions were trying to reach the 
Chad basin, Rabih had to leave the western part of Borno to concentrate his 
forces on his eastern borders.34 Thus, even if Rabih behaved as a Shehu of Borno, 
he could also demonstrate his talents in Realpolitik. 
The religious dimension of Rabih’s rule over Borno should not be ignored 
either. Rabih due to his origin in Eastern Sudan was particularly influenced by 
the mahdiyya. However, his exact relationship with the Sudanese religious leader 
Muhammad Ahmad, who in 1881,  claimed to be the redeemer of Islam, the 
                                            
32 Cohen, 'From Empire to Colony', pp. 74-126. 
33 Anene, The International Boundaries of Nigeria, 1885-1960, p. 260. 
34 Mohammed, Borno in the Rabih Years, pp. 126–7. 
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mahdī, remains to be explored. Ahmad had successfully rebelled against the 
Turco-Egyptian rule and the mahdist state he had created survived until it was 
defeated by the British in 1898.  
What were the influences of this Mahdist state on Borno? Before Rabih’s 
invasion, Shehu Ibrahim of Borno had already sent emissaries to the Mahdist 
Sudan.35 Rabih fought for the mahdist ideology and officially established a 
mahdist state in Borno.36 However, the modalities of the creation of this mahdist 
system have never been examined by any scholar. Asserting that Borno became a 
mahdist state between 1893 and 1900 seems to be too far-fetched. The available 
sources are too weak to demonstrate that Rabih’s state was a genuine mahdist 
state. The historian Kyari Mohammed had underlined the fact that Rabih adopted 
the Mahdist ways in appearance but never practised its doctrine.37 However, did 
RAbih’s Mahdist tendencies have any implications for his conception of territory 
and boundary? 
The lack of sources to explore this avenue of inquiry should not obscure 
the fact that Borno was already in contact with the mahdiyya before Rabih’s 
invasion. This would tend to prove that Rabih’s conception of territoriality might 
not radically be different from the Kanemi’s framework. For example, a mahdist 
state had been founded in 1885 by Mallam Jibril Gaini in Bormi on the boundary 
between Sokoto and Borno.38 Did Rabih’s millenarian beliefs prevent him from 
reorganising his conquered territories as Last argued?39 For these religious 
reasons, Rabih would not have undertaken a reorganisation of the Kanemi 
kingdom. This argument does not seem convincing as other millenarian 
communities such as the Fifth Monarchists in seventeenth-century England tried 
to reorganise their society.40 
                                            
35 Mohammed, Borno in the Rabih Years, p. 33. 
36 Mohammed, Borno in the Rabih Years. 
37 Mohammed, Borno in the Rabih Years, pp. 109–10. 
38 Warburg, Islam, Sectarianism and Politics in Sudan Since the Mahdiyya, p. 46. 
39 Interview with Murray Last 04/05/2010. 
40 Michael Barkun, ‘Millenarianism in the Modern World’, Theory and Society, 1 (1974), 117-146. 
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Thus, either for religious or for practical reasons, it can be argued that 
Rabih ruled over Borno as the Shehus did before him and used the pre-existing 
boundaries to hold his domains. As the most prestigious kingdom in Central 
Sudan, Borno was Rabih’s power basis as demonstrated by the choice of Dikwa in 
Borno as the capital of not only Borno but also his other territories. In addition, 
Rabih tried to develop diplomatic ties with his powerful neighbours and married 
his daughter, Hauwa to Hayatu ibn Sai’d, the renegade great-grandson of Usman 
dan Fodio.41 In a general way, Rabih behaved as a Borno Shehu and was able to 
rule with the help of the semi-nomadic Arab Shuwa and some members of the 
previous Shehu’s family.42 According to oral sources quoted by the historian 
Hallam, he even claimed a library in the city of Murzuk in modern-day Libya 
which belonged to Shehu el-Kanemi, thus showing his inheritance of the Borno 
throne.43 
Émile Gentil, one of the officers of the French army which killed Rabih 
stated: 
But he saw also that he, as a newcomer, could not himself  
undertake the direct administration of a country whose language 
and customs were unfamiliar to him and his followers. He 
therefore left the local chiefs in charge of their various districts, 
so as to provide a liaison between people and ruler; but made 
them subordinate to his own chiefs’ officers, who took his orders, 
and whose reliability he ensured by keeping them near him.44 
In 1971, when describing Rabih’s rule, the anthropologist Ronald Cohen 
evoked the creation of a “third Bornu dynasty” compared Rabih’s acculturation in 
Borno with the Fulanis’ adoption of Hausa culture in the nineteenth century.45 
However, the question of acculturation to Borno culture, does not seem to fit 
                                            
41 Hayatu ibn Sai’d was renegade and the Caliph of Sokoto had allowed the Emir of Fombina to 
wage war on him. Personal communication with Kyari Mohammed (16/12/2011). 
42 Ikime, 'The Fall of Borno', pp. 178-184. 
43 Hallam, The Life and Times of Rabih, pp. 196–7. 
44 Gentil and Mézières, quoted in Thomas Hodgkin, Nigerian Perspectives: an Historical Anthology 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 320–1. 
45 Cohen, 'From Empire to Colony', p. 80. 
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with Rabih’s attitude towards his conquered territories.46 Indeed, according to 
Kyari Mohammed, Rabih created a military dictatorship, the only goal of which 
was to extract money from looting and taxes. Acculturation was thus possible but 
it never happened.47 Famine was common across much of Africa in the last years 
of the century, partly due to drought, partly rinderpest, partly instability. Rabih’s 
political choices consequently reinforced famine in Borno from 1898 on. It can be 
argued that Rabih behaved as an invader but used the political framework of the 
Borno boundaries to assert his power. 
 
2.2. All Paths Lead to Borno 
2.2.1.  “All the resources from Congo, Bornu, Senegal, Algeria and Tunisia 
will be gathered for us”: The French Push for Borno 
 
At the end of the nineteenth century, the French were especially 
interested in linking their colonies in Senegal, Algeria and Congo. However, the 
British were not ready to relinquish the wealthy Sudanic kingdoms they had 
contacted through the Royal Niger Company. Yet, their interest in the African 
polities was secondary as the global competition between both countries was the 
real driving force in the Scramble for Africa as epitomised by the 1898 Fashoda 
incident. Thus, the question of Borno must be firstly understood on a western 
African scale but also on a world scale. Indeed, the negotiations between the 
British, French and Germans took place in Europe and were dealing with 
territories located in Northern America or South-East Asia as well as in Africa. As 
the main part of Adamawa was obtained by Germany in 1893, the British and the 
French nearly always dealt with Sokoto and Borno, the two other great Sudanic 
states, together. 
                                            
46 The question of the acculturation of a conqueror to a culturally strong territory was in the 
centre of a debate in Chinese history for example. When the Manchu conquered Beijing in 1644 
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47 Mohammed, Borno in the Rabih Years. 
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Thus, the negotiations between the United Kingdom and France always 
considered Borno as a relatively small portion of the colonial cake. In addition, 
Borno was always included as factor in the delimitation of the Northern Nigerian 
boundary which was created in five different phases. The first agreement was 
signed in 1890 and was only a general delimitation of the European possessions 
between Say on the Niger River and Barruwa on the shores of Lake Chad. This 
first boundary was modified in 1898 in order to take into account the real extent 
of the caliphate of Sokoto as Thom demonstrated.48 When the tensions between 
the two European powers diminished, a new agreement was signed in 1904 for 
the French to gain access to a “practicable route” through their possessions. 
Finally, the last modifications of 1906 and 1910 slightly altered the boundary 
line. 
However, these repeated revisions to the Bornoan boundaries were 
totally ignored by the Europeans who built their treaties on some of the pre-
existing boundaries in central Sudan. 
A “light soil in which the Gallic cock can scratch”: these are the words Lord 
Salisbury supposedly said when referring to the declaration of 5th August 1890 
which delimited the northern possessions of the United Kingdom in modern-day 
Nigeria. These words were apparently created by the French press in the 1890s 
but stressed the diplomatic climate between both countries.49 Indeed when a 
boundary was established on 5th August 1890, the fertile lands south of the line 
Say-Barruwa were left to the United Kingdom whereas the “light soil”50 north of 
this line was left to France.  
 
II. The Government of Her Britannic Majesty recognizes the 
sphere of influence of France to the South of her Mediterranean 
possessions, up to a line from Saye [Say] on the Niger, to Barrawa 
[Baroua] on Lake Tchad drawn in such manner as to comprise in 
the sphere of action of the Niger Company all that fairly belongs 
                                            
48 Thom, The Niger-Nigeria Boundary 1890-1906. 
49 Frank Cana, ‘The Sahara in 1915’, The Geographical Journal, 46 (1915), 333-357. 
50 Apparently in Lord Salisbury’s own words. 
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to the Kingdom of Sokoto; the line to be determined by the 
Commissioners to be appointed.51 
 
The boundaries in the Lake Chad area in 1890 
(the red line represents the European boundary) 
 
 In this first boundary agreement, the real extent of the caliphate of Sokoto 
was at stake as the boundary was located in the North of Borno. The diplomatic 
ballet between the United Kingdom and France has already been studied by 
Adeleye in 1971 and Hirshfield in 1979.52 For the British, Borno was considered 
as being part of their sphere of influence because it was south of the Say-Barruwa 
line. However, as Anene put it “on the whole, the British position in respect of 
                                            
51 Edward Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1967), pp. 738–9. 
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Borno was very vulnerable, the Say-Barruwa line notwithstanding”.53 The reason 
why the French tried to gain access to Borno was because the British did not sign 
any treaty with the Shehu and because Borno self-evidently did not belong to 
Sokoto. This was a perfect opportunity for the French to obtain more than the 
content of the treaty. 
 The French colonial pressure group was particularly involved in this 
claim. Indeed, even if they were not the final decision-makers, these lobbyists 
tried to obtain more territory than was stipulated in the 1890 boundary 
agreement. Darcy, a member of this group, wrote that “the fateful 1890 treaty […] 
ruled us out of Sokoto, Bornu, Adamawa, the jewels of Central Sudan.”54 He 
cynically suggested that Borno was “rich, powerful and half-civilised”, a fact 
which justified the French interest in this kingdom. 55  He quoted Gabriel 
Hanotaux the French foreign minister of 1894-95 and 1896-98: 
Article 2 of the 5 August 1890 declaration only determined the 
hinterland’s limits of our Mediterranean possessions […] without 
restricting us from accessing the territories, other than Sokoto, 
located south of the line Say-Barruwa.56 
In 1891, Bissuel in his book The French Sahara evoked Crampel’s mission 
which resulted in the signing of a treaty with the Sultan of Borno.57 A second 
mission led by Captain Monteil was sent in 1890 to reconnoitre the new border 
line. Two expeditions led by Mizon were also sent to the Benue and Chad basin in 
1890-91 and 1892-93.58 The latter wrote that “a convention with Adamawa will 
prevent the English and the Germans from accessing the interior of Africa, 
Bagirmi, Wadai and even Borno.”59 
                                            
53 Anene, The international boundaries of Nigeria, 1885-1960, p. 269. 
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General Philebert another member of the French colonial lobby-group 
campaigned for the conquest of Borno in his writing and cartography.60 
 
The only means to prevent this boundless [British] ambition is to 
penetrate ourselves into Africa and take hold of Lake Chad. Thus, 
the western part [of Africa] will be ours. All the resources from 
Congo, Bornu, Senegal, Algeria and Tunisia will be gathered for 
us.61 
 
 
Charles Philebert, French Africa 
What it is – What it should be62 
                                            
60 For more information about the French colonial policy see C. W. Newbury and Alexander 
Kanya-Forstner, ‘French Policy and the Origins of the Scramble for West Africa’, The Journal of 
African History, 10 (1969), 253-276. See also Stuart Persell, The French Colonial Lobby, 1889-1938 
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983). 
61 Charles Philebert, Le Partage De l’Afrique (Paris: Henri-Charles Lavauzelle, 1896), p. 54 
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Thus, the conquest of Borno was thought about in West African terms. The 
scale of the map published in Philebert’s book reveals the conception of Central 
Sudan divided in numerous polities which had to be acquired through treaties 
and if necessary, conquest. Borno is according to the key a “region which should 
be a part of our sphere of influence”. Thus, the French were conscious of the 
existence of the Bornoan territory and were using its independence as an 
element of negotiation. This map could be considered as an imperial instrument 
of power against the British claims and stresses the European conception of 
African polities as tools in their negotiations to expand their colonial empires. 
Therefore, it would be possible to argue that the Europeans diplomatically took 
into account the Sokoto and Borno territories because of the role played by the 
French pro-colonial lobby group and by some French military officers. 
However, this interest in African polities was subordinated to the 
negotiations for the colonial empire as a whole. The question of the extent of 
polities such as Borgu or Sokoto in the 1890s was more a diplomatic and legal 
battle than an ethnological one. The will to preserve the unity of nineteenth-
century polities was linked to the fact that they would be easier to colonise and, 
later, administrate. Thus, if the British and the French wanted to preserve the 
unity of Borno, it was because it served their interests. This was the reason for 
which they conceptualised its territory in their negotiations. Prescott in his 
geographical study of the Nigerian boundaries noticed that “each country tended 
to favour the interpretation which best supported its territorial claim.”63 
According to the British official documents, the 1898 agreement was 
based on a German map of Africa representing Borno.64 
Passing to Lake Chad, his Excellency pointed out that the eastern 
boundary of Bornu had, in the map which accompanied the 
Convention of 1898, been drawn so as apparently to intersect the 
middle of Lake Chad, the idea presumably being that the French 
                                            
63 Prescott, The Evolution of Nigeria’s International and Regional Boundaries: 1861-1971, p. 65. 
64 Justus Perthes’s map of 1892 according to Foreign Office, George Peabody Gooch and Harold 
Temperley, British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914 (London: H.M.S.O., 1927), p. 
348. 
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should be given facilities for crossing by water from their 
possessions to the north of Lake Chad to their possessions lying 
south and east of the Lake.65 
Thus, this document reveals that the creation of boundaries within Lake 
Chad was done according to a narrow interpretation of the boundaries of 
nineteenth-century Borno. The territorial claims in question were based on 
African territories and not only on lines created haphazardly on the maps. In 
1938, the geographer Jacques Ancel defined a boundary as being a “political 
isobar”, id est a line of equal political pressures.66 Indeed, Borno was located at 
the meeting of pressures between the French and British colonial claims. Their 
competition for the whole territory of Borno made the French consider their 
conquest in Bornoan territorial terms. As the British and the French chose to 
ignore the current geopolitical realities of Sokoto and Borno, they based their 
claims on the pseudo-extent of nineteenth-century polities. Thom and Hirshfield 
have already demonstrated this for Sokoto. 
The European claims then were territorially based, reflecting the 
boundaries and the territory of Borno. Hence, the conception of the nineteenth-
century boundaries of Borno was primordial in the French negotiations against 
the British for Lake Chad. 
 
2.2.2. The Anglo-German Boundary of 1893 or How to Divide Borno to Keep 
the French Away? 
 
The presence of the German Reich in Africa is often referred to as a 
belated attempt to participate in the “Scramble for Africa” as Bismarck was said 
to have had little interest in a colonial empire. However, the conference of Berlin 
(1884-1885) led to the regulation of trade and determined the rules of 
acquisition of territories even if it did not specifically carve out boundaries in 
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Africa apart from the boundaries of the Free State of Congo.67 Before the First 
World War, the German Empire had acquired five territories in Africa. Witu was a 
1600 km2 protectorate in modern-day Kenya, which was held between 1885 and 
1890 before being handed over to the British. The other territories were modern-
day Namibia “Südwestafrika”, modern-day Tanzania without Zanzibar 
“Ostafrika”, modern-day Togo and a part of Ghana “Togo” and modern-day 
Cameroon with a stretch of territories in modern-day Nigeria, “Kamerun”. 
The presence of the Germans in Africa can be explained by the 
competition between the British and French in Africa which led the British to 
favour the Germans in regions where French colonial power was too 
preponderant.68 This competition enabled the Germans to obtain a tract of land 
between the Bight of Biafra and Lake Chad as the British hoped that it would 
prevent the different French territories from being unified, as in the 1890s the 
French were trying to join their possessions in Western and Central Africa.69 
Thus, the framework of the Kamerun boundaries can be partly explained by the 
competition between the British, the French and the Germans. 
Moreover, the Germans had a previous scientific knowledge of the Chad 
region; German agents, before and after the creation of the German empire in 
1871, were very active in the Chad region as travellers and scientists travelled 
through modern-day Niger, Nigeria and Cameroon in the second half of the 
nineteenth century.70 As seen in the previous section, Barth in 1850-1855 and 
Nachtigal in 1870-1871 had visited the kingdom of Borno. Thus, when the 
Germans signed agreements with the British in 1893 and the French in 1894, 
they had a scientific knowledge of the Chad basin. Despite the lack of consistency 
in their colonial policy, the German colonial powers hoped to secure a vast area 
in the Chad region. Their interest in the whole Sudan region was not restricted to 
                                            
67 Simon Katzenellenbogen, ‘It Didn’t Happen in Berlin: Politics, Economics and Ignorance in the 
Setting of Africa’s Colonial Boundaries’, in African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits, and 
Opportunities, ed. by Paul Nugent and Anthony Asiwaju (London: Pinter, 1996), pp. 21-34. 
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future Kamerun but to future Nigeria as well. It was particularly hoped that the 
Benue River and the Chad Lake would offer trading opportunities equivalent to 
those of the Congo or Niger. 
The framework of the Kamerun boundaries can also be explained by the 
partly failed colonial ambitions of the Germans in Western and Central Africa. 
More specifically, the belief that the water system of the new protectorate would 
offer trading opportunities was also responsible for the shape of their colony as 
the protectorate of Kamerun was declared in 1884. As Akinwumi puts it: 
The Chad region was highly contested for by the three colonial 
powers. Central to the Chad project was the Adamawa emirate.71 
 This section will argue that the kingdom of Borno was also central to the 
Chad project and that the German perception of the northern boundaries of their 
colony largely relied on the nineteenth-century conception of Borno. 
The first boundary agreement between Germany and the United Kingdom 
was signed in 1885 and delimited the boundary from the Bight of Biafra to the 
Cross River rapids. In 1886, the boundary was extended to Yola and on 15 
November 1893, an agreement was signed so that the new boundary reached 
Lake Chad. Thus, from 1885 to 1893, within eight years, the eastern boundary of 
Nigeria was defined. However, the delimitation was far from being precise: 
In the event of future surveys showing that a point so fixed 
assigns to the British sphere a less proportion of the southern 
shore of Lake Chad than is shown in the aforesaid map, a new 
terminal point making good such deficiency, and as far as possible 
in accordance with that at present indicated, shall be fixed as 
soon as possible by mutual agreement. Until such agreement is 
arrived at, the point on the southern shore of Lake Chad, situated 
35 minutes east of the meridian of the centre of the town of Kuka, 
shall be the terminal point.72 
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Figure 9: “Map to illustrate the boundary between Great Britain and 
Germany in West Africa.”73 
 
 This agreement revealed how much these treaties relied on previous 
observations and the precision of maps. In the case of Borno, the maps were 
imprecise and the impossibility of exploring and demarcating Rabih’s kingdom in 
1893 delayed the boundary demarcation commission to 1903. As seen on Fig. 9, 
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the pink area traditionally representing the British Empire, encompassed the 
most important towns south of the Sahara. This division of the Lake Chad basin 
symbolised the British ambitions to prevent the French from acquiring fertile 
territories north of Lake Chad.74 
However, in 1893, the Germans and the British were only starting their 
expansion beyond the Atlantic coast.75 This boundary agreement totally ignored 
the geopolitical situation of the Lake Chad region located more than 1000 
kilometres from the coasts and arbitrarily deprived Borno of its eastern 
borderlands. 
 
2.2.3. The British, Rabih and the French: ménage à trois in Central Sudan. 
 
Rabih’s conquest threatened the boundaries that the British, French and 
Germans had planned to implement between their spheres of influence. The 
British and French attitudes towards Rabih differed significantly. On the one 
hand, the British chose to recognise Rabih as ‘Sultan of Borno’ with the then-
leader of the West African Frontier Force, Lord Lugard seeing in him a legitimate 
ruler of Borno.76 On the other hand, the French sought to conquer the western 
shores of Lake Chad and so considered Rabih as an illegitimate ruler in the 
region. Thus, the British and the French with identical motivations respectively 
supported and fought against Rabih. Fernand Foureau, a French scientist 
travelling with the military expedition led by Amédée-François Lamy, was 
instrumental in the declaration of Umar Sanda, an heir to the throne of Borno, as 
Shehu.77 This was not fortuitous. Indeed ancient parts of the empire of Kanem-
Borno, such as Kanem or Zinder were now in the French “sphere of influence”. 
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With the presence of an heir to the throne, the French considered they had a 
trump card to play in the Scramble for Borno. 
 
All the notables came over, manifesting their joy to see us, 
naturally expecting that we would get rid of the heavy and 
ruinous authority of Rabih. 
Endless discussions were held around us as two sons of the 
former dethroned Shehu of Kuka were present, Umar Sanda and 
his brother Abubakar Garbai.78 
 
 
Figure 10: Umar Sanda’s photograph taken by Foureau’s mission in 1900.79 
 
When Rabih assassinated a French trader, Ferdinand de Béhagle in 1899, 
the French retaliated by sending military forces. A first column led by Émile 
Gentil was partly defeated but when three French columns joined, they finally 
killed Rabih and on 22nd April 1900.80 Subsequently, the British and the French 
tried to influence the struggle between different would-be Shehus of Borno. 
Rabih’s son, Fadl Allah tried to secure British support for his claim to be 
recognised as Sultan. Lugard was favourable to him but the French favoured 
heirs to the Kanemi dynasty, Umar Sanda until 1900 and Abubakar Garbai later. 
                                            
78 Foureau, Fernand, D’Alger Au Congo Par Le Tchad (Paris: Masson et Cie, 1905), pp. 595-6. 
79 Foureau, D’Alger Au Congo Par Le Tchad, p. 603. 
80 Ikime, 'The Fall of Borno', pp. 178-184. 
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The French supported Umar Sanda until 1900 when he refused to make the 
Shuwa Arabs migrate to the East of Lake Chad.  This refusal cost him his exile to 
the French Congo.81 Because of the cattle-tax they had to pay, Shuwa Arabs were 
considered as an important economic resource by the French and Shehu alike. 
The French preferred Abubakar Garbai to be Shehu in Dikwa, in the German-
reserved part of Borno. They favoured the latter because he could pay them 
tribute.82 Did the French choose the new Shehu of Dikwa because they still 
thought they could obtain German Borno? 
However, after Fadl Allah’s death, the British offered Abubakar Garbai the 
position of Shehu of British Borno, a position that Abubakar Garbai accepted.83 
Thus, the new European powers fought to obtain a legitimate power of Borno on 
its side as they tried to integrate Borno within their own sphere of influence. 
Rabih’s conquest delayed British, French and German plans for Central 
Sudan. When they dealt with Rabih, the French and British totally ignored the 
Anglo-German border. Their actions in the supposedly German sphere of 
influence before the German arrival did not take into account the boundary 
agreement of 1893. Were the French trying to occupy the maximum extent of 
Borno despite the previous agreements? This argument could explain the French 
repeated attacks against Rabih.  
The “race for Nikki” which brought the French and British into opposition 
in the 1890s in present-day Benin and Nigeria already showed that the French 
subscribed to the theory of “effective occupation”. Indeed, in order to prove the 
full extent of an assumed Borgu confederation, the British and the French sent 
soldiers to assess the importance of the political link within the Borgu 
confederation. This race for the assumed capital of the confederation, Nikki, 
became an episode of the Franco-British competition in Western Sudan.84 Borno 
                                            
81 Ikime, 'The Fall of Borno', p. 180. 
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83 Ikime, 'The Fall of Borno', pp. 178-184. 
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1960’, Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, XII (1984), 77-94. 
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could be considered as another example of this race but, this time the Europeans 
were much better informed. 
The only difference was that the French agreed in 1890 on the creation of 
a line from Say on the Niger to Barruwa on the shores of Lake Chad.  
According to specialists of international law: 
[t]hat the imperial powers agreed that treaties of cession had to 
be signed to legitimate transfer of territory in Africa suggests a 
greater respect for the existence of a people than was granted to 
Latin American indigenous peoples, even though in both cases the 
imperial powers ultimately achieved their end result – the 
acquisition of territory.85 
It can be contended that the multiple French attempts to fight Rabih and 
to control the Shehus in Dikwa were an endeavour to dominate the Lake Chad 
region in the effective absence of the other imperial powers. In addition, it must 
be remembered that the French were ousted from the negotiations for the 
domination of Adamawa at the start of the 1890s by the British and the Germans. 
Were their energies redirected to Borno in consequence? Compared to the 
British and Germans, the French had less direct knowledge of the region as the 
nineteenth-century explorers were either British or German but the French 
troops were the first European soldiers in the Lake Chad Basin. It could be 
considered that the French were either willing to conquer Borno or that they 
tried to occupy the region in order to force renewed negotiations for the whole of 
the Sahel. 
The French support for the Kanemi dynasty could have been indeed a 
method of delaying the British and German plans and would have given them 
some leverage in their negotiations for the whole of Sudan. The fact that they 
tried to attract the Shuwa Arab pastoralists into their sphere of influence 
suggests that the French were trying to bide their time and intended to benefit 
from the nineteenth-century structures of Borno. Therefore, the nineteenth-
century boundaries of Borno were re-used by the French as an argument in their 
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bid in Central Sudan without taking into account their previous agreements with 
the British and Germans. 
The eventual aim of the Europeans was to assert the importance of the 
new boundaries but their different time of arrival in Borno made them 
emphasise or ignore the nineteenth-century pattern of the Borno boundaries 
according to their own situation. Thus, the Europeans made conscious choices 
when they evoked Borno in their diplomatic relations. These choices were 
determined by their respective positions in Central Sudan and their subsequent 
political agenda. 
Thus, the French did not perceive Borno as their British and Germans 
counterparts did because the agreement signed with the British in 1890 did not 
suit the 1890s French colonial agenda. The evolution of the French position in 
Western and Central Africa made them reconsider their position. They were 
indeed eager to stress the homogeneity of nineteenth-century Borno so that they 
could ignore the Anglo-German treaty. By stressing the unity of Borno and the 
role of the Kanemi Shehu, they simply wanted to renegotiate their position in 
Central Sudan. 
This highly pragmatic position had thus little to do with national 
stereotypes of colonisation strategies. Indeed, the French because of their 
Republican values supposedly colonised Africa in order to assimilate territories 
to the rest of the French territories.86 The British on the other hand were 
supposedly more willing to consider the role of the nineteenth-century rulers in 
order to legitimise their own position in Africa. In the case of 1890s Borno, this 
does not seem to be the case. The French were willing to support a nineteenth-
century ruler because he suited their interests. Even if the latter was a puppet 
ruler, he provided the French with a historical legitimacy. 
It is exactly this legitimacy that the French sought when they made the 
Shehu of Borno sign a boundary agreement with the sultan of Bagirmi. This 
document found in the Nigerian National Archives has never been studied 
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before.87 Obviously, the question of its authenticity is immediately raised. Only an 
English translation of the treaty remains in Kaduna whereas the Arabic original 
was stolen.88 Nonetheless, for reasons described in a following chapter, the 
British used this treaty in 1923 as a proof of an existing pre-colonial diplomatic 
relationship between Borno and Bagirmi. According to Herbert Palmer, resident 
of Borno in 1923, Émile Gentil at the head of the French troops had this treaty 
signed after the death of Rabih in 1900.89 
[…] This is an agreement between the Sultan son of a Sultan, 
Muhammad Abd ur Rahman Kori son of the deceased Muhammad 
Abd ul Kadir Sultan of Bagirmi, and the Sultan son of a Sultan, 
Sheikh Umar son of the deceased Ibrahim son of the deceased 
Sheikh Muhammad al Kanemi, sultan of Bornu. May God protect 
them. Amen. 
After that:- they have made known their rights pertaining to their 
kingdoms and made by this writing a final and complete 
agreement, and fixed the river Shari, the well-known river, as a 
common boundary between their territories: and in addition to 
that, they agreed on the one hand that Buguman and its subject 
lands and villages between (the) Logone and the Shari as also the 
towns of Gulfei and Shawi and Makari and all their lands should 
belong without question to the kingdom of the Sultan of Bagirmi: 
and on the other hand that Logone and Kusseri and their lands 
and villages, and the land lying between (the) Logone and the 
Shari which belongs to Kusseri should be, without question, in the 
kingdom of the Sultan of Bornu [...]90 
 This boundary treaty illustrates the diplomatic relationships between 
Sudanic rulers. As seen in the previous chapter, letters written in Arabic were 
often exchanged between nineteenth-century rulers. The case of boundary 
agreements was not uncommon either. However, this document could constitute 
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the first Borno-Bagirmi boundary agreement retrieved to this date. This 1900 
agreement could appear as a belated attempt to define the boundaries between 
the two polities. Why would Umar Sanda, newly appointed Shehu of Borno with 
the help of the French, sign such a treaty? Why would the Sultan of Bagirmi, Abd-
ar Rahman Gawrang sign a treaty with the French? 
The “well-known” Shari River was already the boundary between pre-
colonial Borno and Bagirmi. The fact that Émile Gentil made the two rulers 
recognise this common boundary in an official document reveals the French 
attitude towards Borno and Bagirmi after Rabih’s defeat. As the Sultan of Bagirmi 
had signed a treaty of protection with the French in 1897, the French wanted to 
have a proof of Bagirmi’s extent to assert their position towards the Germans. 
Indeed, the French and the Germans had already signed a boundary agreement 
on 15th March 1894.91 In both treaties, the same emphasis was put on the Shari 
River as the boundary between both polities. Thus at two levels, the Shari river 
was a boundary. In 1894, at a European level, the Shari River was supposedly the 
common boundary between the French and the German possessions. In 1900, at 
a local level, Borno and Bagirmi recognised the Shari River as their common 
boundary. This is not a coincidence. This last phenomenon proves to what extent 
the French were ready to use the Bornoan concept of boundary to suit their own 
interests. 
The French hand behind this Bornoan-Bagirmi agreement was obvious as 
this Sudanic treaty was used as evidence to reinforce the French claim to their 
possessions. Such a boundary agreement could be understood as a legal farce but 
the Shari River was genuinely the border between one of Borno’s vassals, Logone, 
and Bagirmi in the nineteenth century. The French intentions became clearer as 
this agreement could be for them a guarantee that, if they did not obtain Borno, 
they would at least obtain Bagirmi whose authority was here clearly recognised 
and defined. The question of the date of this treaty could even be raised. As the 
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original was lost, there is no proof that the treaty was really signed after Rabih’s 
death. It could have been signed beforehand when the French armies were 
preparing to attack Rabih in 1899. 
However did the British have a different perception of the territory of 
Borno? The willingness to recognise a ruler such as Rabih or his son Fadl Allah 
pleaded for a dynastic continuity in a territorially-crippled Borno. The different 
choices made by the French and the British underlined their effective military 
position in Central Sudan at the end of the 1890s. Could it be argued that these 
two different visions originated from two different colonial ideologies? Similar 
cases have already been studied in Madagascar where the French and British 
underlined different characteristics of the Merina society.92 For the French, the 
Merina society was oppressing the other islanders whereas for the British, the 
Merina society was the leading group of the island ready to unify Madagascar 
under their rule. 
The 1890s European perception of Borno illustrates how colonial ideology 
varied according to circumstances. As these circumstances differed for the British 
and the French, so did their perception of the territory of Borno. For the British, 
the Anglo-German boundary agreement of 1893 separating Borno in two 
different parts was their only source of legitimacy. Their title to Bornoan 
territory was a legal treaty signed in Europe. As for the French who arrived 
earlier in this region, their perceived advantage was that effective occupation of 
the territory might grant them a right to modify the situation.93 The treatment of 
the Bornoan territory demonstrates how there was not such a thing as a pre-
conceived ideological kit when dealing with space. 
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Conclusion 
When creating new boundaries in Africa, the European ignorance of the 
African realities was often dubbed a “tea-and-macaroons approach”94. Indeed, it 
was in the comfort of the European chancelleries that many African borders were 
imagined. However, the 1890s were the years when the European boundary 
treaties were confronted with the territorial reality of Central Sudan. The 
Europeans had to re-assess the geopolitical situation of the Lake Chad Basin. The 
dynastic and territorial situation was even more complex than previously 
thought because of Rabih’s invasion of Borno. 
The relative adaptability of the European treaties enabled the French to 
contemplate renegotiating the early treaties of 1890 and 1894. The nineteenth-
century Bornoan territory as re-employed by Rabih became the framework for 
new negotiations between the Europeans as it was used as a legal tool to justify 
the French ambitions in Central Sudan. Thus, the 1890s invaders of Borno, 
whether they were Rabih or the Europeans, simply based their own claims on the 
militarily weak but still coherent territory of Borno. 
The case of Europeans using or re-inventing a precolonial tradition has 
already been largely debated in the last 30 years.95 However, the Bornoan case 
was specific. Because it was invaded by Rabih only seven years before being 
conquered by the Europeans, the latter had to deal with a particularly complex 
situation. In an obvious manner, the Europeans could not apply the Hegelian 
principle of the absence of African History to this part of Africa. History was 
unrolling under their eyes. The choice of the ruling dynasty was thus in the 
balance. There was no specific reason why the Europeans should have either 
supported Rabih or one of the Kanemis. The temporary context made the British 
choose Rabih and the French, the Kanemi Umar Sanda. 
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The Europeans had to choose which ancient Borno they would have to 
revive. This choice put them directly in contact with different pretenders to the 
Bornoan throne under European rule. As seen before, the framework of the 
nineteenth-century borders of Borno was re-used by the French to support their 
ambitions. The dynasty was thus a variable in an equation where the territory 
was the constant. 
The next chapter will assess how the British and the Germans recycled the 
territory of Borno within their early colonial administration from 1902 to 1914. 
It will be shown that the European colonisation was not a rupture from the 
territorial point of view. Indeed, Borno did not disappear within Kamerun or 
Nigeria but was reused to facilitate colonial rule. Thus, just as Rabih did in the 
late nineteenth century, the European invaders recycled the nineteenth-century 
territory of Borno. 
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3. The Quest for a Territorial Framework 
 
As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, the literature about the 
partition of African territories is dense. The legacy of the colonial borders can 
explain this bibliographical wealth. On 22nd April 1900, the death of Rabih paved 
the way for the effective occupation of Borno. This chapter intends to focus on 
the actual partition of Borno between 1900 and the capture of German Borno by 
the British and the French in 1916. The British occupied Borno in March 1902 
when Morland was dispatched by Lord Lugard to occupy the kingdom.1 The 
German presence in the northern parts of Kamerun and in Borno in particular 
was not effective before Dikwa, Rabih’s former capital, was taken over from the 
French in April 1902.2 
As already stipulated in the previous boundary treaty of 1893, the core of the 
territory of Borno became mainly British whereas its eastern part became 
German. The former vassal of Borno, Zinder became French. The aim of this 
chapter is to analyse the imposition of the borders in the early colonial period 
from a cultural and spatial angle. This chapter will not examine the boundary 
treaties under a legal scope as this has been already studied elsewhere.3 
This section will argue that an ideological discrepancy existed between the 
European conception of the borders while in Europe and their pragmatic usage of 
the Bornoan territory and borders once in the field. The second section of this 
chapter will demonstrate by analysing colonial reports and maps of Borno that 
both the British and Germans desperately wanted to acquire the territorial 
legitimacy of nineteenth-century Borno. Moreover, it will be shown that two 
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different logics were used during the European negotiations. Firstly, the British 
and the French used the territory of Borno in their negotiations. This means that 
it was possible to take into consideration local polities in international 
negotiations during the “Scramble for Africa”. Inversely, the Germano-British 
negotiations drew straight lines between the Bakassi peninsula and Lake Chad. In 
this case, the Europeans did not base their demands on any local territorial 
conception. At the end of the nineteenth century, the European conquest of 
Borno clearly displayed the European ambivalent attitudes to African polities. On 
the one hand, their existence could influence international negotiations whereas, 
on the other hand, these considerations could be discarded to carve out colonies 
in Africa. Borno is a perfect example of this attitude. 
 
3.1. A Territorial Conception of Borno? 
 
This first section will show to what extent a precolonial conception of 
territoriality influenced the Anglo-French negotiations for Borno. In the previous 
chapter, it was argued that the Europeans were not constrained by their 
ideological tool-kit when dealing with the African territories. This question 
relates directly to the debate about direct and indirect rule in colonial Africa as 
the major European powers were supposed to have different ruling styles. For 
ideological reasons, the French were supposed to dismantle the existing pre-
colonial structures, an idea stemming from the French Revolution.4 Indeed, the 
concept of tabula rasa, literally blank slate, was implemented in revolutionary 
France between 1789 and 1799. It consisted in totally destroying the former 
political framework, the Ancien Régime, in order to build a new political order 
based on concepts such as equality or liberty. In spatial terms, it meant that the 
former provinces of France would have to be re-organised. In order to promote 
equality, the new administrative structures called départements would have to 
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ignore the previous sociological and spatial realities.5 One hundred years later, 
the French supposedly exported the same concept to colonial Africa. 
The British were perceived as being less ideological.6 For example, in the 
Sokoto caliphate, the British were keen on ruling through “aristocratic 
authoritarians”.7 For purely administrative reasons, it was more efficient to rule 
through some existing pre-colonial structures. If these pre-colonial structures did 
not exist anymore, they had to be re-discovered or even invented as in the case of 
Southern Nigeria.8 During their short colonial period in Africa, the Germans also 
tended to rule their possessions indirectly.9 
The debate on direct and indirect rule has often rightly focused on the 
condition of the colonised Africans. However, the spatial impact of colonial rule 
was often conceptualised at the European level. For example, general histories of 
Africa often contain rubrics concerning British Eastern Africa or French 
Equatorial Africa. What was the European conception of these blocks at the 
beginning of the colonial rule? How did they conceive their own role in the 
creation of federations and colonies? In 1931, Robert Delavignette, a French 
colonial officer wrote about the French colonies which he perceived as French 
départements.10 The French ideology of assimilation for its indigènes was thus 
also present in the territorial conception of their colonies. Was British Indirect 
Rule responsible also for a conservative approach to pre-colonial African 
territories? In other words, were the French, British or German ideologies 
directly translatable in spatial terms? Was the territory of Borno perceived along 
these territorial lines? This section will thus consider the possibility of a national 
perception of African territories. 
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3.1.1. Carving out the Borders in the Treaties 
 
When the British and the French signed a new boundary agreement in 
1898, the text of the treaty did not provide any clear description of Borno’s 
borders. It did not provide the rationale for the modification of the previous 
boundary agreement of 1890 either. Still, the territory located north of the 
Komadugu river and west of Lake Chad was now included in the British sphere of 
influence. 
 
 
Figure 11: The boundaries in the Lake Chad area in 1898 
(the red line represents the European boundary) 
 
Was this to insure that the British could have total control of the western 
shores of Lake Chad? Was this boundary thought to respect more the boundaries 
of Rabih’s Borno? Due to the lack of sources concerning this part of the boundary 
in 1898 and the presence of Rabih in Borno, these questions only remain 
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hypotheses. Indeed, scholars have paid little attention to the territory included 
between Barruwa and the Komadugu River as, it was British for a short time 
between 1898 and 1906, before reverting to French domination. The text of the 
1898 agreement between the different authorities laconically described this part 
of the boundary: 
[…] then due north until it regains the 14th parallel of north 
latitude; then eastwards along this parallel as far as its 
intersection with the meridian passing 35' east of the centre of 
the town of Kuka, [Kukawa], and thence this meridian southward 
until its intersection with the southern shore of Lake Chad.11 
 The lack of precision for this first modification is comparable to the 
agreement between Germany and the United Kingdom in 1903. Indeed, the 
German presence in the northern parts of their colony of Kamerun and in Borno 
in particular was not effective before 1902.12 In 1903, ten years after the first 
agreement was signed between the United Kingdom and Germany, a commission 
was appointed to determine the positions of Kukawa and the boundary on the 
shores of Lake Chad. Prescott has detailed the technical difficulties encountered 
by the surveyors who had to move the boundary eastwards because of an 
imprecision of the map.13 
The rectangular boundary line around Dikwa was demarcated with 28 
concrete pillars up to the shores of Lake Chad.14 The various diaries or articles 
written by the British and German surveyors were technical reports dealing with 
the feasibility of the demarcation of the boundary as the British surveyor Louis 
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Jackson15 and his German counterpart L. Ambronn16 did not seem to have any 
specific perception of the nineteenth-century boundaries of Borno. 
In March 1906, the two governments signed an agreement defining more 
precisely the boundary. Subsequently, the populations were allowed to choose 
the side of the border where they would be able to live. 
V. Thence it will follow the median line of the Yedseram into 
Bornu, as far as a point about 1 kilom. southwest of the village of 
Gorege [Gworege]. This point was defined in 1905 by the local 
officers of both sides by a mark cut on a large tree. 17 
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Figure 12: Nigeria-Kamerun boundary survey map.18 
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The map which accompanied the reports written by Jackson and Ambronn 
aimed purely at geo-localisation, as the surveyors only outlined the main 
landmarks of Borno such as the banks of Lake Chad. Its topographical precision 
was intended to make the boundary as clear as possible for both the British and 
German governments. This phenomenon is easily explainable by the fact that the 
map was annexed to the 1906 treaty. As a purely diplomatic document, both 
treaty and map try to be as factual as possible. They do no mention any existence 
of Borno at all. 
The diplomatic treaties between the Europeans lead to an obvious 
conclusion. There was no difference between the British, the French or the 
German perception of their new boundaries: they were all described on a purely 
technical level. Until the end of the nineteenth century, there was no distinctive 
national approach to colonial boundary creation in Borno. This situation 
dramatically contrasts with the nationalist climate present in France, Germany 
and the United Kingdom. The absence of any clear national aspect to the 
negotiations stemmed from the ignorance of the conquered territories given that 
only the borders had been surveyed. This first wave of boundary creation ended 
in 1903. 
 
3.1.2. The Bornoan ghost behind the European boundaries 
 
This section will argue that the new wave of boundary creation was 
radically different. The boundary itself became amendable to reflect the reality of 
the geographical features and to indigenous polities. Even if the first agreement  
between the British and the Germans clearly proved to what extent they ignored 
local realities, the subsequent minor modifications tried to follow local 
interpretations of territoriality. 
However, British and Germans had a different understanding of their 
1903 demarcation. A German colonial officer complained about the British 
Resident of Borno in an anonymous document dated between 1904 and 1906: 
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The inhabitants of the villages on the eastern side of the border, 
especially from Dikwa, are refused entry by harsh punishments to 
farm villages belonging to Dikwa lying on the western side of the 
border.19 
 Indeed, the British Resident forbade access to his side of the border in 
order to benefit from the farmlands belonging to Dikwa but situated in British 
territory. This strict interpretation of the temporary border demarcated by the 
British and German commissioners in 1903 was, according to the German officer, 
in contradiction of the 1902 protocol of London signed between both countries: 
Article 19 estimates that such an agreed upon natural boundary 
(according to the Article 18) should be demarcated locally as soon 
as possible by the boundary commission, in order to spare a 
future necessary commission to demarcate the boundary, 
irrespective of the acceptance or disapproval of the boundary 
proposition through the native governments.  
Not only have we reached the situation where the commission 
could not agree on a natural boundary, but no agreement could be 
found either on an artificial one.20 
 Therefore, for the German officers, it was unwise to close the boundary 
before the European governments had agreed upon a final agreement. The 
British resident’s decisions were seen as too “hasty”.21 In 1904, on the northern 
border of Borno, the British and the French moved the boundary to the left bank 
of the Komadugu Yobe so that the French could travel from Zinder to Lake Chad 
on the river, Komadugu Yobe.22 It was understood that Borno would be part of 
the British sphere as the French minister put it: “As for Bornu, it is yours”.23 The 
British were not desperately trying to obtain as many villages as possible. They 
                                            
19 Bundesarchiv Abteilungen Berlin (BArchB), RKolA (Reichskolonialamt), R 175 F FA 1/ in 125 
(s.122). 
20 BArchB,  RkolA, R 175 F FA 1/ in 125 (ss.122-125). 
21 BArchB,  RkolA, R 175 F FA 1/ in 125 (ss.122;124). 
22 FO France 3686, M. Cambon to the Marquess of Lansdowne, French embassy in London, 18 
February 1904 in George Peabody Gooch, and Harold Temperley, British documents on the origins 
of the war 1898-1914 (London: H.M.S.O., 1927), p.344. 
23 FO France 3686, Private and confidential, French embassy in London, 4 March 1904, M. 
Cambon to the Marquess of Lansdowne in George Peabody Gooch, and Harold Temperley, British 
documents on the origins of the war 1898-1914 (London: H.M.S.O., 1927), p.351. 
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were able to give land away to the French while trying to secure territories 
located in German Borno. This logic can only be understood in the light of 
Britain’s emerging strategy of laying claim to the entirety of Borno’s precolonial 
territory. The text of the 1904 agreement described the modifications as such: 
 
Thence the frontier shall follow in an easterly direction the parallel of 
13° 20' north altitude until it strikes the left bank of the River Komadugu 
Waube (Komadougou Ouobe), [Komadugu Yobe], the thalweg of which it 
will then follow to Lake Chad. But if, before meeting this river, the 
frontier attains a distance of 5 kilom. from the caravan route from Zinder 
to Yo, through Sua Kololua (Soua Kololoua), Adeber, and Kabi, the 
boundary shall then be traced at a distance of 5 kilom. to the south of this 
route until it strikes the left bank of the River Komadugu Waube 
(Komadougou Ouobe), it being nevertheless understood that, if the 
boundary thus drawn should happen to pass through a village, this 
village, with its lands, shall be assigned to the Government to which 
would fall the larger portion of the village and its lands. The boundary 
will then, as before, follow the thalweg of the said river to Lake Chad. 
Thence it will follow the degree of latitude passing through the thalweg 
of the mouth of the said river up to its intersection with the meridian 
running 35' east of the centre of the town of Kouka, and will then follow 
this meridian southwards until it intersects the southern shore of Lake 
Chad.24 
 
                                            
24 British Parliamentary Papers, Treaty Series. No. 14. 1906. Convention between the United 
Kingdom and France respecting the delimitation of the frontier between the British and French 
possessions to the east of the Niger (1906). 
http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-
2004&res_dat=xri:hcpp&rft_dat=xri:hcpp:rec:1906-007336 [accessed 20 March 2010]. 
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Figure 13: The boundaries in the Lake Chad area in 1904 
(the red line represents the European boundary) 
 
 As the length of the text reveals, the geographical knowledge of the area 
had improved since the two first agreements of 1890 and 1898. By readjusting 
the boundary to the Komadugu Yobe, the British and French considered that the 
whole of Borno would be British. It could be argued that the French tried to 
influence the negotiations to obtain this river as a “natural” boundary as it was 
the northern limit of Borno. Thus, this new border was chosen by the British and 
French because it already was the boundary of Borno. By killing two birds with 
one stone, the French and British hoped to create a viable boundary in the Sudan. 
Their decision not to divide existing villages was furthered by the final 
delimitation of 1906 which took into account some of the existing polities. 
It is agreed that in those portions of the projected line where the 
frontier is not determined by the trade routes, regard shall be had 
to the present political divisions of the territories so that the 
tribes belonging to the territories to Tessaoua – Maradi and 
Zinder shall, as far as possible, be left to France, and those 
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belonging to the territories of the British zone shall, as far as 
possible, be left to Great Britain.25 
 The trade routes in question referred to the difficulties the French 
encountered in their possessions. Indeed, the latter wanted to gain access to a 
practicable route for their troops to obtain water while travelling towards Lake 
Chad. The French wanted to obtain this route not only for their possessions in 
Central Sudan but also to be able to link their territories in Africa. Thus, the 
French attached more importance to these particular negotiations than the 
British.26 This last point explains the haggling between the two colonial powers 
at an international level. In order to obtain their practicable route, the French 
had to find a compromise for Morocco, Egypt, Siam, Newfoundland, the Iles de 
Los and the Niger enclaves.27 The question of fishing rights in Newfoundland in 
particular was central to this exchange of territories.28 Thus, the re-negotiation of 
the boundary north of Borno between the United Kingdom and France was 
included in an international wrangle. Borno was not a priority for the negotiators 
but the outcome of these negotiations was that France abandoned its ambitions 
relating to Borno. 
 The boundaries of the African polities were merely one factor among the 
others in the “Scramble for Africa”. The European powers only used them as an 
argument to pursue their claims as in the case of France’s claims for the entirety 
of the Sultanate of Zinder and Tessawa-Maradi. The French negotiators stressed 
the importance of not dividing these territories whereas officials of the British 
Foreign Office argued: 
It must moreover be borne in mind that these tribal limits are of 
the most elastic and uncertain description. A tribe belongs to one 
petty ruler at one moment, and to another petty ruler at another. 
                                            
25 British Parliamentary Papers, Treaty Series. No. 14. 1906. 
26 For more details, see Prescott, The evolution of Nigeria's international and regional boundaries: 
1861-1971, p.78. 
27 Prescott, The evolution of Nigeria's international and regional boundaries: 1861-1971, p.82. 
28 Thom, The Niger-Nigeria boundary 1890-1906 and FO France 3686 ,Private and confidential, 
French embassy in London, 4 March 1904, M. Cambon to the Marquess of Lansdowne in George 
Peabody Gooch, and Harold Temperley, British documents on the origins of the war 1898-1914 
(London: H.M.S.O., 1927), p.349. 
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We cannot, therefore, attribute to such boundaries the sanctity of 
well-established limits. There is, moreover, this consideration of 
which we cannot lose sight – that if the line is to be corrected at 
one point in order to prevent the division of a French-protected 
tribe, we shall have to insist upon analogous deflections for the 
purpose of preserving the integrity of tribes enjoying our 
protection.29 
 
 
Figure 14: The boundaries in the Lake Chad area in 1906 
(the red line represents the European boundary) 
 
However, in 1906, O’Shee and Tilho the British and French commissioners 
did not share Lansdowne’s doubts about the “elastic[icity]” of the precolonial 
boundaries. Indeed, they proposed numerous deflections of the boundary lying in 
the former vassal states of Borno. Thus, Dammakia was officially in British 
territory but as it used to be part of the sultanate of Zinder, it became French. 
Inversely, Karragirri which was lying in French territory, became British because 
                                            
29 Letter (from the Confidential Print), The Marquess of Lansdowne to M. Cambon, Foreign Office, 
5 March 1904 in George Peabody Gooch, and Harold Temperley, British documents on the origins 
of the war 1898-1914 (London: H.M.S.O., 1927), p.352. 
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it used to be a part of the sultanate of Machina, which was mainly British.30 It can 
be noticed that the Europeans authorities took into account the local boundaries 
both when dealing with relatively small polities and when undertaking 
demarcation at a large scale. 31  Thus when physically demarcating their 
possessions, the Europeans to some extent relied on the existence of precolonial 
boundaries. 
As mentioned above, the French and British authorities conceptualised 
the Bornoan boundaries as being the limits of British influence in the north-
eastern corner of their new Northern Nigeria protectorate. The different factors 
present in the boundary negotiations never challenged the fact that the whole 
territory of Borno would ultimately be British. 
The geopolitical situation had changed since Rabih had been killed by the 
French in 1900. Moreover, in 1904, the new commissioners and colonial officers 
clearly understood the practical profits of ruling their new acquisitions through 
local rulers who had authority over their territory. Borno - it was agreed - would 
be British, therefore, its whole territory would come under British protection. 
Thus, by demarcating the boundary in 1906, the French and British crystallised 
the former northern boundary of Borno in the northern boundary of Nigeria. This 
case is not the only one along this border as Thom proved for the Hausa states in 
1976.32 
Furthermore, most observers in the 1900s described the boundary as 
following the political framework of nineteenth-century Borno. In 1902, an 
Anglo-French commission was sent to demarcate the boundary agreed upon in 
1898. Even if this boundary did not follow the northern boundary of Borno, 
Captain Mundy was sent by the British authorities to explore the north-western 
part of Borno in order to facilitate the future demarcation. The need to send an 
                                            
30 See text modifications in Ian Brownlie and Ian Robert Burns, African boundaries: a legal and 
diplomatic encyclopaedia (London: C. Hurst for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1979), 
Annex II, pp.464-465. 
31 Geographical scales are used in this chapter: a large scale map would depict a village whereas a 
small scale map would cover a continent.  
32 Thom, The Niger-Nigeria boundary 1890-1906. 
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officer reveals the importance attached to the limits of the African polities for the 
future boundaries. 
However, G. Elliot33 and Henri Moll34, the British and French boundary 
commissioners did not fail to mention the presence of Borno. Neither did Elliott’s 
successor in 1908, Major O’Shee.35 His French counterpart gave a more thorough 
description of the whole region. Indeed, the French commissioners appointed to 
demarcate the new 1906 boundary were charged with studying the history, 
geography, fauna and flora of the whole boundary region from the Niger River to 
Lake Chad. Captain Tilho who was in charge of this expedition published an 
extensive narrative of his scientific discoveries.36 The historical part of this 
French government publication contains numerous empirical studies of the 
visited regions. Tilho and another French officer, Landeroin interviewed local 
rulers and transcribed genealogies and local history. This extensive historical 
narrative has often been used by scholars of Borno.37 Landeroin in his “historical 
report” narrated the history of Borno in the nineteenth century as a series of 
misfortunes until the French arrival. However, the nationalist tone of the report 
does not conceal the phenomenon that Borno was a political entity with a long 
history and discernable boundaries. 
And the name of “Gentil”, vanquisher of Rabih and liberator of the 
country, was still alive in people’s mind. His name will survive as 
                                            
33 G. Elliot, 'The Anglo-French Niger-Chad Boundary Commission', The Geographical Journal, 24, 
no. 5 (1904), 505-520. 
34 Capitaine Moll, 'La situation politique de la région de Zinder', Bulletin du Comite de l'Afrique 
française, 1 (1902), 44-48. 
http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k106629s.image.r=bulletin+comite+afrique+francaise.f51.p
agination.langFR [accessed 16 March 2010]. 
35 Major O’Shee did not publish any article about his demarcation of the Niger-Nigeria boundary. 
36 Jean-Auguste Tilho, Tilho Mission, and France Ministe re des Colonies, Documents Scientifiques 
de la Mission Tilho (1906-1909) (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1910). For an overview of his 
Documents Scientifiques, see Camille Lefebvre, ‘Science Et Frontiere En Afrique: Le Terrain De La 
Mission Tilho Entre Niger Et Tchad (1906-1909)’, in Territoires Impériaux: Une Histoire Spatiale 
Du Fait Colonial, ed. by Hélène Blais, Florence Deprest and Pierre Singaravélou (Paris: 
Publications de la Sorbonne, 2011), pp. 109-138. 
37 See one historical example among others: Yves Urvoy, Histoire de l'empire du Bornou, Me moires 
de l'Institut français d'Afrique noire (Paris: Larose, 1949). 
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long as legends perpetuate the odious bloody whims of the man 
that everyone used to call: the cursed one.38 
According to Landeroin, a precise history of Borno was written by its 
British resident.39 However, he analysed the ethno-linguistic landscape of the 
Anglo-French boundary and revealed that the populations north of the 
Komadugu Yobe were part of “French Borno”40 in order to claim a part of the 
prestigious territory already split by the British and Germans in 1893. However, 
he mentioned that even if some ethnic groups were split by the boundary, the 
populations living on the French side of the border used to be independent from 
the Shehu of Borno in the nineteenth century. Thus, the Manga living north of the 
Komadugu Yobe were in French territory because of the geopolitical situation of 
the nineteenth century. It could be cynically suggested that this perception is a 
mere justification of the creation of the European-made boundary. However, in 
the nineteenth century, the populations north of the Komadugu Yobe were 
actually no longer considered as part of Borno. Zinder, as observed by the 
European nineteenth-century travellers, was totally independent from Borno 
especially after Rabih’s invasion. 
Furthermore, it could be suggested that this claim was an attempt to 
integrate the new European-made border within the former African framework. 
The map inserted at the end of the second volume reveals the same perception of 
the boundary: 
 
                                            
38 Tilho, Documents Scientifiques, II, p.378. 
39 In 1908, Landeroin must refer to Hewby. Tilho, Documents Scientifiques, II, p.309. 
40 Tilho, Documents Scientifiques, II, p.398. 
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Figure 15: Map of Northern Nigeria and “Territoire Militaire du Niger” at 
the end of Tilho, II. 
 
 Indeed, this map neatly divides the African polities on both sides of the 
boundary. The integration of the European-made boundary is supposedly 
accepted because it was partly based on the nineteenth century framework. It 
could be argued that maps produced by the European chancelleries over-
emphasised this last aspect in order to justify their own presence in Africa. In the 
specific case of Borno, the similarity between a part of the nineteenth century 
boundary and the European boundary provided a rationale for the French 
domination of the southern parts of the “Territoire militaire du Niger”. 
Indirect Rule has often been criticised for fossilising the political order of 
precolonial African polities.41 Could the northern boundary of Borno be seen as 
an element of this fossilisation? Indeed, the French and the British were eager to 
use the northern boundary of Borno as the limits of their respective spheres of 
influence. However, it is necessary to bear in mind that this interest in the 
precolonial boundaries was subordinated to the European negotiations at an 
                                            
41 Hobsbawm and Ranger, The Invention of tradition. 
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international scale. Besides, the case of Borno being split between the Germans 
and British in 1893 was still in the Europeans’ mind. 
 Nonetheless, like the Germans, the French and British conceptualised the 
territory of Borno in their negotiations and used it as a diplomatic tool. The 
Bornoan space was never ignored before the colonisation and during the 
colonisation as it was integrated within the British colonial framework. The 
British and the French in this second phase of the boundary demarcation were 
partially ready to adapt the boundary to the previous territorial framework of 
Borno. When dealing with Borno, the French territorial tabula rasa was thus not 
put into practice. This was a very pragmatic approach to boundary demarcation 
which prevailed then. The first wave from 1890 to 1903 only drew crude borders 
on the map. The second wave paid much more attention to the existence of 
Borno. For very practical reasons with direct benefits for the Europeans, the 
territory of Borno was re-used by the colonisers. 
 
3.1.3. Legitimacy and Borno 
 
The eventual aim of the Europeans was to assert the importance of the 
new boundaries but their different time of arrival in Borno made them 
emphasise or ignore the nineteenth century pattern of the Borno boundaries 
according to their own situation. As the French did not sign any agreements with 
the Germans and British in the region, they were eager to stress the homogeneity 
of nineteenth century Borno. As the British took possession of the main historical 
territory of Borno, they first underlined the rights of the Shehu to govern the 
whole of Borno. When the Germans eventually arrived in 1902, as the European 
actors were all present, the newly created boundaries were to be respected. 
However, these newly created boundaries became the framework of colonial 
territories who had to be ruled through Kanemi rulers. This explained the split of 
Borno into two different German and British Borno as the newly created 
boundary could not erase the nineteenth century boundaries of Borno. The 
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British, because of their domination of the region realised the importance of the 
Kanemi heir, Garbai, to maintaining Borno as a governable entity.42 
The British and the Germans had to deal with a paradoxical phenomenon. 
On the one hand, they desired to rule their own part of Borno through the 
descendants of the Al-Kanemi, on the other hand they had to deal with a newly 
created border splitting Borno in two different parts. Hans Dominik, the German 
colonial officer in charge of Borno evoked the jealousy between the two Borno 
Shehus. “The first believed that he was the real suzerain and Sanda was only a 
creature of the French.”43 This is the reason why he and his British counterpart 
had to explain the concept that the European boundary had split Borno into 
different parts to the two Shehus: 
Cochrane and I, as we had already agreed, took aside our own Sultan and 
made him understand that from now on there would be an English and 
German Borno, that they were to stay in English and German territory and 
were to prevent themselves from acting with such stupidity. However it 
was very painful to the Kanuris not to have any territory anymore.44 
Thus, the newly decided boundaries of Borno had to be explained to their 
traditional rulers. This description of Kotoko by Dominik reveals the logic of the 
colonial officers. 
[The Kotoko] sultanate was a known tributary of Dikwa and in 
ancient times of Kuka[wa].45 
The nineteenth-century authority of Kukawa over Kotoko was thus 
transferred to Dikwa and was to be exerted from within the new colonial 
boundaries as the nineteenth-century legitimacy of Borno was duplicated in the 
British and German possessions. This blatant contradiction of policies from the 
colonial powers had to be explained to both Shehus, who became British and 
German Shehus who belonged to the colonial authorities and not to their 
                                            
42 For a detailed analysis of the relationship between Garbai and the British see Mahmud Tukur, 
‘Shehu Abubakar Garbai Ibn Ibrahim El-Kanemi and the Establishment of British Rule in Borno, 
1902-1914’, in The Essential Mahmud, ed. by Tanimu Abubakar (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University 
Press, 1989), pp. 45-80. 
43 Hans Dominik, Vom Atlantik zum Tschadsee: Kreigs- und Forschungsfahrten in Kamerun (Berlin: 
Mittler, 1908), p.168. 
44 Dominik, Vom Atlantik zum Tschadsee, p.168. 
45 Dominik, Vom Atlantik zum Tschadsee, p.174. 
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territories anymore. Obviously, the new colonial boundary contradicted the 
conception of Borno for the Kanemi rulers as the Europeans did not consistently 
take into account the Bornoan boundaries in their negotiations. It can be argued 
that the traditional distinction between pre-European boundaries and European 
made boundaries was blurred by the Europeans themselves who used the 
nineteenth century framework of the boundaries to assert their positions. 
 
 
Figure 16: “Schefu Sanda, Sultan von Bornu” 46 
 
                                            
46 “Schefu Sanda, Sultan von Bornu”, anonymous, no date is specified, photograph 13x18, 
Deutsche Koloniagesellschaft, University Library of Frankfurt am Main. 
 http://www.ub.bildarchiv-dkg.uni-
frankfurt.de/Bildprojekt/formular/arraybilderg.php?bild=CD/3317/2014/0946/3317_2014_09
46_0031.jpg&format=1 [accessed 18 February 2010]. 
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Therefore, the newly created boundary of Borno was a paradox as the 
Westphalian boundary created in 1893 by the Germans and British divided a 
territory which possessed delimited boundaries. Thus, the nineteenth century 
boundaries even if blatantly ignored by the Europeans still existed in German and 
British Borno. From 1902 to 1914, the European-made boundary became the 
limit of the Shehus’ authority thus re-creating Borno within each colonial 
territory. It can be argued that the Europeans were eager to transfer the concept 
of nineteenth century Borno to the newly created colonial territory. Thus, even if 
as seen in the previous chapter, the nineteenth-century limits of Borno were 
ignored by the British and Germans in 1893, the concept of the territory of Borno 
was re-used as it conveyed legitimacy to each European colonial territory. 
 
3.2. A Quest for Territorial Legitimacy 
3.2.1. Give me a Shehu 
 
This section will analyse how the Europeans tried to obtain different types 
of legitimacy in Borno. First of all, they tried to install a local ruler at the head of 
the kingdom. This could be considered as a classical case of Indirect Rule. 
Moreover, they attempted to capture the territorial legitimacy of Borno. Thus, 
both dynastic and territorial legitimacies were sought after in north-eastern 
Nigeria. 
After killing Fadl Allah, French troops under the command of Dangeville 
were stationed at Dikwa in order to force their newly appointed Shehu into 
paying them tribute by raising taxes in British and German Borno. They also 
asked Shehu Sanda to accept the forced migration of Shuwa Arabs and their cattle 
into the French sphere of influence. The latter refused and was exiled to French 
Congo. Subsequently, the French appointed his younger brother Shehu Garbai 
who was more tractable in their opinion. 
Thus, the French were appointing rulers and levying taxes in the German 
and British spheres of influence. The French presence in Borno before the British 
and German “effective occupation” remains quite obscure according to the 
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different sources. On 21st April 1902, the French captain Dangeville sent a letter 
to his German counterpart, Pavel from Dikwa, the capital of German Borno: 
We only went [to Borno] because we were firstly attacked and 
then summoned by the Sultan of Borno. Finally, we were 
convinced that you would never blame us for working towards 
the prosperity of a country that you will find today rich and 
powerful whereas it would have been [without us] forsaken or 
entirely ruined.47 
Indeed, in this letter, the French officer detailed the French activities in 
Borno in 1901. They fought and killed Fadl Allah and according to him left the 
Bornoan territory before the end of 1901. In 1902, they were only called to Borno 
by Shehu Garbai to quell a rebellion of Shuwa Arabs. This behaviour was justified 
by only having a “desire to be pleasant to you while insuring our safety“.48 This 
French officer’s statement is unlikely to be true given that the French account 
was described as false by both the British and German powers and letters were 
exchanged between the British and Germans which sought to understand the 
French actions in Borno.49 One of these letters was even intercepted by the new 
Shehu appointed by the French.50 
However, the situation became even more complicated during an eventful 
night at the end of March 1902. The British convinced Shehu Garbai to rule over 
British Borno as he would be more powerful at the traditional centre of power of 
the Kanemi. However, according to French sources, the British hoped as well that 
Shehu Garbai would attempt to rule over German Borno, thus reviving the 
nineteenth-century boundaries of Borno.51 One night, around two o’clock, the 
British smuggled Shehu Garbai across the border. The French tried to prevent the 
migration of his followers and inhabitants of Dikwa by appointing during the 
same night Shehu Sanda, to rule over Dikwa and German Borno. According to the 
                                            
47 BArchB,  RkolA, R 175F FA 1/ in 73 (S.134). 
48 BArchB,  RKolA, R 175F FA 1/ in 73 (S.137). 
49 BArchB,  RkolA, R 175F FA 1/ in 73 (s.100). 
50 BArchB,  RkolA, R 175F FA 1/ in 73 (s.100). 
51 BArchB,  RkolA, R 175F FA 1/ in 73 (S.136). 
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French, this was supposed to prevent the British from obtaining the whole of 
Borno. The French had kept this Kanemi heir as a backup plan in case Shehu 
Garbai would refuse to pay tribute to them. 
This March 1902 night revealed two important features about the 
territory and the boundaries of Borno at the start of the twentieth century. 
Firstly, the existence of Borno as a political entity was not only conceivable to the 
Kanemis but also to the Europeans. The need for a legitimate ruler forced the 
British to bring Shehu Garbai into their sphere of influence as the necessity to 
rule their Northern Nigerian territories through their hereditary leaders was at 
the centre of the British ambitions. Moreover, if the French assertions were well-
founded, a Kanemi ruler could have claimed suzerainty over the whole of Borno, 
British and German despite the presence of the Anglo-German boundary. In 1903 
and at the start of 1904, both Shehus were still trying to levy taxes in some 
border-villages.52 Thus, the border splitting Borno into two spheres of influence 
was apparently not accepted by the traditional Kanemi heirs who were 
supposedly being manipulated by the Europeans.53 However, it should be 
considered to what extent they were being manipulated and whether they were 
using the Europeans for their own purposes. 
It is striking as well that the French and British totally ignored the Anglo-
German border. Their actions in the supposedly German sphere of influence 
before the German arrival did not take into account the boundary agreement of 
1893. 
 
 
 
3.2.2. Borno within Kamerun and Northern Nigeria (1900-1914) 
 
                                            
52 BArchB, RkolA, R 175F FA 1/ in 74 (ss.110-111) for Shehu Garbai levying taxes in German 
Borno and Anene, The international boundaries of Nigeria, 1885-1960, p.284. 
53 Prescott, The evolution of Nigeria's international and regional boundaries: 1861-1971. 
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The survival of the nineteenth century territory of Borno was also desired 
by the Germans when they eventually conquered the North of their sphere of 
influence. Indeed, eastern Borno was conquered by colonial military officers who 
took the initiative to conquer the north of the Kamerun colony from 1899 to 
1902. 54  The Schutztruppen and their officers controlled the residency of 
Tchadseeländer established in Kusseri from 1903 to 1913. This northern 
residency was split into two parts, briefly re-united in 1905-1906, before being 
split into two different parts again. Thus, German Borno was never an 
administrative district but was still included in the Northern residency of 
“Adamaua-Bornu”. In general, the German perception of Borno seems to have 
been inherited from the nineteenth-century travellers’ narratives. It may be 
possible to evoke a retrospective nineteenth century conception of Borno 
through German military eyes.55 
German Borno’s small area and lack of economic potential made this 
remote part of Kamerun a marginal corner of the German colony. Its 
peripherality was confirmed by the results of a German expedition in 1902-1903. 
Indeed Fritz Bauer led an expedition to discover the potential of the colony. The 
result was disappointing for the colonial authorities. Still, Bauer gave a few 
details about Borno. Indeed for him as for the German authorities, the “Sultanate 
of Dikoa” still existed. 
The following day, we reached the boundary of the Dikoa 
Sultanate, which today is constituted by the Komadugu Libeh.56 
This attitude reveals that the German expedition knew through its guides 
where the boundaries of the different sultanates were. Bauer also mentioned the 
work of the boundary commissioners who revealed a better knowledge of the 
region.57 One indigenous leader even complained that his people from the town 
of Gulfei were injured by some Arabs leading Bauer to notice that the “friendship 
                                            
54 Helmuth Stoecker, Kamerun unter deutscher Kolonialherrscharft (Berlin: Ru tten & Loening, 
1960), chapter 1. 
55 Arnold Schultze, The Sultanate of Bornu, (London: Cass, 1968). 
56 Fritz Bauer, Die Deutsche Niger-Benue-Tsadsee-Expedition, 1902-1903 (Berlin: D. Raimer, 1904), 
p.97. 
57 Bauer, Die Deutsche Niger-Benue-Tsadsee-Expedition, 1902-1903, foreword. 
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between Dikwa and Gulfei, at least in the boundary-districts, was not totally 
unclouded.”58 
In addition, various German officials undertook trips to their far and 
remote territory in Northern Kamerun. Governor Jesco von Puttkamer visited 
Dikwa in 1902 and Hans Dominik as a military district officer for Adamawa and 
Borno was in charge of German Borno.59 Their vision of Borno was that of a 
remote part of the German colony and was often restricted to the walled city of 
Dikwa. The Adamaua-Bornu residency was understaffed and the actual German 
control of the territory was limited.60 Most sources dealing with German Borno 
mention it only in case of problems with their British and French neighbours. 
Adamawa was their main concern as the sources available for the 
Tschadseeländer prove.61 Indeed, the Germans acquired the largest part of 
Adamawa even though its capital, Yola, stood in British territory. On the other 
hand, the Germans acquired the capital of Rabih’s Borno without acquiring the 
main body of Borno which became British territory. Thus, the northern Nigeria-
Cameroon boundary symmetrically divided Adamawa and Borno. 
In 1979, Iliffe argued that “the chief characteristic of German rule [in 
Tanganyika] was the power and the autonomy of the district officer”.62 Hans 
Dominik, the German military officer in charge of Borno became more famous for 
his harsh treatment of the Adamawa populations than for his analysis of Borno.63 
The latter was no Nachtigal even though he wrote about his expedition from the 
Atlantic coast to Lake Chad in his book Vom Atlantik zum Tschadsee. 
So we reached in the last day of April 1902 the boundary of the 
old empire of Borno, of which we know the written history from 
the twelfth century, and whose links with Europe were not made 
                                            
58 Bauer, Die Deutsche Niger-Benue-Tsadsee-Expedition, 1902-1903, p.99. 
59 Dominik, Vom Atlantik zum Tschadsee. 
60 See the “letter of protection” given by the Germans to Shehu Sanda in 1903 in Appendix C. 
61 Most sources still available in the Bundesarchiv are microfilms of documents available in 
Yaoundé, Cameroon. Among these microfilms, those dealing with German Borno are quite rare as 
most annual reports disappeared. 
62 John Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika, African Studies Series, 25 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979), p. 118. 
63 BArchB, RkolA, R 175F FA 1/ in 75 (s.211), R 175F FA 1/ in 75 (s.213). 
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through the Atlantic Ocean, from where we came, but through the 
Sahara and the Mediterranean Sea.64 
The most striking feature of German Borno for Dominik was the survival 
of its links with British Borno despite the invasions of Rabih, the French and the 
British. For example, its administrative structure is preserved: 
In opposition to the Fulani feudal state, the Sultan in Borno 
designates for every village a clerk, who is in charge of the state 
policies, levies taxes and administrates justice.65 
Dikwa’s commercial links with Tripoli were severed but the slave market 
was still open as he described the market of Dikwa selling slaves to some 
customers in British Borno.66 The Germans were often criticised by the British 
authorities for their lack of action to forbid slave-trading. Thus, the role of Dikwa 
as a slave-trading market was still important at the start of the twentieth 
century.67 The trading networks were still orientated along nineteenth-century 
lines and not along the European boundaries. The trade networks of nineteenth-
century Borno still prevailed and the Germans officially complained to the British 
authorities who were supposed to prevent Tripoli caravans from reaching Dikwa. 
In other terms, the Germans blamed the British for attracting the whole trade 
from across the Sahara. The British Borno military resident C. Morragh replied to 
this accusation in his letter of 19 April 1902: 
In your letter, you further request that I should assist all caravans 
of Tripoli who want to proceed to Dikwa. The Arabs themselves 
informed me that the English flag was well known to them and 
they know that under it the natives would not be allowed to rob 
them. I trust I have been explicit.68 
                                            
64 Dominik, Vom Atlantik zum Tschadsee, p.146. 
65 Dominik, Vom Atlantik zum Tschadsee, p.155. 
66 Dominik, Vom Atlantik zum Tschadsee, p.164 and Weiss, 'The Illegal Trade in Slaves from 
German Northern Cameroon to British Northern Nigeria', 141-197. 
67 For a full discussion of the slave-trade in Northern Cameroons and Northern Nigeria, see 
Weiss, 'The Illegal Trade in Slaves from German Northern Cameroon to British Northern Nigeria', 
141-197. 
68 BArchB,  RkolA, R 175F FA 1/ in 73 (ss.100-104). 
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 The Germans were eager to profit from the transsaharan trade as it could 
be a source of income for their own section of Borno. They claimed that the 
British were preventing the traders from accessing Dikwa therefore barring them 
from a possible source of income. The new boundary was responsible for a 
shortfall for the Germans who were ready to tap into the restored nineteenth-
century trade for their own benefit. In this case, the understanding of the 
boundary was totally pragmatic as both British and Germans were ready to 
favour the interpretation of the boundary which best suited them.  
 
3.3. The Cartographic Appropriation of Borno 
 
In his seminal essay published in 1989, John Harley redefined maps as 
“representations of power”.69 Recent historiography has demonstrated how 
cartography and colonial conquest were intrinsically linked.70 The colonial 
conquest of Borno was no exception as between the European conquest of 1900 
and the outbreak of the First World War, the territory and the borders of Borno 
were mapped by the three colonial powers. Mapping a new territory was part of 
the colonial process of appropriation. The British and the French had long 
experience of colonial cartography71 while John Noyes had demonstrated how 
German colonial discourse in Namibia was shaped by the European philosophical 
conception of space.72 In India, Matthew Edney demonstrated how the British 
East India Company transformed a “land of incomprehensible spectacle into an 
empire of knowledge”.73 In Algeria, Hélène Blais studied the construction of the 
                                            
69 John Harley, ‘Deconstructing the Map’, Cartographica: The International Journal for Geographic 
Information and Geovisualization, 26 (1989), 1–20. 
70 Matthew Edney, ‘Putting “Cartography” into the History of Cartography’, Cartographic 
Perspectives, 51 (2005), 14-29. 
71James Akerman, The Imperial Map: Cartography and the Mastery of Empire (Chicago: University 
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72 John Noyes, Colonial Space: Spatiality in the Discourse of German South West Africa 1884-1915 
(Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1992). 
73 Matthew Edney, Mapping an Empire: The Geographical Construction of British India, 1765-1843 
(University of Chicago Press, 1997), p. 2. 
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Algerian colonial space.74 She showed how the territory of Algeria was built by 
the French army with the help of indigenous geographical knowledge.  
Could the same methods be applied to colonial Borno? When dealing with 
African territories, most authors underline the lack of comprehension by 
European cartographers when they wanted to map the newly discovered 
territories.75 Should they map the political territories or the Africans themselves? 
The paucity of pre-colonial African cartographies should not obscure the fact that 
the conquered African societies did not wait for the Europeans to conceptualise 
their own political space.76 As demonstrated in a previous section, nineteenth-
century Bornoans had a clear territorial understanding of their own political 
space which directly influenced the cartographic representation of the Lake Chad 
area but also the boundary negotiations in Central Sudan. 
Moreover, the new colonial cartography of this pre-existing territorial 
framework differed from the colonial cartography of acephalous political entities 
such as the Igbo-speaking communities in modern Southern Nigeria.77 At the 
beginning of the twentieth century, Borno was not an ethnic group but a 
kingdom. If not organised along the same lines as the European kingdoms, Borno 
shared some common features with them. The Europeans were very much 
willing to map the kingdom of Borno as it had already been depicted in the 
previous maps of central Sudan. Indeed, the kingdom of Kanem-Borno was one of 
the only Sub-Saharan kingdoms to appear on the early-modern maps of Africa. 
Knowledge about this kingdom circulated from Arabic travellers and 
geographers such as Al-Idrisi who were eager to describe the kingdoms on the 
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75 Norman Etherington, Mapping Colonial Conquest: Australia and Southern Africa (Crawley  W.A.: 
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other side of the Sahara.78 Shading the kingdom of Borno in the British, French or 
German colours on a colonial map was thus a prize for the colonisers who were 
ready to incorporate this prestigious toponym into their maps. Thus, for two 
reasons, the maps representing Borno differed from other early colonial maps of 
Africa.79 Firstly, they represented a territory and not an ethnic group. Secondly, 
the kingdom of Borno was an identified and prestigious landmark for the 
European cartographers. 
One of the first actions of Lord Lugard, after his conquest of Nigeria was to 
dispatch soldiers and engineers to map their newly conquered territories: 
When not fighting, mapmaking was a priority occupation for the 
soldiers and because in this case the fighting was mercifully small 
the mapmaking was correspondingly great.80 
In the specific case of Borno, Lord Lugard himself praised the qualities of 
the soldiers who mapped the kingdom: 
I cannot speak too highly of the ability with which this most 
difficult task (the occupation of the Bornue province) was carried 
out by Colonel Morland and his officers. An enormous area, some 
60,000 square miles in extent, was brought under administrative 
control, with little bloodshed. The difficulties encountered were 
unusually great owing to a lack of water and of supplies but the 
whole expedition, including Major Cubbit’s later operations, was 
concluded in about four months. Over 1,000 miles of country 
were traversed and mapped during this period.81 
                                            
78 For a historical overview of the continental cartography of Africa, see Jeffrey C. Stone, Africa 
and the Sea: Proceedings of a Colloquium at the University of Aberdeen, March 1984  (Aberdeen: 
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This interest in maps can of course be explained by the practical needs of 
the colonial administration to map its possessions. Hence, every single colonial 
report of the entire colonial period was followed by a map which gradually filled 
in the blanks of the territory of Borno. 
Amidst the surviving colonial reports for Borno in the British and German 
archives, it is still possible to find maps which became more accurate as time 
passed. At a first glance, the history of the cartography of Borno could be 
considered as a purely objective cartography subject to linear progress. Malcolm 
Anderson, a Northern Nigerian surveyor of the late colonial period himself wrote: 
Maps were not produced as cartographic tools of colonial 
appropriation and acquisition; rather they came about as a 
consequence of these activities for few things could warm an 
administrator’s heart and better provide a medium for 
development planning than a map of his domain prominently 
displayed in his office.82 
Is it so easy to dismiss the role of the maps as mere victims of the colonial 
mindset of their readers? Were they only produced to “warm an administrator’s 
heart”? The following map produced by and for colonial administrators will 
prove Anderson wrong. 
 
                                            
82 Anderson, The geographic labourers of Arewa, p. 25. 
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Figure 17: Map from the Annual Report for Borno in 191283 
 
This 1912 map of Borno is one of the first detailed maps of the province 
under British colonial rule. Its first function is to localise the different parts of the 
Northern Nigerian province. The borders within the province of Borno are new. 
They are a colonial imposition to facilitate the creation of a territorial hierarchy 
within the nineteenth-century framework of Borno. These borders delimitate 
districts which are at the basis of the colonial administration in Northern 
Nigeria.84 In this map, each district contains its number of inhabitants and the 
amount of the taxes they will generate for the colonial administration. Indeed, the 
cartography of Borno was not only about prestige but was also about power. 
                                            
83 NAK, SNP7 904/1912, Assessment map of the Bornu Province Annual Report 1912. 
84 Tukur, Mahmud, The Essential Mahmud, ed. by Tanimu Abubakar (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello 
University Press, 1989), p. 164. 
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Inspired by Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, geographers such as Harley 
have demonstrated how it is now possible to read maps as instruments of 
power.85 The territory of Borno did not need to be mapped for sole technical 
reasons; it needed also to be mapped for the colonisers to appropriate their new 
territory. What may seem as a simple administrative map can be read as an 
instrument of power. By mapping the local tax areas, this 1912 British map of 
Borno proves that the British tried to appropriate the province of Borno. This 
corresponds to Edward Said’s words describing imperialism as “geographical 
violence”.86 
This German map produced by Max Moisel in 1909 could also be 
understood as “geographical violence”: 
                                            
85 Harley, 1–20. and J. B. Harley and others, The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of 
Cartography (Baltimore, MD; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001). 
86 Edward Said, ‘Yeats and Decolonization’, in Nationalism, Colonialism and Literature, ed. by 
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Figure 18: Map of the northern part of Kamerun by Moisel (1909)87 
 
This “violent” language and lexicon used by the European colonisers in 
their maps at the end of the nineteenth century is very revealing. Indeed as 
during the colonisation of America, the Europeans tried to transcribe Kanuri and 
Arab words on the map of Borno in their own language. For example, in 1901, the 
Germans transcribed the name of Rabih’s former capital as “Diköa” whereas the 
British named the same town “Dikwa”. 88  This simple spelling difference 
obviously comes from the different alphabetical transcription of sounds in the 
two languages. However, writing a Kanuri name in a German or a British manner 
provides the European reader with a familiar feeling. In this regard, the 
                                            
87  Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Unter den Linden, Kart LS 3 Bhr 30, Grosser Deutscher 
Kolonialatlas, bearbeitet von Paul Sprigade und Max Moisel, Herausgegeben von der 
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reprinted in 2002. 
88 See for example Colonel Morland’s letters in Seidensticker, ' Beginning of colonialism in Borno: 
Morland's report', 39-50. 
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Anglicisation or Germanisation of the toponyms is the first step for the 
appropriation of the territory. This was not the first time the Europeans were in a 
situation where they had to make their environment more intelligible as they had 
already dealt with the same situation in sixteenth-century America.89 
Furthermore, the Europeans needed to integrate toponyms within their 
own possessions. For example, the toponym of “Bornu” is partly integrated 
within the colonial framework. Thus at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
both British and German maps use the toponym of “Bornu” in two different ways.  
First of all, it is possible to find a cross-border “Bornu”. This first “Bornu” 
refers to the nineteenth-century territorial framework evoked previously. As 
demonstrated before, the Europeans heavily relied on the territorial concept of 
Borno to demarcate their boundary. Even if the Anglo-German border did not 
take into account the territory of Borno, the maps still indicate it as a territorial 
entity. This “Bornu” can be considered as the nineteenth-century Borno. 
The second “Bornu” is a European Borno. On the same 1909 map, Max 
Moisel wrote “British Bornu” and “Deutsch Bornu”. It is remarkable that these 
two toponyms are indicated in their respective colonial language, namely English 
and German. 
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As seen in this representation, this second “Bornu” is clearly integrated 
within the colonial territories. The borders of the “Deutsch Bornu” are clearly 
demarcated with a pink line, the same colour being used for the boundary 
between Nigeria and Kamerun. Only the width of the line changes between the 
European border and the African border. Thus, the Bornoan boundaries are 
totally integrated within the German colonial framework. Even though the British 
and Germans split Borno, Moisel integrated the other territories such as their 
part of Borno or Logone within the colonial protectorate of Kamerun. The key of 
the map itself reveals the extent of the appropriation of the territory. The African 
boundaries and all the colonial tools of administration such as the military posts 
BORNU 
Residentur der 
deutschen 
Tschadsee-
länder 
Nigeria 
Mandara 
Deutsch 
Bornu 
Logone 
Gülfei BORNU 
British 
Bornu 
Figure 19: Schematic representation of the 
cartographic division of Borno by Moisel in 1909 
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are in the German colour, pink. Thus, at first glance, the different territories and 
their borders become German possessions.90 
The manner in which these maps were used and read cannot be 
misunderstood. Map readers in Europe directly assimilated the newly conquered 
territories to their own national territories. The mental appropriation of space in 
Northern Kamerun far exceeded the actual control of the German troops in this 
area as seen in the previous section. There is a vivid contrast between the map 
ordering colonial space and the actual control of people’s land. The map can thus 
be apprehended as a programmatic instrument of the colonial conquest. It does 
not describe Kamerun as it is, but Kamerun as it should be. 
 Moreover, if a perspective from below is assumed, it can be argued that 
Northern Kamerun is only a collection of different African territories which are 
perfectly interwoven within the colonial framework of Kamerun. As a gigantic 
jigsaw puzzle, the “Residentur der deutschen Tschadseeländer” combines 
different territories such as “Logone” or “Gülfei”. This could be considered as an 
attempt to demonstrate that the German colonial boundaries re-used the 
nineteenth-century boundaries as much as possible. Obviously, “Bornu” was split 
between the two different colonial powers, but as for the other territorial 
entities, the Germans tried to respect them. By using nineteenth-century Bornoan 
boundaries within their own colonial administration, this conceptualisation of 
colonial space could be understood as an attempt to legitimise colonial rule.  
                                            
90 For a geographical study of the German colonial cartography, see Rudolf Hafeneder, ‘Deutsche 
Kolonialkartographie 1884 - 1919’  Euskirchen: Universität der Bundeswehr  München, 2008) 
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Conclusion 
Before 1900, the Europeans had two different attitudes towards their 
borders in Africa. When it suited them, as in the case of the Franco-British 
negotiations, the territory of Borno was re-used in the different treaties. 
Nineteenth-century limits could be adopted by the invaders to delimit their 
possessions. Nonetheless, straight lines – the symbol of the European partition of 
Africa – were also drawn by the British and Germans. Borno can therefore be an 
exemplary case of the ambivalent attitude adopted by the Europeans in Africa. On 
the one hand, they had to rely on pre-existing structures for pragmatic reasons. 
On the other hand, they could discard them in their competition against other 
Europeans. 
Thus, before 1900 and the First World War, the relative lack of control of 
the colonial powers in the Lake Chad area meant that the colonisers had to rely 
on the pre-existing socio-political structures. In classical historiography, this is 
supposed to be one of the main factors for the utilisation of “Indirect Rule”.91 In 
the specific case of Kamerun and Nigeria, it would be possible to evoke a 
“territorial indirect rule”, as the colonisers relied very much on the pre-existing 
nineteenth-century structures. This “territorial indirect rule” as illustrated by the 
first colonial maps constituted only one aspect of “indirect rule”, but to what 
extent was it the over-arching aspect of “indirect rule”? Historiography has very 
much focused on the various consequences of the imposition of colonial rule. 
Without denying any of its aftermaths, the colonisation of Borno could not have 
been undertaken without a spatial framework in which the colonisers would rule. 
The creation of the international borders partly solved this spatial conundrum. 
However, how would the Europeans administrate their different territories 
amalgamating diverse ethnic groups and territories? 
Using the nineteenth-century framework thus seemed logical. It was not 
for philanthropic reasons that the Europeans tried to respect the pre-existing 
territorial framework. It was because they needed it. This rational choice led 
                                            
91 See this perception in a ‘Lugard Memorial Lecture’ given at the International African Institute 
in 1963 by a French colonial administrator: Deschamps, 'Et Maintenant, Lord Lugard?', 293-306. 
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them to consider either rebuilding a totally new administrative framework or 
recycling some of the pre-existing territories. By consequence, the territory of 
Borno and its boundaries were reused by the Germans and the British for purely 
rational reasons. As mentioned earlier in this section, the French themselves 
suggested that their territorial reorganisation was rational. To the claimed 
rationality of the French territorial organisation, the British and Germans 
opposed a rational reutilisation of the Bornoan territorial framework. Even if not 
based on the same conception of colonial rule, the European discourses dealt 
with spatiality in a very rational manner. 
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4. The British Resurrection of Borno            
(1902-1960) 
 
This chapter will argue that Borno did not disappear when the British 
invaded it in 1902. On the contrary, this chapter will even suggest that the 
territory of Borno survived throughout the colonisation because of colonial rule. 
The territorial conservatism of the British led them to utilise the pre-existing 
spatial structures to establish their rule in Borno. This is how the kingdom of 
Borno ravaged by years of wars was resurrected in 1902. 
It was not out of respect for its long history, that the kingdom of Borno 
was preserved. It was the needs of Indirect Rule that caused the British to re-use 
the late-nineteenth century borders and territory of Borno to exert their rule. 
The first part of this chapter will assess the attempts of the British to rule over 
the north-eastern corner of their colony through the kingdom of Borno. The 
second part of this chapter will analyse the role played by the British officials 
themselves in the preservation of the territory of Borno. This section will suggest 
that through colonial reports, academic studies and memoirs, the British colonial 
officials re-constructed the territory of Borno for their own benefit. 
Instead of being dissolved within Nigeria, the territory and the borders of 
Borno were thus re-used throughout the colonial period. It is hoped this section 
will reveal the extent to which the colonisers were ready to adapt their rule to 
the pre-existing spatial patterns. This section will thus demonstrate that relative 
continuity existed between the late nineteenth-century territorial framework and 
its colonial successor. 
 
4.1. The province of Borno 
4.1.1. From a kingdom to a province? 
 
At the beginning of colonial rule in Northern Nigeria, the kingdom of 
Borno was divided into two military provinces from 1901 to 1904. Firstly split 
into Northern and Southern provinces, Borno was subsequently separated 
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between Eastern and Western provinces by the British administration. However, 
this division was mostly undertaken on paper as the British colonial troops did 
not set foot in Borno before 1902.1 
Each village was supposedly included within a wider district, which was 
itself included within an emirate, which was finally included in the province of 
Borno. This rational stratification led to the creation of a purely territorial 
hierarchy. Once on the spot, a senior Resident would be in charge of the two 
provinces at the same time. This system recognised the unity of Borno within the 
Northern Nigerian administrative framework. In 1904, for economic and 
practical reasons, the double-province system disappeared and Borno was 
created as a province. This province survived until the end of the colonisation in 
1960.2 
 
 
 
 
In theory, the new administrative divisions were coherent geographical 
units whereas the former system allowed the incumbent to rule over villages and 
areas scattered in non-contiguous areas. It will be argued that the 
                                            
1 Wilhelm Seidensticker, ‘Beginning of Colonialism in Borno: Morland’s Report’, 39-50. 
2 John Prescott, The Evolution of Nigeria’s International and Regional Boundaries: 1861-1971, p. 
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framework in Northern Nigeria as theorised 
by Lugard. 
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territorialisation of Borno simplified the late-nineteenth century administration 
but still operated within the nineteenth-century borders. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, districts and emirates were 
seemingly new administrative divisions which appeared on the map of Borno. 
However, the emirate of Borno or the divisions such as Fika were only the former 
subdivisions of the kingdom of Borno now rebadged. For example, as proved by 
early colonial reports and maps, the “emirate of Bornu” roughly corresponded to 
nineteenth-century “Bornu proper”. The “division of Fika” also matched the 
nineteenth-century territory of Fika. By using the terms “emirate” and “division”, 
the colonial official nomenclature respected the late-nineteenth-century 
hierarchy as the Shehu of Borno was more powerful than the leader of Fika. In 
addition, the name “district” appeared to be recent but according to Cohen, these 
districts roughly corresponded to the “pre-colonial fiefs”.3 With new names such 
as “emirate”, “divisions” and “districts”, the British recast the nineteenth-century 
territorial framework of Borno within the Northern Nigerian administration. 
The choice of the names of these administrative divisions reveals Lugard’s 
conception of British rule in Northern Nigeria. The kingdom of Borno became a 
“province” and metropolitan Borno, an “emirate”. Its former vassals were turned 
into “divisions” whereas its former fiefs were called “districts”. The terms 
“province”, “division” and “district” demonstrate that the Western rational 
conception of space was directly applied to Borno. By using the same terms 
throughout the British colony, the former kingdom was directly integrated within 
Northern Nigeria and, after 1914, Nigeria. The beginning of the twentieth century 
was the moment when the kingdom of Borno was turned into one of the 
Northern Nigerian emirates.4 
However, this transformation did not make Borno vanish from the map. 
The British did not only keep the names of places, they also preserved the 
territorial framework of late nineteenth-century Borno. The colonial framework 
was thus mostly a translation of the administrative situation found in Borno 
                                            
3 Renaud Morieux, Une Mer Pour Deux Royaumes: La Manche Frontiere Franco-anglaise (XVIIe-
XVIIIe Siecles) (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2008), p. 164. 
4 Anthony Kirk-Greene, The Principles of Native Administration in Nigeria: Selected Documents, 
1900-1947 (London: Oxford University Press, 1965). 
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before the conquest of Rabih. This reutilisation of the administrative framework 
was not only a direct application of Indirect Rule. It was also the direct result of 
the conquest of Northern Nigeria by the British. How could the latter have 
imposed their authority without preserving the former territorial framework? 
How would they have collected taxes otherwise? How would justice have been 
dispensed in another framework? 
The first colonial officers tried to determinate which province should 
administer which towns. For example, the town of Machina was closer to Kano 
than it was to the capital of Borno which explains the reasons why some early 
British officials wanted this town to be directly administered by Kano. In 1902, 
Hewby the resident of Borno agreed with this new provincial border but stressed 
that: 
Machina: This place belongs properly to Bornu, to whom it always 
paid tribute, and the people would prefer to come under Bornu to 
following Kano. However it is in the extreme north angle, and 
perhaps, the line of the Kano province might be drawn between 
Machina and Nguru.5 
Therefore, in 1908, the provincial boundary was modified so that 
Machina should be part of the province of Borno and not Kano. The 
colonial report of 1909 mentioned:  
The boundary of Machena taken over from Kano end of 1908 has 
been approved. No boundary question of any other importance 
has arisen.6 
This example proves to what extent the provincial administration of 
Borno adapted its borders to the former administrative framework. The 
questions of the nineteenth-century tribute and who the “people would prefer to 
come under” were preponderant. Between the beginning of colonial rule in 1902 
and 1914, the provincial borders of Borno were hence modified in four specific 
areas: Machina, Kakuri, the Bedde Territory and the Tera and Babur regions in 
the south of the province.7 
                                            
5 SNP 15, Acc. No. 10, Reports 1902 (Bornu). 
6 SNP 7, Acc. No. 1271/1910: “Bornu Province, Annual Report for 1909”. 
7 Prescott, The evolution of Nigeria's international and regional boundaries: 1861-1971, p. 142. 
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Figure 21: The modifications of the regional borders of the province of Borno 
(1908-1921)8 
 
J.R.V. Prescott, an American geographer who studied the regional borders 
of Nigeria in the 1970s, implied that these four changes were justified on ethnic 
grounds.9 This is only one aspect of the question. As seen previously for Machina, 
historical reasons were more relevant to the first colonial officers than ethnic 
ones. The main interest of British colonial rule was not ethnic consistency but 
colonial efficiency. Preserving the pre-conquest administrative framework was 
                                            
8 This map was created after Prescott’s maps in Prescott, The evolution of Nigeria's international 
and regional boundaries: 1861-1971, p. 137;140. However, Prescott failed to mention the case of 
Machina in his study of the modifications of the borders of Borno. Primary sources such as the 
Northern Nigeria Government Gazette or colonial reports were used to retrace the history of these 
modifications. As these documents were not systematically available, the date of 1912 for Kakuri, 
Bedde, Tera and Babur is only an estimate. According to the Northern Nigerian colonial reports, 
these changes were undertaken at some point between 1908 and 1914. 
9 Prescott, The evolution of Nigeria's international and regional boundaries: 1861-1971, pp. 137-
139. 
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the key to this efficiency. The first geometric shape of the province was only a 
rough estimate of the real extent of Borno. From the beginning of the colonisation 
to 1914, the Europeans never ceased to modify the shape of the province to 
facilitate their own administration. This was not always done in favour of Borno. 
For example, around 1912, the Kakuri territory was handed over to the province 
of Kano because it used to belong to Hadejia. The latter being in the province of 
Kano, it made more administrative sense for Kakuri to be part of Kano province. 
In addition, these borders were also modified for simple demarcation 
reasons. The territory of Gwani was thus added to the province of Borno in 1921 
because the river Gongola was a simpler way to demarcate the provincial 
territory than the previous straight border. However, in most cases, the 
modification of these borders was undertaken under a historical pretext. The 
substitution of nineteenth-century boundaries for straight borders was thus 
operated by the British in hope of a more efficient way to rule the province. For 
administrative purposes, they gradually rebuilt the late nineteenth-century 
territory of Borno within colonial Nigeria. 
The precision of the provincial borders can be understood as a genuine 
effort to make colonial administration more efficient. This explains the British 
endeavour to delimitate the international and provincial borders of Borno. The 
necessity to obtain precise administrative boundaries in a relatively short time 
span made the British colonisers choose the nineteenth century boundaries as 
the provincial boundaries. They were created out of administrative necessity for 
the implementation of Indirect Rule. The quasi-congruence between the 
nineteenth-century space and its colonial successor is not fortuitous. It was the 
direct result of the British policy to adapt to the late nineteenth-century space in 
Borno. 
 
4.1.2. A Cartographic Fossilisation? 
 
The study of colonial maps confirms how the creation of the new colonial 
province nearly entirely relied on the nineteenth-century territory of Borno. This 
section will argue that the cartographic transition between nineteenth-century 
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and twentieth-century Borno was particularly smooth. A selection of colonial 
maps will be used to illustrate the chronological evolution of the cartography of 
the province of Borno. Maps as tools of territorial possession helped the British 
to represent their power in a colonial context. As a result, the cartographic power 
of the British colonial rule could only be expressed thorough the cartographic 
representation of the territory of Borno. 
 
Figure 22: Borno on a British colonial map of the War Office in 190910 
 
The first British colonial maps represented the borders of Borno within 
Northern Nigeria in two different manners. First, the international boundaries 
were relatively precise because they had been demarcated at a diplomatic level 
between European nations at the turn of the twentieth century. On this 1909 map 
(Fig. 22), the international borders could be considered as accurate because of 
the number of international treaties dealing with the precise demarcation 
                                            
10 CO 700/NIGERIA44. 
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between British, French and German territories. Secondly, this situation 
contrasts with the regional borders which in 1909 appear to be still mainly 
composed of arcs and straight lines. In Northern Nigeria, the British 
administration only paid attention to the demarcation of regional borders once 
the international boundaries were settled. In the case of Borno, these boundaries 
were only demarcated once the British had reached the kingdom. It meant that 
the creation of the regional borders was only possible in Nigeria and not in 
London. Whereas the Europeans had relatively substantial time to carve out their 
possessions in the Lake Chad area, the regional borders of Borno had to be 
delimited in a relative short time span. 
Moreover, the provincial border is symbolised on the map by a red line 
which affirms the definite authority of the Shehu over lands which he never 
totally controlled. For example, the Bedde territory was not a part of the 
Kanemis’ domains before the British conquest. Cartographic representations of 
Borno have a tendency to simplify a complex geopolitical situation. It could be 
argued that the map integrates peripheries within the province of Borno for 
clarity purposes. How could it be possible to map a fluid geopolitical situation 
with cartographic symbols? It is striking though that the colonial maps of Borno 
made the same political statements as their nineteenth-century predecessors. As 
the authors of the maps were still European and their source of information was 
still Bornoan, they reproduced the same image of Borno ruling over its distant 
peripheries. This would not be the first time the Europeans gave one of their 
rulers more land than he had before the European conquest. For example, when 
the British created the protectorate of Uganda, they transferred the southern part 
of the kingdom of Bunyoro to Buganda.11  
Furthermore, the precision of this early colonial map could be 
misunderstood. Only certain places along roads, rivers and borders were known 
to the cartographers. The towns and villages along the trade network and the 
international borders were exaggerated to fill the blanks of this colonial map. In 
1909, many parts of Borno were still not surveyed by the British. The 
                                            
11 Shane Doyle, ‘From Kitara to the Lost Counties: Genealogy, Land and Legitimacy in the 
Kingdom of Bunyoro, Western Uganda’, Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and 
Culture, 12 (2006), 457-470. 
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multiplication of names on the map falsely gives the impression that the British 
mastered a territory they were not well acquainted with. This blank-filling 
technique is not unique to the Bornoan situation. This cartographic technique 
was often used by the Europeans in their colonial endeavours in America, Asia or 
Africa.12 This technique helped the European govern their paper provinces and 
furnished them the intellectual tools to master a territory they did not actually 
control. As Ian Barrow already demonstrated for India, colonial cartography was 
a narrative of power.13 
 
                                            
12 Isabelle Surun, ‘Le Blanc De La Carte, Matrice De Nouvelles Représentations Des Espaces 
Africains’, in Combler Les Blancs De La Carte, ed. by Isabelle Laboulais-Lesage (Strasbourg: 
Presses universitaires de Strasbourg, 2004), pp. 117-144. 
13 Ian Barrow, Making History, Drawing Territory: British Mapping in India, C. 1756-1905 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), conclusion. 
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Figure 23: Map of the province of Borno as presented in the colonial report of 
193114 
 
As proved by this 1931 map, the residents and the district officers in 
Borno were gradually filling these blanks year after year. As a result, they made a 
choice to map the most important towns and cities they knew on the colonial 
maps of Borno. Paradoxically, this rational choice led to the reduction of the 
number of toponyms on the map which proves once again that the first maps of 
the province were trying to dissimulate their geographical ignorance. This map of 
1931 illustrates this territorial rationalisation which led the colonial 
administration to represent the territory of Borno with its most important 
features: its principal towns and roads. This administrative map reveals the 
extent to which the province of Borno was integrated within the colony of 
Nigeria. 
                                            
14 Gordon Lethem’s papers, MSS Brit Emp s. 276, Rhodes House, Oxford. 
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Even if these maps preserved the territorial integrity of Borno, they also 
turned it into a simple province of Northern Nigeria. After the amalgamation of 
Northern and Southern Nigeria by Lugard in 1914, Borno remained a province in 
the newly created Nigeria. The status of the province was thus affirmed by the 
maps which put on the same level the different provincial creations. The situation 
of Borno was not totally original when compared with the situation of other 
provinces such as Kano emirate.15 Even if Borno province was not entirely a case 
apart, it was, however, a perfect example of the cartographic fossilisation of a 
pre-colonial territory. Even if demoted to a provincial level, the spatial structure 
of late nineteenth-century Borno survived within colonial Nigeria. 
This fact could be compared with the French situation where, in theory, 
the French supposedly created new political entities based on a Cartesian and 
equalitarian conception of space. Actually, the administrative sub-divisions, the 
cantons, were created on a loose conception of the nineteenth-century territorial 
structures. Robert Delavignette, a French colonial administrator, stressed the 
inherited territoriality of these divisions: “The canton is in most cases a former 
feudal province turned into an administrative district”.16 In a chapter of his book 
Freedom and Authority in French West Africa, he also emphasised the role of the 
African chiefs in the territorial framework of the French sub-Saharan colonies. 
French rule was partly based on the assumption that strong pre-colonial 
structures were a sound basis for their own power. For example, in nowadays 
Burkina Faso, the French used the Mossi kingdom as a basis for their colonial 
administrative division. Even after different attempts of reform in the first 
decade of the twentieth century, the structure of this kingdom was preserved in 
the colonial administration.17 
 
                                            
15 Margery Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 
87. 
16 Robert Delavignette, Freedom and Authority in French West Africa (London: Published for the 
International African Institute by the Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 75. 
17 Personal communication with Benoit Beucher, 12 April 2011. 
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Figure 24: The province of Borno in 195218 
 
This last map of 1952 intends to prove that the province of Borno and its 
borders were now totally absorbed within the Nigerian framework. The network 
of roads and towns in the province show the territorial control of the British over 
Borno. According to this map, space had been re-ordered by colonisation. 
However, this administrative map does not taken into account another 
phenomenon: the relative autonomy of Borno within Northern Nigeria. The 
colonial maps tend to standardise the colonial space and over-generalise a 
situation on the Nigerian scale. 
The early colonial maps attempted to convert nineteenth-century space 
into colonial space. This space was subsequently reused within the narrative of 
British colonial power. The fossilisation of the Bornoan territory within the 
Nigeria map was thus operated by the British to satisfy their own administrative 
needs. As the first maps depicted a homogenous geopolitical situation on the 
                                            
18  The Nigeria Handbook (London: The Crown Agents for Oversea Governments and 
Administrations, 1956), end of volume. 
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western shores of Lake Chad, the late colonial maps also tried to represent Borno 
as any other province in Nigeria. The following sections will argue that the 
political messages present on the maps were far from being so clear-cut. The 
actual situation was in the hands of the colonial officials. 
 
4.1.3. A Colonial Territorial Policy 
 
This section will argue that the colonial officers present in Borno led a 
quasi-autonomous territorial policy. They did not only focus on the creation of a 
colonial hierarchy fit for Indirect Rule, they also focused their policies on the 
territory of Borno. 
The first argument in favour of such policies was the size of the province 
of Borno. 
“The provinces in Nigeria are so large – Sokoto and Bornu are each larger than 
Ireland […] that a Resident must rely largely upon his District Officers.”19 
The first reports underline the derelict state after the rule of Rabih. The 
first colonial officers such as W.P. Hewby focused on two main objectives. The 
first one was to restore the capital of Borno, Kukawa as the capital of the 
province of Borno. The second one was to delimitate the new international 
borders. 
Since the 1810s, the capital of the Shehus had been Kukawa; however the 
city had been destroyed by Rabih in 1893.20 Nine years later, the British sought to 
re-establish Kukawa as the capital of Borno. Shehu Garbai, the newly British 
appointed Shehu, meanwhile resided at Monguno, fifteen kilometres south of 
Kukawa to benefit from the protection of the British troops. Kukawa was “at 
                                            
19 Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, p. 129. 
20 Ronald Cohen, ‘From Empire to Colony: Bornu in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries’, in 
Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960: Vol. 3: Profiles of Change: African Society and Colonial Rule, ed. by 
Peter Duignan, L. H. Gann and V. Turner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 74-
126. 
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present […] one large cornfield” according to the Resident, Hewby.21 When 
Lugard visited Borno in 1904, it was in Kukawa that he presented Shehu Garbai 
his staff of office. This ceremony was highly symbolic as it was in the nineteenth-
century capital of Borno that the Kanemi dynast officially became part of the 
colonial administrative framework. Was this ceremony only symbolic? As seen in 
the previous chapter, the British desperately needed to obtain territorial 
legitimacy in Borno. Choosing Kukawa even though it had been destroyed by 
Rabih, as the centre of power of the province, was part of a deliberate British 
strategy as they were seeking a dynastical and territorial continuity for Borno. 
However, the choice of Kukawa was not the best one for the Shehu and the 
British administration because of the climatic and commercial disadvantages of 
the city. Indeed, despite Hewby’s attempt to resurrect the trade between Tripoli 
and Borno, the commercial flows had changed.22 The trade route towards 
German and French territories was believed to be more important at the 
beginning of the twentieth century which explained why a location between the 
market village of Maiduguri and the British fort of Maifoni was selected. Hewby 
wrote: 
It has been decided to remove the native capital from Kuka[wa] to 
Maiduguri, the increasing commercial importance of which rendered this 
step necessary, though it seems a pity from the sentimental point of view, 
Kuka having been the capital for so many decades.23 
 
                                            
21 Sydney Hogben and Anthony Kirk-Greene, The Emirates of Northern Nigeria: a Preliminary 
Survey of Their Historical Traditions (Oxford University Press: London, 1966). I would like to 
thank Anthony Kirk-Greene for his time and for his gift as he gave me a reprinted version of his 
1966 book: The Emirates of Northern Nigeria. 
22 NAK, SNP 7, Acc. No. 510/1904: “Trade Between Tripoli and Northern Nigerian and Transport 
Facility to Certain Agents”, 396. 
23 Colonial Reports--annual. No. 551. Northern Nigeria., 1908, p. LXIX.243 (p. 11). 
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Figure 25: Localisation map of Kukawa, Maiduguri and Dikwa 
 
On 9th January 1907, the Shehu moved southwards to the new capital 
called Yerwa.24 Despite being created as a separate entity, Yerwa came to be 
known as Maiduguri after the close village of the same name.25 Consequently, the 
quest for territorial legitimacy for the British had its limits. The choice of Yerwa 
made the new capital relatively closer to the other cities of Northern Nigeria as 
the former capital, Kukawa, and Yerwa are separated from 180 kilometres. The 
better location of Yerwa, the new capital was a perfect demonstration of the 
possibility to adapt to the commercial situation in the Lake Chad region and 
political situation in Nigeria. 
However, the capital was not the only nineteenth-century political 
landmark that the British wanted to preserve. The territorial administration of 
nineteenth-century Borno was also preserved by the authorities to a certain 
extent. 
                                            
24 Hogben and Anthony Kirk-Greene, p. 338. 
25 Rupert Kawka, From Bulamari to Yerwa to Metropolitan Maiduguri: Interdisciplinary Studies on 
the Capital of Borno State, Nigeria  Ko ln: Ko ppe, 2002). 
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The colonial judicial and tax system was particularly responsible for the 
preservation of the territorial identity of Borno. Indeed, Northern Nigerian 
provinces were conceived by Lugard, their creator as the basis for justice and tax 
collection.26 The British Governor would be at the top of the Northern Nigerian 
hierarchy and it would be in his name that justice would be dispensed and taxes 
would be collected.27 In the first decade of British rule and during the First World 
War, numerous Africans were integrated within the colonial administration 
because of the shortage of British personnel. The British created “Native 
Authorities” which institutionalised nineteenth-century offices within the 
colonial framework. These Native Authorities were directly enshrined in 
Lugard’s vision of colonial Northern Nigeria. In his political memoranda of 1906, 
the latter spelt out the rules of “native administration”. In this blueprint for 
colonialism, Lugard established how the nineteenth-century elites should 
maintain their power.28 
This early participation of the Bornoan officials within the colonial 
administration had direct consequences on the British conception of Indirect 
Rule. Firstly, a higher number of judges had to be appointed by the colonial 
administration among local educated men. Schools were created to foster the 
creation of this intellectual elite.29 Secondly, the Native Authority had also to 
collect the “General Tax” which also included jangali, a cattle-tax which was the 
main source of the revenue for the new province.30 The Land Revenue Ordinance 
of 1904 forced the Northern Nigerian “chiefs” to give a quarter of their revenues 
to the British government. However, the Shehu could still retain three quarters of 
the taxes, a revenue not negligible as slave-trading was banned by the British 
administration. Indeed, one of the main incomes of the Bornoan elite in the 
                                            
26 Frederick Lugard, Colonial Reports--miscellaneous. No. 40. Northern Nigeria. Memorandum on 
the Taxation of Natives in Northern Nigeria, 1907, p. LIV.473 
<http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-
2004&res_dat=xri:hcpp&rft_dat=xri:hcpp:rec:1907-008221> [accessed 16 December 2011]. 
27 Colin Newbury, ‘Accounting for Power in Northern Nigeria’, The Journal of African History, 45 
(2004), 257-277. 
28 Quoted in Newbury, 'Accounting for Power in Northern Nigeria’, 257-277. 
29 Murray Last, ‘The “colonial Caliphate” of Northern Nigeria’, in Le Temps Des Marabouts, ed. by 
David Robinson and Jean-Louis Triaud (Paris: Karthala, 1997), p. 75. 
30 Morieux, Une mer pour deux royaumes, p. 164. 
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nineteenth-century was slave-trade. The economic loss engendered by the 
suppression of slave-trade and the Land Revenue Ordinance must have 
considerably changed the income of the Shehu. 
The Proclamation of 1906 allowed the Residents to study the communities 
which would be taxed. This is how the British administration became acquainted 
with the “former modes of tax collection in Borno”.31 
The colonial income tax was based on census and data collection led by 
village headmen and members of the Shehu’s administration.32 As Borno was a 
Muslim province, the colonial officials did not encounter many difficulties in 
implementing their tax system. However, the nomadic populations were harder 
to tax. For example, numerous colonial reports stressed the difficulty of collecting 
this jangali from the nomadic Shuwa Arabs: 
Migrations across the frontiers continue as heretofore. It is at 
present impossible to estimate the numbers of migrants and it 
will never be possible entirely to check these. Nomad tribes such 
as Shuwa Arabs must constantly move about in search of pasture 
and water... A census of Shuwa Arabs commenced in November 
had to be abandoned as the ever suspicious Arabs commenced 
migrating to German territory in large numbers.33 
Despite these specific issues related to the nomadic life of the Shuwa 
Arabs, the colonial reports mentioned few difficulties encountered by the Native 
Administration as it played its role within the colonial system. Major decisions 
such as death sentences had to be approved by a British official but this 
organisation gave much autonomy to the Bornoan hierarchy which was in charge 
of justice and tax assessment.34 
It could be suggested that the nineteenth-century Borno administration 
and its colonial successor shared numerous features in appearance. As during the 
                                            
31 See the details given by Lugard in his 1904 report for Northern Nigeria Colonial Reports--
annual. No. 476. Northern Nigeria. Report for 1904, 1906, p. LXXIV.723 
<http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-
2004&res_dat=xri:hcpp&rft_dat=xri:hcpp:rec:1906-006816> [accessed 16 December 2011]. 
32 Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria, p. 52. 
33 NAK, SNP 7, Acc. No. 904/1912: “Bornu Province, Annual Report for 1911”. 
34 I. Okonjo, British Administration in Nigeria, 1900-1950: a Nigerian View (New York: NOK 
Publishers, 1974), pp. 46–47. 
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nineteenth century, so at the beginning of colonial rule, justice and tax collection 
were organised by the Shehu’s administration.35 
However, it is undeniable that the nineteenth-century justice and tax 
system differed from the British colonial justice or tax system. For example, 
village headmen and other officials had to adapt to the new political situation of 
Northern Nigeria. The Bornoan administration faced many challenges with, for 
instance, the introduction of coinage instead of cowries and tributes in produce. 
In addition, the new system had to be meticulously recorded by the Bornoan 
educated elite who had to be trained to produce record books. The Shehu’s court 
was also under the scrutiny of the British administration as the Native Court 
Proclamation of 1900 gave power to the Resident to access the proceedings of 
the court at all times.36 
Moreover, the British sought to reorganise the fief system of nineteenth-
century Borno.37 At a local scale, the fief system based on kinship and personal 
links was gradually substituted with a fully territorial system of fiefs.38 This 
system existed before the British colonisation but its generalisation to the whole 
of Borno had political and cultural consequences. A pyramidal structure based on 
village and district heads was implemented by Hewby in the 1900s. However, 
this was not totally new to Borno. As seen in the previous chapters, Borno was a 
relatively centralised state with a strong administration in the nineteenth 
century. 
At the beginning of colonial rule, tax-collection from local headmen was 
not very dissimilar from the pre-Rabih period. In many cases, the hierarchy did 
not even change. For example, in 1907, “sixteen of the former fief-holders are 
now Ajias [heads] of districts”.39 With the same interlocutors and the same 
territory, the tax collectors might not have found it difficult to continue collecting 
                                            
35 Okonjo, British Administration in Nigeria, 1900-1950, p. 47. 
36 Okonjo, British Administration in Nigeria, 1900-1950, p. 46 and David Smith, ‘Native Courts of 
Northern Nigeria: Techniques for Institutional Development’, Boston University Law Review, 48 
(1968), 53. 
37 Cohen, 'From Empire to Colony', pp. 74-126. 
38 Morieux, British Administration in Nigeria, p. 164. 
39 Lugard, Report for 1904, p. 34. 
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taxes whether it be for the Shehu of for the British. Despite all the notable 
changes mentioned earlier, the perception of the territory of Borno did not 
greatly vary because of the administrative continuity between the nineteenth-
century kingdom and the Northern Nigerian province. 
In addition, it could also be a proof of the relative adaptation of the British 
administration which had to integrate African personnel within the colonial 
framework because of the shortage of British staff. This British adaptation could 
be seen as a purely pragmatic move; however, British colonial rule was exerted 
through Borno and not through a totally artificial creation. It could be suggested 
that the Europeans were ready to create new artificial international boundaries 
such as the boundary separating Borno between the British and the Germans 
when required. Nonetheless, for pragmatic reasons, they were eager to preserve 
the local territories at a provincial level to facilitate Indirect Rule. By 
consequence, through tax-collection and justice, Indirect Rule had the effect of 
preserving the territorial integrity of the kingdom of Borno. 
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4.1.4. Borno as a Part of the British Frontier Policy 
 
The frontier policy undertaken by the British in Borno revealed the 
attitude adopted by the colonisers. Indeed in 1902, Borno became the north-
eastern corner of the colony of Northern Nigeria. Before this date, the 
international borders were not officially implemented between Northern Nigeria, 
Kamerun and the Territoire Militaire du Soudan. One of the first roles of the 
Residents of Borno was to delimitate the borders of the colony of Northern 
Nigeria. The boundary commissions studied earlier revealed the difficulty to 
delimitate precise borders between the European colonies. 
 For example, the National Archives of Kaduna still contain details about 
the Anglo-French boundary commission of 1904. According to these documents, 
the British Residents of Borno were eager to attract the Manga populations south 
of the river Yobe, i.e. into British territory.40 These population movements were 
encouraged by the British even if: 
migrations into German territory have not been worth recording. 
Some people from the Mobber District have gone over the Yobe 
River into French territory. Occasional movements across the 
river may for some time be expected on this frontier, the people 
on both sides being the same tribe and closely related.41 
The main priority of the British authorities was to prevent smuggling and 
ban slave-trading. As Borno was one of the termini of the transsaharan trade, the 
Bornoan borders had to be under their scrutiny. Nonetheless, Paul Lovejoy 
showed how slavery in Northern Nigeria did not come to a halt because of these 
measures.42 Moreover, as the Germans were not actively preventing slave-trade 
in their territory, the British had to patrol the international borders of Borno.43 
                                            
40 NAK, SNP 17/5, Acc. No. 6830, 42372, Anglo-French boundary Commissions (1904-1908). 
41 NAK, SNP 7, Acc. No. 1271/1910: Bornu Province, Annual Report for 1909. 
42 Paul Lovejoy and Jan Hogendorn, Slow Death for Slavery: The Course of Abolition in Northern 
Nigeria, 1897-1936 (Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
43 Holger Weiss, ‘The Illegal Trade in Slaves from German Northern Cameroon to British 
Northern Nigeria’. 
166 
 
In 1910, the Residents finally found the borders “satisfactory”: 
International frontiers are satisfactory; and the transfrontier 
migrations tend to become less frequent and unsettling, though 
they will of course, continue for years. It is proposed to dig a 
trench along the Anglo-French boundary, from beacon to beacon, 
as a definite line for native guidance; but a trench that would last 
long as a visible mark in this light sandy soil is a large operation 
requiring supervision that has not been available. 
The arming late in the year of our 25 Preventive Service Agents 
with buckshot-carbines has had a good effect; for these men on 
the frontiers frequently ran serious risks of their lives in their 
duties of the prevention of salt-smuggling and slave-running. No 
affrays have been reported.44 
Population flows were in general subject to enquiries from the colonial 
officers willing to ensure that the Northern Nigerian provinces would become 
prosperous. However, this demographic concern was not only economic. When 
the British conquered Sokoto in 1903, numerous Muslims chose to follow the 
Sultan Attihiru I in his hijra or religious migration to the east.45 This hijra was a 
demographic movement that the British tried to prevent but not always 
successfully in the first years of the colonisation.46 This type of definitive 
migration was also completed by the hadj, the pilgrimage to Mecca which was 
supposed to be temporary. However, once again, the European feared these 
demographic flows.47 When between 1st April 1907 to 31st December 1907, 5005 
pilgrims to Mecca travelled through Borno, the resident declared: “These figures 
show a continual drain on our Nigerian population.”48 From an administrative 
point of view, pilgrims had to be delivered travel passports from the British 
authorities: 
                                            
44 NAK, SNP 7, Acc. No. 1090/1911: “Bornu Province, Annual Report for 1910”. 
45 Dale Eickelman and James P. Piscatori, Muslim Travellers: Pilgrimage, Migration, and the 
Religious Imagination (University of California Press, 1990), p. 38. 
46  Personal communication with Murray Last and Murray Last, ‘Islam and Colonialism: 
Intellectual Responses of Muslims of Northern Nigeria to British Colonial Rule By Muhammad S. 
Umar.’, Journal of Islamic Studies, 18 (2007), 439-441. 
47 Nehemia Levtzion and Randall Pouwels ed., Islam in Africa Under French Colonial Rule, ed. by 
Nehemia Levtzion and Randall Pouwels (Oxford: James Currey, 2000). 
48 NAK, SNP 7, Acc. No. 1761/1908: “Bornu Province, Annual Report for 1907”. 
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“There were 5954 passports issued in Bornu during 1911... Though the wastage 
must be very great, it is probable that many returning pilgrims omit to present 
themselves for registration, otherwise the annual drain on the Nigerian 
population must be very serious.”49 
Borno was part of a wider British frontier-policy of the British in Northern 
Nigeria as the latter believed in a Mahdist threat. The beginning of colonial rule in 
Africa was largely influenced by the fears of Mahdist uprisings in the whole of 
Africa. As seen in the previous chapter, Rabih himself was believed to be Mahdist 
when the Sudanese rebellion was quelled in 1898 by Herbert Kitchener. The 
Mahdists ignored the new international borders as they wanted to topple 
established rulers in Western and Central Sudan. To a certain extent, the 
colonisers had reasons to feel concerned as Mahdis emerged nearly every year in 
Northern Nigeria. Lugard said himself: “wherever you look under every bush and 
tree, there is a Mahdi.”50 Upheavals in two towns of the Sokoto Caliphate, Bormi 
and Satiru, respectively in 1903 and 1906 led to British armed repression.51 In 
Borno, Sa’id ben Hayat created the town of Dumbulwa at the beginning of 1919. 
This settlement located by Fika on the border of Borno province grew rapidly to 
3000 inhabitants.52 
The British Resident, Herbert Palmer, took this threat very seriously and 
associated any expression of discontentment with Mahdism. With the help of the 
Shehu of Borno, he dispersed the whole community of Dumbulwa and deported 
their leader, Sa’id ben Hayat from 1923 to 1959.53 The perception of this threat 
was perfectly expressed by Palmer when he became Lieutenant-General of 
Northern Nigeria in 1925. Indeed the latter commissioned two of his officers to 
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write a book entitled “History of Islamic Political Propaganda in Nigeria”.54 Islam 
as a transnational movement was particularly feared by the colonial officers in 
Borno who saw in Mahdism an opposition to colonial rule. Borno as a border-
province was at the centre of these colonial preoccupations. 
Furthermore, Mahdism was not the only transborder Muslim 
phenomenon that the British feared. The Sanussiya, a religious order with 
political aims, was already opposing the French in their conquest of the Sahara.55 
The British administration, once again at the border of Northern Nigeria saw the 
Sanussiya as a direct enemy.56 When considering British colonialism in Northern 
Nigeria, it is customary to argue that the British colonisers reached an agreement 
with the Muslims.57 Lugard and his successors supported and defended some 
specific aspects of Islam.58 But, residents of Borno had to pay a close attention to 
those Islamic aspects that were undesirable in the eyes of the British rulers. 
Firstly, they had to investigate the circulation of pilgrims and ideas to and from 
Eastern Sudan. The frontier-policy adopted by the British in Borno did not put an 
end to the migratory flows of the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca. However, they put 
under very close scrutiny all the ideas coming from the east. 
This explains why the British were genuinely concerned with the links 
between the Northern Nigerians and the rest of the Muslim world. This subject 
has already been studied for Hausaland by Mahaman Alio who wrote a thesis 
about the place of Islam in the Franco-British colonial frontier.59 The latter 
discovered that the fear of anti-colonial Muslim revolts led to a relatively close 
transborder cooperation between the French and the British from the 1920s on. 
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This collaboration consisted in the exchange of intelligence reports between 
Niamey and Kano but was interrupted between 1940 and 1943 when Niger came 
under the control of Vichy France. When de Gaulle took over the French African 
colonies in 1943, the cooperation was resumed. Borno was primarily concerned 
with this policy as many pilgrims from Northern Nigeria but also from French 
Western Africa were travelling through Maiduguri. Ideas and men circulating on 
a west-east axis then were crossing colonial borders. 
These policies were partly based on the help provided by the Sultan of 
Sokoto or the Shehu of Borno. For their help against the Mahdists, both were 
awarded the C.M.G., a British decoration.60 The fact that Borno was a frontier 
province of Northern Nigeria cemented the relationship between the Shehu’s 
administration and the British officers. The nineteenth-century hierarchy of 
Borno was thus incorporated within a wider frontier-policy led by the British 
against some uncontrolled aspects of Islam. Borno and Sokoto were used as 
defensive walls against the presumed fanatical influence of Mahdism. The 
borders of Borno which were the limits of the spiritual influence of the Shehu 
were thus used by the British authorities to prevent foreign influences from 
gaining ground in Northern Nigeria. This last point reveals the extent to which 
the British authorities were ready to use the late nineteenth-century structures 
to implement their own policies. 
This section argued thus that the Bornoan administration of the early 
colonial period played a decisive role in the preservation of the territorial 
continuity of Borno. As this administration operated within the same conceptual 
framework as their predecessors, they transmitted the notions and conceptions 
of the Bornoan territory and borders to the British administration. The 
transmission of this spatial dimension to the British colonisers reveals the 
strength of the Shehu’s administration. The resilience of Borno as a space is 
therefore not primordialist but is the result of a cultural transmission 
perpetuated by British Indirect Rule. 
Despite the territorial changes due to the creation of colonial borders, the 
British assured the territorial continuity of Borno within Northern Nigeria. On a 
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legal point of view, the independent kingdom of Borno disappeared but the State 
continuity was preserved through the administrative framework of Indirect Rule 
in Northern Nigeria and then Nigeria. It may be possible to evoke an active 
territorial conservatism. 
The fossilisation of the territory of Borno occurred in the first years of 
colonial rule. In a relative short time span (1902-1914), the British reconstructed 
the territory of nineteenth-century Borno. This brief period can be understood as 
establishing the territorial matrix for British rule in Borno. The territory of Borno 
re-emerged in the beginning of the twentieth century not to be modified again 
after the 1920s. This first period of territorial fascination was subsequently 
echoed in the writings of the colonial officials. 
 
4.2. The Colonial Officials as Heralds of Borno 
 
This section will argue that the colonial officers present in Borno played a 
very specific role in the preservation of its territory throughout the colonial 
period. By promoting its historical specific identity, they reinforced its 
particularity within Nigeria. This section will assess their perception of the 
territory of Borno via the study of their writings whether they be scholarly 
studies, personal memoirs or reports for the Colonial Office. These officers 
wanted their studies to become secondary sources for their governments or 
readers. By turning them into objects of study, this section will transform these 
secondary sources into primary sources. 
The colonial officers in charge in Borno were eager to discover the history 
of Borno. One could argue that their interest was simply due their need to 
implement British Indirect Rule. Indeed, in order to create the very type of 
colonialism Frederick Lugard desired, the colonial officers had to analyse and 
understand the African structures they were officially in charge of. As Lugard put 
it himself, the resident must “study the native laws and customs, which react on 
Koranic law in Moslem districts, and replace it in pagan areas. […] The officer 
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who knows the language cannot fail to acquire a keener interest in and sympathy 
with the people”.61 
Lugard had particularly Northern Nigeria in mind when he theorised the 
role of the residents and the district officers in the British colonial empire. 
Because of its Muslim population, its hierarchy and its size, Borno was an ideal 
place for Britain to exert Indirect Rule. The relationship between the British and 
the emirs of the Sokoto Caliphate has often been perceived as the embodiment of 
Indirect Rule.62 Borno could also symbolise the type of Indirect Rule Lugard 
desired as proved by the fact Lugard referred to Borno no less than thirteen 
times in his book, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa.63 
 It would thus be possible to consider the British interest in the history of 
Borno as a purely instrumentalist study for the sake of the “Dual Mandate”. This 
is a very classical interpretation of Indirect Rule.64 However, in the case of Borno, 
the colonisers went further as the colonial residents realised that the history of 
Borno was not limited to the very recent events of the conquest of Rabih. They 
soon realised that they were dealing with the history of a kingdom tracing back 
its history to the eleventh century. The narratives of the nineteenth-century 
explorers were part of their compulsory training while in Europe. Their 
perception of this territory was largely influenced by the first descriptions of 
Borno by Denham but also by the historical accounts given by Barth and 
Nachtigal. 
 In order to study the perception of the territory and borders of Borno by 
the colonial officers, this chapter will analyse various documents written by them 
during their time in Borno. Some of their official reports are still available today 
in the Nigerian National Archives of Kaduna, in the British National Archives in 
Kew or in Rhodes House at the University of Oxford. As Borno was colonised 
from 1902 and 1960, it was initially hoped that this chapter could analyse 58 
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annual reports. However, it was impossible to locate all 58 annual reports for the 
province. The sources are fragmentary especially between the beginning of the 
colonisation in 1902 and the end of the First World War in 1918. However, some 
quarterly reports are still available in Kaduna and some colonial reports found 
their way to Kew and Oxford. 
Despite the relative lack of consistent data for the early colonial period, 
various colonial officers sought to write about the history of Borno in a scholarly 
manner after the First World War. Moreover, in the later colonial period, colonial 
officers wrote their memoirs about their personal experience in Borno. 
This chapter will thus rely very much on three different types of primary 
sources corresponding roughly to three different chronological periods. The first 
sources available are the colonial reports available throughout the colonial 
period. Even if some of them are lost today, they are the only source available for 
the early colonial period. The second type of sources corresponds to the scholarly 
studies led in the 1910s and 1920s by the various colonial officers. This is 
arguably the most original set of sources. Finally, for the post-Second World War 
years, colonial memoirs will be used to provide a better analysis of the personal 
conceptions of the colonial officers. 
 
4.2.1. Colonial Officials as Scholars 
 
Borno was one of the oldest kingdoms of Africa when the Europeans 
invaded it at the turn of the twentieth century. The Europeans in their colonial 
endeavour genuinely desired to understand the societies they just conquered. It 
could be suggested that this interest was entirely cynical as more knowledge 
about the conquered societies would only help the Europeans to better colonise 
them. In his political memoranda, Lugard demanded in a militaristic style that the 
Residents should become more familiar with the history of the colonised 
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societies.65 In Borno, most Residents became more than familiar with the history 
of Borno as they transformed into ardent scholars of the history of the kingdom. 
Where is the Hegelian perception of the supposed lack of History in 
Africa? Most colonial officers operating in Borno were apparently devoid of such 
prejudice. They count even as the first western scholars of the history of Borno, 
collating and analysing documents of the history of the kingdom. In doing so, the 
first colonial officials emulated their predecessors in India.66 For example, 
eighteenth-century British scholars, Nathaniel Halhed and William Jones were 
considered as “aficionados of Indian culture”.67 The first Governor-General of 
India, Warren Hastings noted in 1784: “Every application of knowledge and 
especially such as is obtained in social communication with people, over whom 
we exercise dominion, founded on the right of conquest, is useful to the state”.68 
Lugard himself born in India was very much a product of imperial India. He was 
certainly influenced by this conception of knowledge.  
This scholarly interest was not, of course, devoid of any racist prejudice. 
These studies were not only undertaken in the name of Knowledge but for the 
sake of colonial rule. The scholar-administrators of Borno had a very clear 
agenda: the first being the administration of their province, the second one the 
study of the Bornoan people in order to subdue them. The scholar-administrators 
of Borno did not see the contradiction between their work as scholars and as 
administrators as they were two sides of the same coin. 
In an article published in 1974, Gwilym Jones, a colonial administrator 
turned anthropologist, examined the development of colonial anthropology in 
Nigeria. He isolated four different phases: the first one was the phase of the early 
and middle nineteenth-century traveller-ethnographers, the second phase 
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concerned military men interested in travelling at the turning point of the 
twentieth century; the third phase was that of colonial officials who were 
amateur anthropologists in the first half of the colonial period; the last phase was 
mainly about the professional anthropologists trained in London by Bronisław 
Malinovsky. The time sequences examined by Jones correspond to Borno’s 
experience. 
The first ethnographer officials followed the example of nineteenth-
century explorers such as Denham, Clapperton, Barth and Nachtigal who were 
eager to discover the past of Borno. 
At the turn of the twentieth century, the tradition of studying Borno was 
perpetuated by European military officers who also developed an interest in the 
history of their conquests. The linguist Thomas Geider has retraced how these 
Europeans also studied the Kanuri language and culture overtime.69 However, as 
the reports of the early period prove, the lake itself was generally more 
important than the inhabitants of the Lake Chad basin or their language.70 The 
following officers were the soldiers who did not limit their study of the Lake Chad 
area to its geographical features. 
For example, the Foureau-Lamy mission of 1898-1900 was charged with 
unifying the French colonial possessions between Western and Equatorial Africa. 
Among other goals, it had to deal with Rabih but its members also studied the 
countries they visited. The scientific results of the expedition were published in 
the Documents Scientifiques de la Mission Saharienne Foureau-Lamy.71 Fernand 
Foureau, a leader of this mission himself published a narrative of the mission 
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called D’Alger au Congo par le Tchad.72 In these last two studies, Foureau did not 
specifically focus on Borno itself but described the intrigues of Umar Sanda and 
Garbai in their quest to become Shehus again. 
In the first decade of the twentieth century, European soldiers even if not 
fighting on the Northern Nigerian soil, were still writing about Borno. A French 
military member of the Anglo-French boundary demarcation mission paid 
specific attention to the Lake Chad region. With the help of his interpreter Moïse 
Landeroin, Jean-Auguste Tilho published the results of his enquiries in another 
series of Documents Scientifiques as his predecessor Foureau.73 A few years later, 
he explored the Lake Chad region again and also published an article about his 
discoveries.74 In 1907, an English officer, Boyd Alexander explored the Lake Chad 
area and described the societies he encountered.75 In 1924, Frederick Migeod 
also produced a travel narrative partly concerning Borno.76 
In Central Sudan, the European military and colonial conquest was never 
undertaken with a total ignorance of the conquered societies. These sources 
contain a wealth of documents and in the case of Tilho’s Scientific Documents 
particular examples of recorded oral history. However, what was the quality of 
the information provided by these studies of the early twentieth century? It 
seems that the later productions of the amateur anthropologists have been more 
criticised than these early sources of information. These first reports are often 
understood at face value whereas their anthropological successors from the 
1920s are more subject to criticism.77 
                                            
72 Fernand Foureau, D’Alger Au Congo Par Le Tchad: Mission Saharienne Foureau-Lamy (Paris: 
Masson et Cie, 1902) <http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k5668141v> [accessed 28 April 
2011]. 
73 Jean-Auguste Tilho, ‘The French Mission to Lake Chad’, The Geographical Journal, 36 (1910), 
271-286. 
74 Jean-Auguste Tilho, Documents Scientifiques De La Mission Tilho, 1906-1909 (Paris: Impr. 
Nationale, 1910). 
75 Boyd Alexander, From the Niger to the Nile, 1st edn (E. Arnold, 1907).and Boyd Alexander, 
‘Lake Chad’, Journal of the Royal African Society, 7 (1908), 225-238. 
76 Frederick Migeod, Through Nigeria to Lake Chad (London: H. Cranton, 1924). 
77 Personal communication with Camille Lefebvre. 
176 
 
Nonetheless, these studies constitute the link between the narratives of 
the nineteenth-century explorers and the first colonial officials. A German officer 
former member of the Anglo-German demarcation commission of 190378, Arnold 
Schultze published in 1910 a monograph entitled Das Sultanat Bornu  Mit 
Besonderer Ber cksichtigung Deutsch-Bornu.79 This book was the first western 
monograph entirely devoted to Borno. In nine chapters, it revealed the new 
perception of the kingdom by the colonial officials. The academic interest 
developed by Barth and Nachtigal could be found again in Schultze’s work as the 
latter trained as a geographer. Schultze also wanted to discover the history of 
Borno and in his monograph, gave an updated version of the recent events which 
led to the European colonisation. His narrative of the rise and fall of the Kanemi 
dynasty in the nineteenth century could be considered as a typical account of the 
decline and fall of empires. Schultze’s historical account described the personal 
role of the last nineteenth-century Shehus in the demise of their kingdom. As they 
had lost the martial and leadership qualities of their ancestor Mohammad El-
Kanemi, their kingdom fell to an invader, Rabih. 
“The results of Umar’s policy of inaction were bound to show themselves 
fatally in the border districts and in the provinces only loosely attached to 
Bornu”.80 
This summary of the history of nineteenth-century Borno could be easily 
comparable with the history of the Roman Empire written between 1776 and 
1789 by Edward Gibbon.81 This analogy demonstrates the extent to which the 
first colonial officials were influenced by their own classical education when 
considering Borno. Where the European nineteenth-century travellers saw in 
Borno a medieval polity, the colonisers saw in it a pre-medieval empire. This shift 
from the medieval to the ancient era may indicate an evolution towards an 
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imperial mind-set. As the Europeans were building colonial empires, they 
perceived themselves as heirs to the Romans. Archaeologist Richard Hungley 
analysed this phenomenon in his book, Roman Officers and English Gentlemen.82 
He proved that the British perceived themselves as the heirs of the Romans in 
Britain. His study demonstrated to what extent the British colonial officers in 
India and Africa were directly inspired from the Roman example. For example, 
the British duplicated the Roman frontier policy of building a limes by creating 
the “Salt Hedge” or “Customs Hedge” in Northern India in 1843.83 Similarly, for 
early colonial officers, the British battles against the Mahdi in Sudan mirrored the 
Roman fight against the “Welsh”.84 
Thus, Schultze’s monograph was more than a new way to deal with the 
history of Borno. It also became the prototype for the history of a colonised 
territory. As the main part of Borno was British, it seems paradoxical that this 
first study did not come from a British but from a German officer. However, this 
fact can be explained by the nineteenth-century German academic interest in the 
Lake Chad area. Compared to the small area of German Borno, the kingdom 
attracted a relatively high number of publications. For instance, Rudolf Prietze, 
Nachtigal’s nephew, wrote at the beginning of the twentieth century on the flora, 
fauna, songs and proverbs of Borno.85 Between 1913 and 1942, Adolf von 
Duisburg wrote ethnographical articles and books on the Kanuri.86 In the 1920s 
and 1930s, Albert Drexel a linguist who desired to find links between Sumer and 
Africa studied the Kanuri language among other languages.87 From the 1930s to 
the 1950s, Johannes Lukas was the first linguist to travel to Borno to study the 
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Kanuri language.88 Despite the loss of Kamerun, German academic interest never 
disappeared. 
British officials rapidly understood the potential of such studies and in 
1913, Philip Benton, a British officer stationed in Borno translated Schultze’s 
monograph.89 He also published a revised version of Duisburg’s grammar book in 
1917.90 According to Anthony Kirk-Greene:  
he became an authority on Bornu’s ecology, embracing a host of interests, 
such as history, language, exploration, flora and fauna and thereby lending 
weight to his personal credo of, as he once expressed it, [I am Bornoan, I 
consider nothing that is Bornoan alien to me].91  
Most of his writings are today gathered in The Languages and Peoples of 
Bornu reprinted in 1958.92 
However, Benton was not isolated. Other colonial officials residing in 
Northern Nigeria focused on the culture of their newly conquered subjects. 
Charles Temple, Chief Secretary of Northern Nigeria in 1910 and Lieutenant-
Governor in 1914 edited one the first ethnological surveys of Northern Nigeria in 
his Notes on the Tribes, Provinces, Emirates and States of the Northern Province of 
Nigeria.93 This collection of notes compiled by his wife Olive Temple94 can be 
seen as one of the first attempts of the British administration to gather 
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ethnological intelligence on Northern Nigeria.95 As Charles Temple put it: “a close 
and detailed knowledge of the habits and customs of the native is of the first 
importance to the European administrator.”96 
In Borno, John Patterson published Kanuri songs97 whereas Herbert 
Palmer desired to write the history of the kingdom. As the latter stressed himself 
in the introduction of his book Sahara and Sudan: 
during some twenty-six years spent in various parts of Northern Nigeria, 
much of the author’s leisure was occupied in attempts to find data for the 
compilation of a true history of its more important units, or ruling classes, 
such as the Fulbe and Kanuri of Bornu.98 
From 1904 to 1930, Palmer gathered oral and written data while climbing 
the ladder of the Northern Nigerian colonial hierarchy. First an Assistant 
Resident, he rapidly became Resident in Northern Nigeria. He was promoted to 
the Residency of Borno in 1917 before becoming Lieutenant-Governor of 
Northern Nigeria in 1925. His published Arabic letters and testimonies became 
the basis of modern scholarship for Hausa and Bornoan studies.99 During his 
eight years in Borno, he focused on the history of the Sayfawa kingdom. 
Admittedly, his approach and methods are nowadays out-dated. For 
example, Palmer subscribed to the diffusionist theories which wanted to find the 
origins of Borno in distant migrations. Palmer’s chronology of the Sayfawa kings 
was inaccurate and was revised later by historians such as Dierk Lange.100 Nor 
did he, for example, quote his sources when he mentioned the existence of a 
territorial division of sixteenth-century Borno. However, Palmer promoted the 
kingdom on the historical academic stage. His monograph Sahara and Sudan 
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revealed the importance of written and oral sources in the understanding of the 
history of an ancient African territory. 
In 1922, the Phelps-Stoke Report was used as the basis for a 
reorganisation of education in Northern Nigeria and recommended that local 
languages should be used in class. In order to teach Kanuri culture to the young 
Bornoans, a series of book called Kitabuwa Kanuribe, the Kanuri books, was 
published by the Nigerian colonial authorities. The fifth and last book of this 
series was dedicated to history.101 Not surprisingly, the first author of this book 
was a colonial officer in Borno, Randall E. Ellison who was working as the Officer 
of Education in 1935. His main informant was Muhammad Ngileruma who later 
became Waziri of Borno and was the Permanent Delegate of Nigeria to the United 
Nations Organization from 1960 to 1962.102 The relationship between colonial 
officials and the local elite was here clearly displayed. 
Furthermore, a British version of Bornoan history was also transmitted in 
schools. Thus the work of these colonial officers was also taught to the new 
generations of Bornoans. Shehu Sanda Kura who was Shehu from 1922 to 1937 
was particularly involved in this production of History books.103 Historical 
knowledge was manipulated and transmitted by the British and the local elite 
during the colonial times. 
Which past were these colonial scholars interested in? Colonial scholars 
such as Schultze, Benton and Palmer devoted their attention to the history of 
great men and their prestigious feats. For example, they examined great figures 
of the past such as King Idris who used firearms against his opponents in the 
sixteenth century. The prestigious roots of the Bornoan kingdom were also 
sought after. According to this early generation of scholars, as the kingdom of 
Kanem-Borno was the first kingdom to be Islamised in Africa, it must have found 
its origins in the Middle East. For example, Palmer concludes that the Bornoans 
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to Bosoma Sheriff who let me read a draft version of this chapter. 
103 Personal communication with Bosoma Sheriff.  
181 
 
were linked with “Iranian Barbarians”. 104  This assumption was directly 
influenced by the Hamitic hypothesis which wanted to find the origins of complex 
societies such as Borno outside of Africa. In that sense, colonial historiography of 
Borno was not different from the colonial historiography of other colonial 
territories such as Rwanda.105 
These scholars of Borno were not thus totally original as they were not the 
only Europeans to study the history of “their” local colonised territory. For 
example, the French colonial officials in Ouagadougou also spent time studying 
the Mossi country. In 1907, the French “commandant de cercle”, Captain G. 
Lambert wrote an ethnographical account of the Mossi.106 In 1909, Lieutenant 
Lucien Marc, published a monograph on the Mossi of Ouagadougou.107 In the 
French colony of Niger, a colonial officer, Georges Noël, even developed an 
interested in the history of Bilma a seventeenth-century Kanem-Borno outpost in 
the Sahara where a part of the population still spoke a dialect of Kanuri during 
the colonial times. As a result, Noël transcribed Kanuri stories in a French-Kanuri 
grammar book.108 
Studying the history of Borno enabled the colonial officers in charge to 
appropriate their province. This personal sense of belonging enabled them to 
administer Borno more as a ruler than as a colonial officer. For example, when 
Lugard met Hewby at the border of Borno province, the former said: "I may be 
High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria, but I see, Mr. Hewby, that you are King 
of Borno”.109 
Two factors were responsible for such an attitude. Firstly, the 
geographical distance between the colonial capital of Northern Nigeria, Zungeru, 
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and later Kaduna and Maiduguri particularly isolated Borno from the rest of the 
colony.110 The British in charge of Sokoto never developed such a strong 
autonomous attitude. Secondly, it could be argued that the British colonial 
officials were directly influenced by the strong political framework of Borno. In 
1958, Robert Heussler a historian of Northern Nigeria described the specificity of 
what was then called “the Holy Kingdom”.111 Indeed according to him: 
In a North that was sacred overall, Bornu was the sanctus sanctorum 
where the power of a small clique of officers was as great as their ideas 
were reactionary.112 
It seems that for these officers that Borno was an ideal place from which 
to advance their career. After his eight years in Borno, Palmer was promoted 
Lieutenant-Governor of The Gambia and later on became Governor of Cyprus; 
Gordon Lethem, Resident of Borno from 1925 to 1931 became Governor of the 
Seychelles, the Leeward Islands and British Guyana; John Patterson, Resident of 
Borno in 1937 became Chief-Commissioner of Northern Nigeria.113 Northern 
Nigeria was then the best place to work for career-minded Western African 
British officials.114 It could be argued that being stationed in Borno gave these 
officers the largest share of the prestige attached to Northern Nigeria. In addition, 
studying Borno provided academic laurels to them which benefitted their own 
career. The conjunction of these two factors made the British colonial officials 
eager to follow the steps of Benton or Palmer. 
Their scholarly interest, even if undeniable, was thus not totally unselfish. 
The autonomy from Zungeru, Kaduna and Lagos made it possible for these 
colonial officers to establish their authority in a remote corner of the British 
colony. It could be suggested that they became “authorities” in the two meanings 
of the term. In a system of Indirect Rule where the spatial structure of the 
nineteenth-century territory of Borno was preserved, they were at the head of a 
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hierarchy from which they could exert their power. As products of European 
universities in charge of a society with a self-evidently knowable past, they could 
become academic authorities of Borno to foster their own career. These officers 
were compelled to promote the unity and continuity of the Bornoan space to 
improve their own status as Residents of the province. They were not in charge 
of a semi-arid, remote and relatively impoverished province; they were Residents 
of the ancient Holy Kingdom of Borno. The relationship between these two 
perceptions made these officers proud and defensive of their own authority of 
their province.  
This does not mean that Bornoan historical events or characters were 
overrated by these officers as the quality of their work is undeniable. However, it 
is striking that numerous officials turned Borno into an academic object to 
pursue their own career objectives. The historian Anthony Kirk-Greene who was 
District Officer in Borno in 1955 stressed how these first figures of Residents 
were genuinely attached but also protective of their own authority.115 Kirk-
Greene himself even became a specialist of Borno116 while also focusing on the 
colonial service hence becoming a scholar of these early scholars.117 
 
4.2.2. The Territory of Borno in the Colonial Memoirs 
 
Some colonial administrators did not write scholarly articles or books on 
Borno. However, the available annual colonial reports still available fill the gaps 
in the accumulation of knowledge of the “Holy Kingdom” of Borno. For the 
purposes of British colonial administration, the first part of the annual reports 
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sent to the central government of Northern Nigeria summarised the history of 
Borno in a version mostly inspired by Benton and Palmer. This vulgate of the 
history of Borno was and still is to a certain extent the official version of the 
history of Borno. This version of Bornoan history was first propagated by the 
travellers and other colonial officials who did not write in an academic manner, 
but who described Borno in their memoirs. 
This history of Borno was always depicted as the history of the rise and 
fall of the Holy Kingdom. Margery Perham who travelled through Borno in 1932 
described in her diary her personal feelings of admiration about the kingdom. In 
one page, she emphasised that Borno once “dominated that whole dry heart of 
north-central Africa, stretching from the present Bornu to the borders of the 
present Sudan”.118 Rex Niven resident of Borno from 1940 to 1943 and again 
from 1948 to 1950 repeated the history of the territory of Borno in his memoirs, 
Nigerian Kaleidoscope.119 For him, the Residency of Borno was “something 
essentially unique and out of this world. Bornu’s greatest difficulty was ‘spatial’. 
Its huge size made administration difficult and travelling often a nightmare”.120 
This Bornoan exceptionalism was reinforced by other colonial officers. 
In their memoirs of civil service throughout the whole of the British 
Empire, Gawain Bell121 and Bryan Sharwood-Smith122 were careful to mention 
the history of nineteenth-century Borno. Trevor Kerslake, Assistant-District 
Officer in Borno from 1942 to 1944, stressed that “Bornu was, and perhaps still 
is, a remote and somehow separate part of what was known as the Holy 
North”.123 Nicholas McKlintock in his memoirs evoked: “The core of the province 
was the great central emirate of Bornu itself, under its venerable ruler, the Shehu. 
But surrounding this were four smaller emirates, all of which were historically 
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within the influence of Bornu and which have been grouped together by the 
British into one great administrative unit”.124 Trevor Clark, member of the last 
generation of colonial officers in Nigeria, also referred to the history of Borno in 
his edited book.125 
It could be suggested that the different colonial officers in Borno 
reproduced the idea of a Bornoan exceptionalism. This is not to deny that Borno 
presented some characteristics of its own but the colonial authorities reproduced 
the ideas conveyed by the earlier colonial administrators. The conservatism of 
the colonial officers in charge of Borno made them consider the territory of 
Borno as a “Holy Land” in essence. By repeating endlessly in their colonial 
reports or memoirs, the history of the rise and fall of the kingdom of Borno, they 
assured that it would survive the British colonisation. Kirk-Greene stressed how 
these political officers assured that their power thus remained unchallenged in 
the whole of Northern Nigeria.126 
For example, the colonial officers present in Borno were reluctant to link 
Maiduguri to the rest of the country rail network. As it would have exposed 
Borno to waves of emigration and immigration, officials were not especially 
enthralled by the perspective of being part of the Nigerian market.127 This 
conservatism was expressed in the relationship between the late colonial officials 
and the Bornoan hierarchy. Their attitude, which will also be explored in the next 
chapter, reinforced the territorial identity of Borno. 
In a 1972 essay, Ronald Robinson revealed how collaboration was 
essential to British imperialism.128 The memoirs of the British officers present in 
Borno certainly reveal such an attitude in Borno. The presence of an ancient 
aristocracy in a kingdom must have been familiar to some of these colonial 
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officers. How could they not remember their education with the landmark of 
1066 when William the Conqueror won the battle of Hastings? The Sayfawa 
dynasty of Borno had equally been in power between the eleventh and the 
nineteenth centuries. In Borno, the new subjects of the British Empire had been 
subjects of a king almost as long as the English themselves. 
Could we talk about a certain territorial affinity between the British 
colonial officers and the Borno aristocracy? 
The first colonial officers in British or German Borno were mostly 
professional military officers who had no special training in territorial 
administration. However, after the First World War, the European colonial 
officers were particularly prepared for their task. In 2000, Anthony Kirk-Greene 
published a monograph on the training of British colonial officials.129 He detailed 
how in 1926, a university course called “Tropican African Service” and renamed 
in 1932 as “Colonial Administrative Service” was devised at the Universities of 
Oxford and Cambridge.130 This course was mainly academic as it was not until 
1945 that the course would be under the direction of a District Officer. After the 
Second World War, the course was also given at the London School of Economics 
with some particular training in colonial history, economics, law, anthropology, 
geography and languages.131 
The anthropology training became quite important in the 1930s when 
these colonial officers were encouraged to take such courses while on leave in 
the United Kingdom.132 Post World War II officers destined for Borno were 
especially trained to administer Muslim communities as they were encouraged to 
study Islamic Law and Arabic in order to fulfil their duty of District Officers in 
Northern Nigeria.133 
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 Thus most colonial officials in Borno shared the same education 
background. As members of the British middle class, did they share the same 
territorial perception of their colonised territory? Did they, for example, export 
spatial attitudes shaped by British parishes and counties to Borno? One could 
believe that their own understanding of the districts, emirates and province 
within Borno should perhaps be understood on a sociological basis. As these 
colonial officials were working in Borno, they perhaps applied their own 
territorial framework to Borno. In this case, they spatially translated the 
parishes, counties and districts in their colonial administration. The colonial 
officers’ education is not to be understood as a deterministic element in their 
conception of colonial rule. However, in their spatial dealings with Borno, they 
surely applied their own conception of territoriality to the kingdom. It could be 
argued that this attitude was not specific to Borno as all the colonial officers 
tended to reproduce their own spatial environment in their colonies. This last 
argument only remains a hypothesis as a systematic study of the colonial officers 
attitude to space would be needed. In the absence of primary and secondary 
sources on this question, this last point is thus speculative. One thing is certain: 
as Borno was already relatively centralised before the European conquest, their 
own understanding of territoriality found a favourable echo in the Shehu’s 
kingdom. 
 Thus the territorial framework of the province of Borno was the result of 
the tension between concepts imported from Europe and the nineteenth-century 
Bornoan borders and space. The interaction between these two British and 
Bornoan understandings of territoriality produced the province of Borno. 
Colonial Borno was thus a hybrid territorial product. The “Britishness” or the 
“Bornoness” of the province are not easily definable as sources are quite scarce. 
One thing is certain: the province of Borno was not a pure colonial product 
neither was it a mere resurrection of the kingdom of Borno. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter argued that the colonial administration recycled the late 
nineteenth-century kingdom of Borno within the Nigerian framework. The quest 
for territorial legitimacy led the British to constantly adapt their colonial 
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administration to the previous territorial framework. The provincialisation of 
Borno was based on the utilisation of some of its nineteenth-century borders and 
its concept of territoriality. Indirect Rule thus preserved the territory of Borno 
within colonial Nigeria as European spatial tools of census and mapping 
particularly reinforced its territorialisation. 
This last argument means that the Bornoan space was re-used and 
reconstructed by the colonial officials. The independent kingdom was no more 
but it could survive within their own administration and writings. The first 
colonial officials in a quest for legitimacy and personal glory analysed the ancient 
history of Borno. Thus, they produced history as a way to assert their own power. 
This could be compared to what Sara Berry discovered in colonial Asante where 
history was used to deal with land claims. As in Asante, historical precedence 
mattered.134  
In the case of Borno, the history of the kingdom was clearly manipulated 
and even transmitted back to the Bornoan via colonial schools. This process 
meant that historical research undertaken by colonial officers permeated that 
part of Bornoan society attending western schools. Despite the lack of precise 
primary sources, could it be possible to talk about historical feedback operated 
by the British? 
These studies re-shaped the colonial understandings of British rule in 
Northern Nigeria as it enabled many Borno Residents to exert a conservative rule 
over “their” province. The personalisation of colonial rule in Borno was thus 
enabled through the powerful framework of the territory of Borno. Preserving 
the nineteenth-century space became a synonym for preserving power for the 
British and their Indirect Rule. The fossilisation of the borders led to the 
development of a Bornoan essentialism within Nigeria which partially explains 
the survival of the territory of Borno. 
The territorialisation of Borno was encouraged by the colonial officials 
who were more than eager to reinforce the specificity of their territory. It could 
be suggested that the British reinforced the territory of Borno by giving it a 
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definite administrative and academic status. The conjunction between the two 
administrative and academic spheres turned this kingdom into a “province” but 
also into an intellectual “region”. 
The “province” of Borno became a “region” as it was objectified by its 
different administrators. The nineteenth-century semi-abstract concept of the 
territory of Borno was turned into a concrete territory by the double 
administrative and academic treatment of the Bornoan space. This phenomenon 
was echoed throughout the colonial period by the colonial officials. However, it is 
important to see the two first decades of the colonial rule as the matrix for this 
spatial fossilisation. Indeed the first decade saw the creation of the province of 
Borno, whereas the second one saw the birth of the academic “region” of Borno 
in the writings of Duisburg and Benton. The four subsequent colonial decades 
only echoed and amplified this phenomenon. 
In the next chapter, the treatment of German Borno will illustrate the 
perception of Borno as an essential province and not as a simple administrative 
division. Indeed, in 1921, the League of Nations gave German Borno as a mandate 
to the British. The next chapter will assess the reasons and the reactions to this 
choice which reunified Borno within colonial Nigeria. 
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5. The reunification of Borno by the British: the 
Emirate of Dikwa (1916-1961)1 
 
This section will analyse the conquest of the German protectorate of Kamerun 
by British and French troops during the First World War. It will especially focus 
on the former German Emirate of Dikwa which officially became part of Nigeria 
in 1961. It will be argued that the British sought to reunify the nineteenth-
century polity of Borno for their own ends. 
The territory studied in this chapter is relatively small as the Emirate of 
Dikwa was only a portion of the German protectorate of Kamerun. With an area 
around the size of Northern Ireland (13 335 km²), it had a population of 
approximately 265 000 inhabitants in 1959.2 From a European point of view, the 
Emirate of Dikwa would just seem one of many spoils of the First World War. 
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Figure 26: Location of Northern Cameroons 
 
 
 
Figure 27: Precise location of Dikwa Emirate 
 
Conquered in 1916, it officially became a League of Nations Mandate in 1921 
before being rebranded a United Nations Trusteeship Territory in 1946. From 
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1916 to 1959, the Emirate of Dikwa was part of the Northern Cameroons which 
was directly administered by Nigeria. In 1959, the inhabitants of the Southern 
and Northern Cameroons had to vote in a plebiscite. Either they would join 
Nigeria or they would decide their future at a later date. They chose the second 
option. In 1961, a second plebiscite was organised. The choice lay between 
Nigeria and Cameroon. This time, the inhabitants of Northern Cameroon chose to 
join Nigeria whereas the Southern Cameroonian chose to join Cameroon. Thus, in 
1961, after 40 years of British administration under the League of Nations or the 
United Nations, Dikwa became Nigerian. 
The recent historiography on the Republic of Cameroon has not often focused 
on what then-constituted “Northern Cameroons”. Border issues have been 
analysed mostly in Southern Cameroons because of the Anglophone-
Francophone divide. For example, Anastasia Nzume wrote her Ph.D. dissertation 
on the opportunities offered by the presence of the Anglo-French border in 
Southern Cameroons from 1916 to 1961.3 Emmanuel Mbah also studied the case 
of Southern Cameroons when he analysed the land boundary conflict in 
Bamenda.4 In the north of the Republic of Cameroon, only Abdouraman Halirou 
has studied the current Nigeria-Cameroon border. In his doctoral thesis, the 
latter analysed how local conceptions of borderlands contrasted with European-
imposed borders. However, his study of the colonial borders of Cameroon did not 
take into account the border between the Emirate of Dikwa and the rest of 
Nigeria.5 
If scholars developed an interest in Cameroonian history of the 1950s, they 
focused more on the French decolonisation. The best example is a book entitled 
Kamerun! which discussed the war led by the French army against the Union des 
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Populations du Cameroun from 1955 to 1962.6 In this publication, the authors 
compared the French political and military repression of any Bassa or Bamileke 
opposition with the wars led in Indochina and Algeria. The small Emirate of 
Dikwa in the north of Northern Cameroons seems very distant and forsaken. 
However, the very town of Dikwa used to be the capital of Borno under 
Rabih’s rule  1893-1900). The symbolic importance of this territory is thus 
significant. From a Bornoan point of view, the Anglo-German border split their 
kingdom. The modification of the border after the First World War was thus a 
means of reunifying nineteenth-century Borno. The need to recapture African 
voices was thus of primary importance for this study. However, as in the previous 
chapter, most sources are only British colonial documents which distort the 
Bornoan conception of territoriality. The reports sent by the British every year to 
the League of Nations or United Nations perfectly embodied the colonial mindset 
as local opinions were only quoted if they re-asserted the British positions.7 
Dissenting opinions only came to light after 1959 when the inhabitants of Dikwa 
voiced their disagreement with the British and Northern Nigerian policies. These 
sources available in newspapers are a precious tool for the understanding of the 
history of the Emirate of Dikwa after its conquest by the British in 1916.8 
It seems that most historians or geographers only analysed the conquest of 
German Kamerun and its repartition between France and the United Kingdom. 
For example, the diplomatic partition of Kamerun after the First World War was 
studied by John Prescott9, Akinjide Osuntokun10, Brian Digre11 and Peter 
Yearwood12. These publications mainly focused on the territorial exchanges 
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which took place after the First World War. It would not be an exaggeration to 
describe Dikwa Emirate as the least of the concerns of the European 
chancelleries. When and if interested in Kamerun, the Europeans were more 
eager to deal with economic hubs such as the harbour of Douala. To understand 
the full story of the partition of Kamerun, it would be necessary to evaluate the 
history of the British and French Cameroons from their conquest to 1961. By 
focusing on a portion of the British Cameroons, this section intends to 
demonstrate that to a certain extent, the Scramble for Borno was not completed 
before 1961. 
 
5.1. The Conquest of German Kamerun 
5.1.1. The Conquest of Dikwa 
 
Compared to the situation in Eastern Africa during the First World War, the 
two German colonies in Western Africa, Kamerun and Togoland, never became 
major battlefields. As these German protectorates were mostly bordered by 
British and French territories, the German troops were surrounded as early as 
1914. Nonetheless, the Schutztruppe in Kamerun under the lead of Carl 
Zimmerman resisted the pressure of the Entente Forces from August 1914 until 
February 1916.13 
It was in Northern Kamerun that the German troops resisted for eighteenth 
months. Captain Ernst von Raben at the head of his troops took refuge in the 
Mandara Mountains in the vicinity of Mora, in Mandara. Von Raben only 
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surrendered on 18 February 1916 with his 155 soldiers.14 On the German side, 
Fritz Damis15 and on the British side, Captain Arthur Lees16 wrote diaries during 
their time in the Mandara Mountains which were subsequently published. In the 
southern part of Kamerun, the German troops were also defeated which forced 
the German forces and civilian authorities to flee to the Spanish colony of Rio 
Muni. In general, the history of the military conquest of Kamerun is thus 
relatively well documented. 
As a result of the war, new provisional borders were drawn between British 
and French occupied territories in the colonial territory of Kamerun.17 There 
were two stages in the redefinition of the border. The first negotiations took 
place in London on 23 February 1916 whereas France and the United Kingdom 
signed a final agreement in September 1919. The 1916 borders were supposed to 
be provisional but they largely influenced the negotiations in 1919. During these 
three years though, the border was constantly the subject of modifications. 
Prescott and Yearwood have both described the precise diplomatic 
correspondence between London and Paris during this period. However, because 
of inaccuracies in the maps studied by Prescott, only Yearwood’s arguments 
seem valid.18 
As in the 1890s, the first border created by the British and the French in 1916 
was not precise. This mistake came partly from the maps used by the Europeans 
                                            
14 For more information about the Mandara mountains during the First World War, see the 
website created by Gerhard Müller-Kosack, http://www.mandaras.info/ [accessed 12 September 
2011]. 
15 Fritz Damis, Auf Dem Moraberge: Erinnerungen an Die Kämpfe Der 3. Kompanie Der Ehemaligen 
Kaiserlichen Schutztruppe Für Kamerun. Verein Ehemaliger Angehöriger Der Kaiserlichen 
Schutztruppe Für Kamerun (Berlin: Mandaras Publishing, 1929) 
<http://www.mandaras.info/MandarasPublishing/Auf_dem_Moraberge.pdf> [accessed 12 
September 2011]. 
16 Arthur Lees, The Cameroon Diary of Arthur Lees 1914-915: An Account of the Beginning of the 
Mora Campaign from the British Side, ed by Dan Robinson (Mora: Mandaras Publishing, 1914) 
<http://www.mandaras.info/MandarasPublishing/LeesCameroonsDiary1914-1915.pdf> 
[accessed 12 September 2011]. 
17 For very precise details about the negotiations, see Peter Yearwood, ‘The Reunification of 
Borno, 1914-1918’, Borno Museum Society Newsletter, 25 (1995), 25-45. 
18 Yearwood first referred to the inaccuracies of Prescott’s demonstrations in John Prescott, ‘The 
Evolution of the Anglo-French Inter-Cameroons Boundary’, The Nigerian Geographical Journal, 5 
(1962), 103-20 and Prescott, The Evolution. Yearwood’s comments are available in Yearwood, ‘In 
a Casual Way’, endnote 7. 
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but also by the British assumption that German Borno would be relatively easy to 
delimitate. The new border was named after the French delegate Picot in charge 
of the discussions.19 It was agreed that the British should obtain the German 
province of Borno “Deutsch Bornu”. On 24 February 1916, the British Foreign 
Secretary, Edward Gray, sent a telegram to Francis Bertie, the British ambassador 
in Paris: 
We would, therefore, accept M.Picot’s proposals, asking only that 
the territory of the Emir of Bornu should not be divided, and 
should go to us for administrative reasons, and that not only 
British merchants vessels, but British ships of war, should be able 
to use Duala during the war.20 
Thus for “administrative reasons”, the British delegate Charles Strachey drew 
from memory the border of “the territory of the Emir of Bornu” on a map with a 
broken blue line. As the current maps of Northern Cameroons were as defective 
as Strachey’s memory, the border actually split the province of “Deutsch Borno”. 
These mistakes from the British authorities nonetheless revealed how much the 
latter desired to adapt the new border to the nineteenth-century territory of 
Borno. After obtaining Dikwa, Strachey desired to obtain the whole of Mandara in 
the south. The eastern part of Northern Kamerun would thus be French. 
Whitehall asked authorities to provide precise information. G. Tomlinson who 
was District Officer in Borno wrote a report about the newly conquered part of 
“Deutsch Bornu”. The latter explained that: 
A comparison of the sphere thus provisionally assigned to Great 
Britain with the Dikoa Emirate shows a wide discrepancy 
between the two areas. The effect of the Anglo-French boundary 
agreement is, in short, to exclude from the British Sphere 
considerable portions of the territory governed by Shehu Sanda 
[…] Finally it takes from the Mandara Emirate a strip of country to 
which Dikoa has no claim, and which is at present administered 
from Mora by the French.21 
The logic was clear: if Shehu Sanda had any claim on different territories so 
then should the United Kingdom. If he did not as in the case of Mandara, the 
                                            
19 Prescott, The evolution of Nigeria's international and regional boundaries: 1861-1971, pp. 45–
62. 
20 National Archives, Kew Gardens, United Kingdom. CAB 137/143/20. 
21 G. Tomlinson, "Report on Dikoa", 20 June 1916, FO 371/2859. 
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position of the United Kingdom would have been compromised in its negotiations 
with France. The territorial appropriation of Borno would thus be total as it 
would be undertaken throughout the area formerly held by Dikwa’s monarch. It 
did not matter that the regional boundaries changed at different times during 
German rule, what counted was the title to territories owned by the monarch of 
Dikwa. However, as mentioned earlier, the borders of German Borno were 
modified more than once during the short German presence in the Lake Chad 
area.22 
Moreover, the same report revealed that as in the case of his predecessors, 
Tomlinson heavily relied on the local perception of the borders to ascertain his 
findings. His report contains numerous mentions of his enquiries as to the 
position of the borders. When on tour, Tomlinson asked direct questions to the 
village leaders to discover to whom they were paying taxes and under whose 
authority they placed themselves. When he arrived in the village of Isge, “he was 
taken by the local headman to a point on the river which the German authorities 
had proclaimed as the meeting point of the Madagali and Dikoa Emirates”.23 The 
transmission of the borders was thus complete. The German recognised and 
modified some of the borders they found in 1902; the British inherited them 
through local headmen. The agency of the local leaders is thus not to be neglected 
as they transmitted their territory, as recognised by the Germans, to the British. 
Recognising this double legacy was an attempt by the British to legitimise 
their own conquest and as Tomlinson wrote himself: “The boundary […] is well-
established, and during the time I spent in Dikoa has given rise to no disputes”.24 
                                            
22 Tomlinson detailed the evolution of the regional border between the German emirates: “It may 
here be noted that the territory assigned to Shehu Sanda underwent several changes during the 
German occupation. During the first year or two, Logone and Gulfei were treated as subordinate 
to Dikoa. These two states were then made independent, but for some years at least, Shehu Sanda 
held the important towns of Maffate and Afade, with their dependent villages, east of the River 
Lebait. During that period his north-eastern boundary seems to have been the river Sserbewel 
and its affluents. It was only in 1911 that the Rivers Lebait and Kalia were finally assigned as the 
eastern boundary. Assuming that Gulfei and Logone ought to remain independent. The present 
boundary is probably the best. The boundary between Mandara and Dikoa appears to have 
undergone fewer changes. The most important appears to have been the transfer of the village of 
Dure from Dikoa to Mandara a few years ago.” G. Tomlinson, "Report on Dikoa," 20 June 1916, 
Kew, FO 371/2859, pp.4-5. 
23 FO 371/2859. Kew, FO 371/2859, pp.4-5. 
24 FO 371/2859. Kew, FO 371/2859, p.4. 
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Indeed, Tomlinson was looking for stable boundaries for the British to have a 
clear understanding of their role in the region. Whether he was right or wrong 
was not the question as these new British boundaries relied on local perceptions 
of the German administrative borders. However, as they were modified 
numerous times during German colonial rule, local populations had the 
opportunity to sanction German imposed boundaries. By seeking their approval, 
Tomlinson favoured a territorial cooperation between the British and the local 
elite. Once again, territorial legitimacy was the key in British conquest, however 
small it was. 
As early as 28 February 1916, the Foreign Secretary tried to attenuate the 
importance of the broken blue line drawn by Strachey. He sent a telegram to the 
French ambassador in London, Paul Cambon: 
At the same time His Majesty’s Government consider that for 
administrative reasons it is very desirable that the territory of the 
Emir of Bornu should no longer be divided and they must 
therefore ask the French Government to agree that the portion of 
Bornu lying to the east of the Nigerian frontier (as very roughly 
indicated by the broken blue line in the map initialled by M. Picot) 
should be administered by His Majesty’s Government.25 
Whitehall was not the only one disappointed by the provisional border. A 
1916 secret document from the Imperial War Cabinet evoked the necessity of 
redrawing the border to obtain Douala and the Mandara mountains in “the event 
of a war with France”.26 Furthermore, from 1916 to 1919, the British officers in 
Borno sent reports, letters and memoranda to London to petition for the 
reunification of Borno. It was not before the treaty of Versailles in 1919 and the 
League of Nations Mandate of 1921 that the new border was officialised. 
At the scale of Borno, its whole nineteenth-century metropolitan territory 
was included within British territory. This had a direct consequence on the 
negotiations of the border between the British and the French. As in the case of 
the border separating the north of Borno from the French territory of Niger, 
ethnic and cultural criteria were taken into account by the European powers. As 
                                            
25 CAB 137/143/29. 
26 Anonymous note by the Colonial Office, Secret GT. 592, CAB 24/11. 
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was previously the case, these criteria were not the priority of the European 
governments but one argument among others in a negotiation at a world scale. 
The next sections will demonstrate how the British used the nineteenth-century 
borders of Borno to push their advantages in what would become Northern 
Cameroons. 
 
5.1.2. The League of Nations Mandate and the United Nations Trusteeship 
 
British-conquered Kamerun was divided into two parts: Southern Cameroons 
and Northern Cameroons. The former region of “Deutsch Bornu” became part of 
the British Northern Cameroons which consisted of two non-contiguous 
territories. It was directly administered by the Northern Region of Nigeria and 
the province of Borno. The British took the step of renaming “Dikoa” as 
“Dikwa”.27 The border separating the British and the French mandate was the 
result of a compromise between the mandatory powers. 
The division of the German African colonies between Belgium, Britain and 
France is often dubbed the “repartition of Africa” by historians.28 In this 
repartition, Kamerun was at the bottom of the list of the European priorities. In 
addition, Southern Cameroons was considered as more important than the rest of 
the country. In this situation, the town of Dikwa and its territory were only 
details compared to the world-scale negotiations. 
If these territories were acquired by the British, they were to reward the 
Shehu of Borno and the Lamido of Fombina for their help during the First World 
War.29 Indeed on 3 October 1914, Bukar Garbai, Shehu of Borno sent a letter to 
Lugard, Governor of Nigeria: 
I have assisted the Resident with all that has been required, 
horses, donkeys, bullocks, carriers and corn, and everything that 
he asked for. The Resident told me that we know that Governor 
                                            
27 NAK, SNP10/262p/1916. I would like to thank Gerhard Müller-Kosack for this piece of 
information. 
28 Digre, Imperialism’s New Clothes, xi. 
29 Yearwood, 'In a Casual Way', p. 227. 
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Lugard wants money for this war. I remember that last February I 
gave him £4000 for schools, public works and sanitation etc. I 
should like the destination of this money to be changed and given 
for the war.30 
Despite the fact that the British were fighting against the Ottomans, the 
world’s leading Muslim power, the Bornoan elite was ready to help the British.31 
However, this aid came with a price. Indeed the alliance forged between the 
British and the ruling elite was once again expressed in territorial terms. As he 
helped the British during the war, the Shehu had to obtain territorial gains from 
the negotiations in Europe. As seen in a previous chapter, the first Anglo-German 
boundary totally disregarded the nineteenth-century border of Borno. The 
German defeat during the First World War was a perfect opportunity for the 
Bornoans and British to redraw this border. 
Where to draw this new border? Yearwood stressed how the British 
administration disagreed on which territories to acquire. 32  The Nigerian 
administration wanted to obtain all the former satellites of Borno whereas 
London was more inclined to have a broader perspective and wanted to attach to 
Borno territories for which  Borno had no historic claim. 
However, Lagos and London shared similar concepts concerning the 
reunification of ethnic groups. Historian Michael Callahan studied the impact of 
the creation of mandates on European colonial policies. He revealed how the 
ideals of the American president Woodrow Wilson pervaded the foreign policy of 
Britain and France towards their mandates. According to Wilson, the League of 
Nations created a “sacred trust”.33 The concept of “self-determination” was 
popularised by the Soviets in 1917 and the idea was repeated by Lloyd George in 
                                            
30 Oxford, Rhodes House, MS BEs 77-053, Letter from Shehu Bukar Garbai to Governor Lugard, 3 
October 1914. I am grateful to Rémi Dewiere who obtained this letter. 
31 A letter in Oxford, Rhodes House from Shehu Bukar Garbai to Governor Lugard reveals that the 
Shehu of Borno agreed to fight the Germans despite the fact they were allied with the Ottomans. 
In addition, the Shehu stressed that the Ottomans were not the followers of the imam Malik. 
Belonging to a different school of Sharia law was thus used as a pretext to support the British. MS 
BE s 77-011 1914/11/18. I am grateful to Rémi Dewiere who translated this letter. 
32 Yearwood, 'The reunification of Borno', 25-45. 
33  Michael Callahan, Mandates and Empire: The League of Nations and Africa 1914-1931 
(Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 1998); Michael Callahan, A Sacred Trust: The League of 
Nations and Africa, 1929-1946 (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2004). 
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his address on 5 January 1918: “a territorial settlement must be secured, based 
on the right of self-determination or the consent of the governed.”34 Woodrow 
Wilson himself evoked the parity of interests between colonisers and colonised 
Africans.35 The fifth point of his 1918 speech clearly mentioned: 
V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all 
colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle 
that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests 
of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the 
equitable claims of the government whose title is to be 
determined. 
This mandate spirit, Callahan argues, created an obligation for the Europeans 
to care for the populations living in the former German colonies. By arguing that 
ethnic identities should not be split by colonial boundaries, the British and 
French governments recognised a legal right for Borno to be reunited. This right 
was expressed in ethnic, cultural and religious terms by the colonial 
administration and the press. Thus, the northern section of the Northern 
Cameroons became assimilated with former Borno because of their ethnic and 
religious links. More importantly, the previous historical links existing between 
Dikwa and metropolitan Borno were reactivated by the British so that Dikwa 
would become part of Borno once again. 
Dikwa had only been separated from the rest of Borno for fourteen years. On 
the time-scale of the Kanem-Borno Empire, these fourteen years were a mere 
episode. German colonial rule could thus have been perceived as insignificant 
when compared with the previous centuries of rule from Kukawa or 
N’gazargamo. In the eyes of the ruling elite and the British colonial officials, 
Bornoan history had certain continuity. From the arrival of the German troops in 
1902 to their surrender during the First World War in 1916, metropolitan Borno 
was officially ruled by two colonial powers. The First World War provided the 
opportunity for reunification. 
                                            
34  Lloyd George, “The British War Aims”, 5 January 1918 
http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Prime_Minister_Lloyd_George_on_the_British_War_Aims 
[accessed 15 December 2011]. I would like to thank Peter Yearwood for this suggestion. 
35 Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of 
Anticolonial Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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Once again, the British administration raised the question of the extent of 
Borno. As in the nineteenth-century, the European chancelleries tried to 
determine where the borders of Borno stood. Should they include the former 
dependent territories of Gulfei, Kotoko and Logone? As early as 1914, Lugard 
wanted to undo the borders of the earlier partition. He planned to acquire 
German Borno and its dependencies in case of a victory by the Entente forces.36 
Lugard was eager to acquire the nineteenth-century territories of Adamawa and 
Borno in their totality. It is true that he totally misconceived the real extent of 
Adamawa and considered that the Emirate of Dikwa was a “ridiculous little bit of 
Bornu which did not matter”37, but it was obvious for him that this territory had 
to be acquired. 
Tomlinson in his 1916 “Report on Dikoa" recommended the acquisition of the 
Emirate of Dikwa in the name of the former historical links between Dikwa and 
the British Province of Borno.38 Even in 1916, the British colonial administration 
still wished to revive the relationship between “metropolitan Borno” and its 
former vassals.  
In 1922, Palmer revealed that a boundary agreement was signed between the 
Shehu of Borno and the ruler of Bagirmi in 1900 in nowadays Chad. The content 
of the boundary agreement was already studied in a previous chapter. However, 
its “discovery” by Palmer uncovers the British understanding of the territory of 
Borno. Indeed on 27 December 1922, Palmer sent a telegram to the Secretary of 
the Northern Provinces in Kaduna: 
I have the honour to enclose with an English translation, an 
Arabic copy of an agreement as to the boundaries between Bornu 
and Baghermi […] 
It would appear therefore that had this document been brought 
to light sooner, it would have been an unanswerable proof as to 
                                            
36 Lugard to CO, 8 October 1914, CO to Lugard, 28 October 1914, Af67461/40171, quoted by 
Yearwood, 'In a Casual Way', p. 229. 
37 Lugard to Flora Lugard, 26 March 1916, MSS Lugard 4. I am grateful to Peter Yearwood for his 
remarks. 
38 G. Tomlinson, "Report on Dikoa," 20 June 1916, Kew, FO 371/2859. 
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what constituted ‘German Bornu’ under the terms of the Anglo-
French agreement as to the Cameroon boundary.39 
From Kaduna, the Secretary of the Northern Provinces sent a summary to 
the Chief Secretary to the government in Lagos on 9 February 1923: 
Even, if this agreement, is not of sufficient importance to secure the 
acquisition of the large tract of country to which it refers, it should prove 
useful in negotiating for other portions of the Cameroon elsewhere as 
outlined in the Governor’s despatch of the 25 March 1922.40 
From Lagos, E.J. Arnett produced a report for the League of Nations in 
1923: 
It is urged that the past and present boundaries are a cause of 
injustice and hardship to the tribes of Bornu and Dikwa who have 
been cut off from their fellow subjects of the ancient Sultanate of 
Bornu as it existed at the time of the first partition of these 
territories among the European Powers. Since these paragraphs, 
an important Arabic document has come to light […] 
It would appear that had this document been brought to light 
sooner, it would have been unanswerable proof as to what 
constituted “German Bornu” under the terms of the Anglo-French 
Agreement as to the Cameroons Boundary […] 
From this Agreement, it is clear that the areas of Woloje, Logone 
and Kusseri lying East and South-East of Dikwa historically and at 
quite a recent date formed part of the Sultanate of Bornu.41 
 This correspondence between British officials illustrates how local reports 
in Borno influenced a general policy concerning border negotiations. From 
Maiduguri to Lagos, the local geopolitical situation echoed through the 
correspondence to reach Whitehall in London. Thus, the modification of the 
border between the British and French mandates of Cameroons was directly 
informed by historical documents provided by the ruling elite of Borno. 
                                            
39 Letter from the Resident of Borno, Herbert Richmond Palmer to the Secretary Northern 
Provinces, Kaduna, 27th December 1922, received 19th January 1923 in Kaduna, NAK, SNP17/6, 
Acc No.7587, 50765. See full correspondence in Appendix B. 
40 Letter from the Secretary Northern Provinces, Kaduna to the Chief Secretary to the 
government, Lagos, 9 February 1923, NAK, SNP17/6, Acc No.7587, 50765. 
41 Extract from Minute Paper n.2775/1923: Report on that portion of the mandated territory of 
the Cameroons included in the administration of the northern provinces of Nigeria, NAK, 
SNP17/6, Acc No.7587, 50765. See full correspondence in Appendix B. 
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This could be considered as a very convenient way for the British to prove 
their point during their negotiations. However, without further documentation, it 
would be hard to prove or disprove the authenticity of this border agreement. 
One thing is certain: the British once again sought legitimacy in the nineteenth-
century territorial framework of Borno. According to this logic, Woloje, Logone 
and Kusseri located in the French mandate of Cameroun should be in the British 
mandate of Northern Cameroons because of the historical links between Borno 
and its formal vassals. The British logic was obvious: as Borno was in the British 
colony of Nigeria, the former dependencies of the kingdom should be included 
within Nigeria. This argument illustrates how British imperialism based itself on 
a previous imperialism. 
On the other hand, the French logic did not find its roots in nineteenth-
century territories but in the in the presence of the north-south link from Bare to 
Kusseri. By linking the railway to the north of the country, the French tried to 
favour the economy of their future Mandate.42 Two different kinds of pragmatism 
were thus in operation when dealing with German Kamerun. The French followed 
an economic logic whereas the British adapted their claims to an ethno-political 
pattern. 
Moreover, as the British sent their report to the League of Nations, the 
territorial claims of the Shehu of Borno found their way to Geneva. By inscribing 
the territorial framework of Borno within the international legal arena, the 
British hoped to secure the recognition of their own demands. Even if the League 
of Nations never totally modified the border in favour of the British, the report to 
the League of Nations stressed: “the rulers and people of Bornu legitimately 
regret the loss of their former territory”.43 
According to this British document, it was not the British who suffered a 
territorial loss but the “rulers and people of Bornu”. The colonial administration 
totally assimilated Bornoan imperialism and translated it into international 
diplomatic terms. As seen in the previous chapter, the colonial officials in Borno 
                                            
42 Yearwood, 'The Reunification of Borno', p. 43. 
43 Extract from Minute Paper n.2775/1923: Report on that portion of the mandated territory of 
the Cameroons included in the administration of the northern provinces of Nigeria, NAK, 
SNP17/6, Acc No.7587, 50765. See full correspondence in Appendix B. 
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entirely identified themselves with the ruling elite. For example, Palmer saw all 
the regions surrounding Lake Chad as rightfully belonging to Borno. In 1919, he 
travelled form Maiduguri to Jeddah in the Arabian kingdom of Hejaz; his report 
stressed how the whole of the Lake Chad areas were once part of the empire of 
Kanem-Borno.44 
For example, Tomlinson and Palmer both desired Mandara to be part of the 
British sphere. They both exaggerated the extent of Borno’s control over this 
mountainous region in the nineteenth century. They suggested that Mandara was 
paying tribute to Kukawa in the nineteenth century, a fact which justified the 
British control over these mountains. As in the case of the territory of the Bedde 
at the beginning of the century, the British officers in Maiduguri overemphasised 
the real extent of Borno to justify their claims. In this instance however, the 
border to be modified was not a regional border. As it was feeble, this historical 
argument did not convince the French to modify their positions in Mandara. As a 
result, the border split Mandara into two different parts.45 
The direct link between nineteenth-century history and twentieth-century 
British domination was thus expressed clearly by colonial officers in Borno. 
History was unmistakably utilised for the benefit of British colonial rule. In less 
than two decades in Borno, British colonial officers reproduced the same 
imperialist discourse not only for the benefit of the Shehu but for the United 
Kingdom as well. The match between the discourse of the ruling elite of Borno 
and the British colonial officials was thus visible in the case of the future of the 
Emirate of Dikwa. There was no ambiguity between the aims of the Resident of 
Borno and those of the Shehu as they both shared the same vision of the 
territorial extent of Borno. 
Indeed, the similarity between British and Bornoan territorial aims seemed 
obvious despite the relatively small territorial gain of Dikwa in 1919. This 
alliance between the two ruling elites outlined the interests of the British in 
                                            
44 Herbert Palmer, Report on a Journey from Maidugari [sic], Nigeria to Jeddah in Arabia, 16th 
June 1919, , CO 879/119. 
45 Bawuro Barkindo, ‘The Mandara Astride the Nigeria-Cameroon Boundary’, in Partitioned 
Africans: Ethnic Relations Across Africa’s International Boundaries 1884-1984, ed. by Anthony 
Asiwaju (Lagos: Lagos University Press, 1984), pp. 29-49. 
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Borno. Lagos desired to extend its borders whereas the officers in Maiduguri 
would have a larger province to administrate. However, the motivations of the 
local colonial official did not always seem clear. Could dreams of a reunited 
Borno outweigh the prospect of increased administrative work with insufficient 
staff? Indeed, reuniting Borno and Dikwa would mean more pressure for officials 
in Maiduguri. The report written in 1916 by Tomlinson was a perfect example of 
this strain on the colonial administration. So how could it be possible to explain 
the attitude of these colonial officers? It could be suggested that the residents of 
Borno behaved as monarchs in their own province arguing that their province 
had the right to recover its lost territories. Officials such as Benton and Palmer 
were more Bornoan than the Shehu himself and were eager to aggrandise their 
own territory. As seen in the previous chapter, the career of residents could be 
determined by their relationship with the local elite in Northern Nigeria. No 
doubt the reunification of Borno benefitted Palmer who in 1925 became 
Governor of Northern Nigeria. 
The rhetoric of territorial loss and gain was thus directly applied to the 
province of Borno where Indirect Rule took a highly personalised and irredentist 
turn. As a pre-existing spatial structure was deemed necessary to implement 
British colonial rule, colonial officials saw the First World War as an opportunity 
to extend not only the power of the Shehus but also their own power. Spatial 
irredentism as expressed in the case of Dikwa proved that colonial and pre-
colonial elites could forge an alliance in Borno. The next section will explore the 
relationship between Dikwa, the rest of Borno and Nigeria as a whole.
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5.2. Towards a Nigerian Borno 
 
Legally, Northern Cameroons was a League of Nations Class B Mandate from 
1922 to 1945. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations stipulated that 
“Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the 
Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under 
conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion”.46 This 
article supposed a strict differentiation between colonies and mandates. 
However, in the case of Borno, the British always tried to play down the 
differences between these two juridical categories and the mandate of Northern 
Cameroons was always administered as part of the Nigerian Benue, Adamawa 
and Borno provinces. Not surprisingly, Dikwa was administered from Maiduguri. 
 
5.2.1. There Can Only Be One Shehu 
 
As a part of its mission in Northern Cameroons, the United Kingdom had to 
provide the League of Nations and later the United Nations with reports on its 
actions. What has survived does not shed a particular light on the British actions 
in Dikwa. They mainly described Dikwa as a Muslim town linked to Maiduguri by 
cultural and historical ties. General policies such as the introduction of Indirect 
Rule and Native Authorities to the former German protectorate were a British 
priority in 1921.47 
In addition, Adamawa, and not Borno, was at the centre of attention as 
slavery was still widespread in Northern Cameroons.48 Indeed, the north of the 
                                            
46 The full text of the Covenant of the League of Nations can be found on the website of Yale 
University: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp [accessed 22 June 2011]. 
47 E. J. Arnett, ‘Cameroons Under British Mandate. Report by H. M. Government to the Council of 
the League of Nations for the Year 1932’, Journal of the Royal African Society, 33 (1934), 85-87. 
48 Holger Weiss, ‘The Illegal Trade in Slaves from German Northern Cameroon to British 
Northern Nigeria’. 
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new British Mandate was one of the last African regions to experience slavery. 
For example in 1927, the new colonial authorities imprisoned Hamman Yaji, one 
of their own headmen in Adamawa. Indeed, the latter had been raiding his non-
Muslim neighbours for the last fifteen years successively under German, French 
and British rule. Hamman Yaji even recorded his own actions in a diary published 
in 1995.49 Unfortunately, there is no primary source as rich as the diary of 
Hamman Yaji for Borno. 
Under these circumstances, the remote town of Dikwa did not attract much 
attention either from Lagos or London. Apart from the boundary negotiations, 
former German Borno was not often mentioned by colonial sources. It could be 
argued that Dikwa was absorbed not only administratively but also mentally by 
the British colonial administration. The annual reports of the District Officers in 
Dikwa or the general provincial reports did not contain much information about 
this small territory. However, Dikwa came back on the political scene in 1937. 
Indeed, when Borno’s Shehu Sanda Kura died in 1937, the British 
administration had to choose his successor from within the Kanemi dynasty. His 
cousin the then-Shehu of Dikwa, Sanda Kyarimi, became the new monarch.50 This 
move was not unplanned. As early as the early 1930s, the Residents of Borno 
evoked this scenario. Algernon Walwyn, Resident of Borno from 1934 to 1937, 
submitted the idea to his superiors in 1935. He “consider[ed] that the Shehu of 
Dikwa would be a satisfactory successor”.51 
However, 
It must be remembered that the reunion of Dikwa and Bornu, 
though possibly desirable in itself, is only a very inconsiderable 
step towards the unification of the former Bornu Empire, which 
included for instance, Damagaram and I feel that we should not 
                                            
49  Hamman Yaji, James H. Vaughan and Anthony Kirk-Greene, Diary of Hamman Yaji 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995). 
50 Sanda Kyarimi or Umar ibn Muhammad according to the sources. 
51 Arewa House, 11085, 1/17/112, Confidential 97/35, Resident of Bornu to the Secretary 
Northern Provinces, 14 February 1935.See full document in Appendix D. 
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allow sentiment to obscure the real point at issue which is the 
successful administration of the Bornu Emirate.52 
The reasons for the reunification of Borno were not thus totally rational as 
“sentiment” played a certain role in the choice of the Shehu of Dikwa as Shehu for 
the whole of Borno. This irredentist feeling already detailed in a previous section 
was thus expressed on an administrative level. Dikwa as an historical part of 
Borno had to be ruled from Maiduguri not only because it was a pragmatic choice 
but also for more subjective reasons. Once again, the British Residents shared the 
same agenda as the ruling elite in Maiduguri. The ghost of the nineteenth-century 
territory still lingered in the minds of the colonial officials. By becoming Shehu of 
the whole of Borno, Sanda Kyarimi reunited under his personal rule a territory 
which had been divided since 1902. The appointment of the Shehu of Dikwa as 
Shehu of Borno led to the dissolution of the office of Shehu of Dikwa. Mustafa Ibn 
Muhamad, the successor or Sanda Kyarimi in Dikwa became “Emir” and not 
“Shehu” of Dikwa.53 
For 35 years, two Shehus had co-existed. This was considered an anomaly. 
Thus, the British Residents intended to rectify the wrongs of the Scramble for 
Africa. As they campaigned for the modification of the border after the First 
World War, they advocated the unification of Borno. 
Even if Walwyn was cautious not to completely equate the colonial Province 
of Borno with nineteenth-century Borno, Percy Butcher, his successor in 
Maiduguri was impressed by the ceremony of appointment of the new Shehu 
who “took his place on the historic chair sent to his great ancestor Shehu Laminu 
 the founder of the Kanemi dynasty) by the Sultan of Constantinople.”54 There 
was clearly a sense of continuity when the British officials favoured the Shehu of 
Dikwa as Shehu of Borno. In 1937 as in 1902, the British were seeking a dynastic 
continuity for the benefit of the colonial administration. This dynastic continuity 
was going hand in hand with the territorial reconstruction of Borno. 
                                            
52 Arewa House, 11085, 1/17/112, Confidential 97/35, Resident of Bornu to the Secretary 
Northern Provinces, 14 February 1935. See full document in Appendix D. 
53 NAK, SNP17, Acc. No.29641, Annual Report for the Province of Borno, 1937. 
54 NAK, SNP17, Acc. No.29641, Annual Report for the Province of Borno, 1937. 
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Thus, the academic irredentism of the colonial officers in Borno had a 
practical effect on the administrative division of Nigeria. The role of the colonial 
officers was preponderant in the acquisition of the land tract of German Borno 
between 1916 and 1921. In addition, they also favoured the territorial 
reconstruction of the kingdom of Borno in 1937. 
However, it was not the first time that British officers had a leader from 
Northern Cameroons cross the border to become a “first-class chief” within 
Nigeria. Indeed, in 1924, Muhammadu Bello better-known as Maigari was District 
Head of Nassarawo in Northern Cameroons when he was appointed Emir or 
Lamido of Yola at the death of Lamido Abba. As Nassarawo used to be part of 
Adamawa before the European colonisation, the British reinforced the 
homogeneity of Northern Nigeria and Northern Cameroons by choosing Maigari, 
a former German District Head, as Lamido of Yola.55 Thus, the choice of the Shehu 
of Dikwa as Shehu of Borno was not innocent. It seemed to be a coherent policy 
from the British authorities to absorb Northern Cameroons within Northern 
Nigeria. Their actions reached a pinnacle when they campaigned for the 
annexation of Northern Cameroons to Nigeria at the end of the 1950s. 
 
5.2.2. The Reunification of Borno? The Two Plebiscites of 1959 and 1961 
 
On 13 December 1946, the former League of Nations Mandate of the British 
Cameroons ceased to exist and was officially replaced by the “Trust Territory of 
the Cameroons under British Administration”.56 There was no tangible difference 
between the two types of legal domination for the inhabitants of the Dikwa 
Emirate. The reports sent to the League of Nations from 1924 to 1938 and to the 
United Nations from 1947 to 1959 were not intrinsically dissimilar. They all 
contained the history of the Dikwa Emirate and its most recent developments. As 
mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the small size of Dikwa and its 
                                            
55 Anthony Kirk-Greene, Adamawa, Past and Present: An Historical Approach to the Development 
of a Northern Cameroons Province (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958). 
56 D. H. N. Johnson, ‘The Case Concerning the Northern Cameroons’, The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 13 (1964), 1144. 
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apparent similitude with the rest of Borno made the north of Northern 
Cameroons a region hardly worth mentioning in an official report. However, the 
end of the 1950s would change this picture.57 
As a Trust Territory, Northern Cameroons had to decide on its future at the 
end of British colonial rule. The United Nations decided that a referendum should 
be held on 7 November 1959 in Northern Cameroons. The inhabitants of 
Northern Cameroons had two choices: either they would join independent 
Nigeria or they would officially remain a Trust Territory. The two questions 
officially asked were: 
(a) Do you wish the Northern Cameroons to be part of the Northern Region 
of Nigeria when the Federation of Nigeria becomes independent? 
(b) Are you in favour of deciding the future of Northern Cameroons at a later 
date?”58 
 
                                            
57 From 1924 until 1937, the United Kingdom submitted reports to the League of Nations under 
the title: Report by His Britannic Majesty’s Government on the Administration of British 
Cameroons for the Year x. From 1947 to 1949: Report to United Nations on Administration of the 
Cameroons. 
58 United Nations, ‘The Future of the Trust Territory of the Cameroons under United Kingdom 
Administration’, 1959, A/RES/1350 XIII) <http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/335/84/IMG/NR033584.pdf?OpenElement>. [accessed 
15 July 2011]. 
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Figure 28: Poster for the 1959 Plebiscite59 
 
Most officials whether they were in Maiduguri, Lagos, London or New York 
expected a victory for the first alternative. A United Nations Visiting Mission 
believed in 1958 that: 
it to be manifestly the opinion of the northern population as a 
whole, as far as it can be expressed at present and in the 
foreseeable future, that they should become permanently a part 
of the Northern Region of the Federation of Nigeria.60 
For the Visiting Mission, the vote would only be a formality. Because of its 
historical, cultural and religious links with Nigeria, the Northern Cameroons 
would join the Northern Region of Nigeria. This last report before the 1959 
plebiscite simply echoed the documents sent to the League of Nations and United 
Nations by the British government since 1922. Some Nigerian newspapers also 
considered these remote regions as part of Northern Nigeria and not as a 
separate entity: 
                                            
59 Arewa House, 1/18/3251. 
60 United Nations Review, 5, 37, 1959 quoted by James H. Vaughan, ‘Culture, History, and Grass-
Roots Politics in a Northern Cameroons Kingdom’, American Anthropologist, New Series, 66 
(1964), 1078-1095 (p. 1078). 
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On Saturday, November 7 [1959], the people of the United Nations Trust 
Territory of the Northern Cameroons, at present administered by the 
Government of Northern Nigeria and consisting of the easternmost parts 
of the Provinces of Bornu, Adamawa and Benue, will take part in a 
plebiscite.61 
 
Hence the result of the 1959 plebiscite came as a surprise as 62% of 
Northern Cameroonian chose to remain under the United Nations Trusteeship.62 
Different reasons were given to explain this result. The first one given by the 
United Nations was that the Northern Cameroonian rejected the “system of local 
administration”.63 Indeed, the Northern Cameroons had no government of its 
own whereas Southern Cameroons with a smaller population had its own 
government. In 1959, the Northern Cameroons were not officially a province but 
were directly administered from Benue, Adamawa and Borno. Thus, by voting for 
the second alternative, the Cameroonian expressed their discontent with their 
administrative situation within Nigeria. The local population of Northern 
Cameroon resented being classified as appendages of Northern Nigeria, a place 
reserved for them by the British and the Bornoan officials. 
Furthermore, local conditions were much more important to Northern 
Cameroonian than the more distant question of joining Nigeria or not. Being part 
of Nigeria or a Trust Territory was not fundamentally different to most of them.64 
As James Vaughan has proved for the Margi country, most Cameroonians voted 
against Nigeria’s ruling political party, the Northern People’s Congress  NPC). For 
historical reasons, the ruling elite of the Northern Cameroons were linked to the 
Fulani political elite of Northern Nigeria. As a result, some inhabitants of 
Northern Cameroons voiced their opposition against their rulers through the 
new political forms offered to them. Opposition political parties such as the 
United Middle Belt Congress, the Action Group alliance, the Northern Kamerun 
                                            
61 Nigerian Citizen, 11 July 1959. Arewa House, 1/6/3093, Plebiscite for Northern Cameroons 
Publicity. 
62 Figures from Report of the United of Nations Commissioner for the Supervision of the 
Plebiscites in the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, (T/1491), p.85. 
63 Bongfen Chem-Langhëë, The Paradoxes of Self-Determination in the Cameroons under United 
Kingdom Administration: The Search for Identity, Well-Being, and Continuity (Lanham, MD: 
University Press of America, 2003), p. 154. 
64 West Africa, 7 November 1959, Arewa House, 1/20/3268. 
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Democratic Party, and the Northern Elements Progressive Union encouraged 
their followers to vote against the NPC.65 In 1959, voting for the second 
alternative of the plebiscite meant a “no-confidence vote in the NPC”.66 Thus, 
voters of the Margi country chose to vote against the NPC and selected the second 
option offered to them. 
In Dikwa, the anti-NPC feelings could be traced back to 1954 even though the 
majority of the population was either Kanuri or Shuwa Arab. The tensions 
between Northern Nigeria and Dikwa were at their peak when a reform of the 
Native Authorities launched by the Lieutenant-Governor and backed by the NPC 
overthrew Dikwa’s Emir, Mustapha III.67 The relationship between the NPC and 
the Dikwa elite had been put under much strain for at least ten years.68 Voting 
against the Nigerian option showed that Dikwa was not ready to forget the 
political domination of the NPC. 
The Premier of Northern Nigeria Ahmadu Bello and leader of the NPC 
accused the British of trying to retain control of the Northern Cameroons. 
According to him, the result could be explained by “subversive actions by the 
British officers who organised the plebiscite”.69 Once the results of the 1959 
referendum were proclaimed, he addressed a letter to the United Nations. In this 
document, he blamed the result of the referendum on three different reasons: 
1. Lack of proper publicity and information. 
2. People were not told what is at stake. 
3. A deliberate desire on the part of the officials of the administering 
authority (Britain) to keep and develop the territory as a future imperial 
nuclear war base when other West African imperial territories are lost as 
a result of pressure brought about by the United Nations.70 
                                            
65 Daily Times, 4 August 1959. See Richard Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent 
African Nation (Africa World Press, 2004) for a detailed analysis of the political conditions of 
Nigeria in the 1950s. 
66 Vaughan, Culture, 'History, and Grass-Roots Politics in a Northern Cameroons Kingdom’. 
67 Alhaji M. Yakubu, ‘Coercing Old Guard Emirs in Northern Nigeria: The Abdication of Yakubu III 
of Bauchi, 1954’, African Affairs, 92 (1993), 593-604. 
68  For details about the Shehu’s grievances see Chem-Langhëë, The Paradoxes of Self-
Determination, pp. 30–31. 
69 Quoted by The Telegraph, 11 November 1959. Arewa House, 1/19/3261. 
70 Letter to the Trusteeship Committee by the Northern People’s Congress, 21 November 1959, 
quoted in Sunday Times, 22 November 1959. Arewa House, 1/19/3261. 
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It would be impossible to totally deny the existence of a project for a British 
military base in Northern Cameroons. However, this only seems a rumour as no 
documents seem to confirm this information. This belief might be compared to 
the French projects in the Sahara at the same period as the latter wanted to keep 
the oil-rich south of Algeria as a nuclear test area.71 Thus, the United Kingdom 
would supposedly have rigged the 1959 referendum so that it could have kept 
control of Northern Cameroons when Nigeria became independent in 1960. 
However, Northern Cameroon had no strategic value in terms of natural 
resources. Neither was it useful for military training as British troops had not set 
foot in Cameroonian territory since 1924.72 This largely reduces the credibility of 
Bello’s claim who publicly sought to blame the British and not the NPC for the 
plebiscite defeat. 
Nonetheless, the British colonial administration did not expect the outcome 
of the 1959 referendum. The administration in Kaduna tried to gather as much 
information as possible to understand the reasons for this vote. 
In the former German Borno, the second alternative also won a victory. 54% 
of the voting population chose to remain a United Nations Trusteeship. How to 
explain such a result when the whole British administration claimed that Borno 
desired to be re-united? It could be argued that this result contradicted the very 
argument about the preservation of the territory of Borno throughout the 
colonial period. Indeed, if 54% of voters in the Emirate of Dikwa chose to vote for 
the second alternative, it meant that the question of the territorial integrity of 
Borno was not as fundamental as was demonstrated earlier in this chapter. 
 
                                            
71 The French Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes was created in 1957 as an ill-fated 
attempt to regroup the different Saharan territories of modern-day Chad, Mauritania, Niger and 
Algeria. 
72 Report by his Britannic Majesty’s Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the 
administration of the British Cameroons for the Year 1924, p.31 quoted by Callahan, A Sacred 
Trust, p.26. 
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Figure 29: Circles of the Dikwa Division in the 1959 plebiscite.73 
 
Precise figures for this plebiscite are still available. In the plebiscite circle of 
Dikwa North, 7 575 persons decided to join Nigeria whereas 7 197 persons 
preferred the second alternative. In the plebiscite circle of Dikwa Central, 8 891 
persons voted for the first alternative whereas 11 988 persons preferred the 
status quo.74 Nonetheless, voters in Dikwa Central preferred the second option. 
Moreover, in the Gwoza District dwelled communities which had never been 
under the domination of a Kanemi before the German colonisation. According to 
colonial reports, the sense of belonging to the Bornoan framework did not exist 
at all in this area.75 Consequently, Gwoza District voted for the second alternative. 
But even in Dikwa taken as a whole, a minority voted for the first alternative.  
This could seem contradictory to the assertion that the Bornoans from Dikwa 
wanted to be reunited with their Nigerian counterparts. To a certain extent, the 
plebiscite results did not clearly outline the territorial pattern of Borno. Djalal 
Abdoh, United Nations Commissioner for the Supervision of the Plebiscite, 
explained the vote in favour of the status quo. 
Like their fellow Northern Cameroonian, the inhabitants of the Dikwa 
Emirate resolved to decide their future at a later date. After all, for financial and 
political reasons, the Emirate of Dikwa would have fared better if distinct from 
                                            
73 Detail of the map at the end of the Report of the United of Nations Commissioner for the 
Supervision of the Plebiscites in the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, (T/1491). 
74 Figures from Report of the United of Nations Commissioner for the Supervision of the 
Plebiscites in the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, (T/1491). 
75 West Africa, 7 November 1959, Arewa House, 1/20/3268. 
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Northern Nigeria. The 1930s, 1940s and 1950s saw different attempts from the 
authorities in Dikwa to obtain the creation of a Region of Northern Cameroons.76 
However, it would be possible to identify a certain pro-Nigerian vote in the 
regions closer geographically and historically to Borno. The links between Dikwa 
and the rest of Borno have been analysed above and accordingly the plebiscite 
circle which chose to join Nigeria was the one containing the town of Dikwa. Not 
surprisingly, the circle of Dikwa Central containing regions more loosely linked to 
Borno did not choose to join Nigeria. 
                                            
76 Chem-Langhëë,'The Paradoxes of Self-Determination in the Cameroons under United Kingdom 
Administration', chap. 3. 
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Figure 30: Map used by the United Nations for the 1959 plebiscite in the Northern 
Cameroons.77 
 
The argument that Bornoan historicity would have reinforced a pro-Nigeria 
vote in 1959 is only a hypothesis at this stage. Indeed, the voting results do not 
clearly show at a village level that the closer to Borno the villagers were, the 
more inclined they were to vote for the Nigerian option. The United Nations 
report for the 1959 plebiscite is potentially a very useful source as it contains the 
exact results for each village or village grouping. However, certain names have 
                                            
77 Map available in United Nations Report, (T/1491). 
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changed over the years; the localisation of some settlements would be complex. 
Maps and gazetteers have not solved this issue so far. 
Strikingly, the opinion of the population of Dikwa was not evoked in the 
media before the results of the first plebiscite. No petitions were sent to the 
United Nations as in the case of Togoland.78 The primary sources still available do 
not seem to reveal the feelings of the population. After all, the 1959 plebiscite 
was supposed to be a formality. It was only once the results were released, that 
the British government and the press developed an interest in the reasons 
behind this vote. Thus, the opinion of some members of the local Bornoan elite 
became discernable in 1960. In that year, Mallam Abba Habib, the Waziri of 
Dikwa and general secretary of the NPC clearly expressed his view for the 
Emirate of Dikwa: 
Never in our history had Dikwa been outside of Bornu and hence 
of Northern Nigeria, and under no political circumstances should 
we allow our association with Bornu and the Northern Nigeria to 
be threatened.79 
According to the elite in Dikwa, the sense of belonging to Borno was stronger 
than any other political opinion. The equation was simple: as the inhabitants of 
Dikwa were historically part of Borno, they should have been part of Nigeria. 
Bornoan irredentism clearly favoured the federation of Nigeria in 1959. Even if it 
would be difficult to extrapolate this attitude to the rest of the population of the 
Emirate of Dikwa, a certain form of Bornoan belonging still prevailed. The best 
counter-example is the population of the Gwoza Hills who were neither part of 
Borno in the nineteenth-century nor ethnically linked with the Kanuri or the 
Shuwa and who overwhelmingly voted against Nigeria. Thus in 1959 two-thirds 
of the Gwoza dwellers declined the Nigerian option. However, the second 
plebiscite held in 1961 did not confirm this attitude. 
                                            
78 Paul Nugent, Smugglers, Secessionists & Loyal Citizens on the Ghana-Togo Frontier: the Lie of the 
Borderlands Since 1914 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002), pp. 170–180. 
79 Nigerian Citizen, 10 August 1960, Arewa House, 1/18/3251. 
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Indeed as the British Cameroons chose to remain a Trusteeship Territory in 
1959, the United Nations decided to organise a second referendum on 12 
February 1961. The two questions asked were: 
(a) Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent 
Federation of Nigeria? 
(b) Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent 
Republic of the Cameroons?80 
British-ruled Southern Cameroon decided to become a part of the Republic of 
Cameroons whereas the Northern Cameroons opted to join the Nigerian 
federation. In 1959, 60% of the population had voted against federation with 
Northern Nigeria. Two years later, the situation was reversed. What has caused 
the difference? 
Analysts and witnesses stressed the efforts deployed by the British 
administration to ensure that the mistakes committed in 1959 would not be 
repeated. Thus, on 1 July 1960, the Northern Cameroons were constituted as a 
separate Province within Northern Nigeria. When Nigeria became independent 
on 1 October 1960, the Northern Cameroons were separated from the federation 
of Nigeria and were directly administered by a former British colonial governor, 
Percy Wyn-Harris.81 The British renamed Northern Cameroons “Trusteeship 
Province” and tried to create a quasi-autonomous administration.82 Malcolm 
Cooper, a British Plebiscite Supervisor in 1961, described the organisation of the 
second Plebiscite in his memoirs. According to him, the creation of the Province 
of Northern Cameroons was “soft soap” for the people of Northern Cameroons.83 
Despite all these measures, the “Trusteeship Province” was still part of Northern 
Nigeria. 
                                            
80 As quoted in Johnson, 'The Case concerning the Northern Cameroons'. 
81 Establishment and Organisation Department, 29/60, 7 October 1960, Arewa House, 1/2/3076. 
82 See all the administrative details in Chem-Langhëë, p. 158. 
83 See his memoirs online: Malcolm Cooper, The Northern Cameroons Plebiscite 1960/61: A 
Memoir with Photo Archive (Electronic ISBN Publication: Mandaras Publishing, 2010) 
<http://www.mandaras.info/MandarasPublishing/CameroonsPlebisciteMemoir-
Cooper2010.pdf>. [accessed 18 July 2011]. 
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As for the Emirate of Dikwa, more autonomy was given to the Gwoza Hills. 
For electoral purposes, the Gwoza Hills dwellers were given their own Native 
Authority. According to Cooper, this explains why most of them consequently 
chose to join Nigeria.84 On the one hand, the geographical distance and on the 
other hand, the absence of historical links could explain the different pro-
Cameroonian or pro-Nigerian attitudes. 
 
Figure 31: A polling booth in Gwoza. The black box is for Nigeria whereas the red 
one is for Cameroon. (12 February 1961)85 
 
The aims of the British administration were obvious as they believed 
Northern Cameroons ought to become British according to observers such as 
Vaughan.86 Even the decision to allow women to vote was regarded as helping to 
reinforce the pro-Nigerian vote “as the women, who tend to be very conservative 
among the pagans, possibly strengthened the pro-Nigerian forces.”87 
It is also worth noting that the number of voters rose by 170% between the 
two plebiscites. The introduction of universal suffrage would have resulted in an 
                                            
84Cooper, The Northern Cameroons Plebiscite 1960/61, p.32. 
85 Cooper, The Northern Cameroons Plebiscite 1960/61, p. 63. 
86 Vaughan, ‘Culture, History, and Grass-Roots Politics in a Northern Cameroons Kingdom'. 
87 Vaughan, ‘Culture, History, and Grass-Roots Politics in a Northern Cameroons Kingdom’, p. 
1092. 
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increase of approximately 100%. Demographic growth might have resulted in 
perhaps a 5% rise.88 170% seems to be an extraordinary figure even if around 
265 000 inhabitants lived in the Emirate of Dikwa according to the 1952 census. 
                                            
88 United Nations Visiting Mission Report in the Cameroons, (T/1426), 5 118, p. 62. Quoted by 
International Court of Justice, ‘Memorial of the Government of the Federal Republic of Cameroon’, 
1961, p. 32 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=1c&case=48&code=cuk&p3=90> 
[accessed 16 December 2011]. 
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Figure 32: Pro-Nigerian vote in Dikwa Emirate (1959-1961)89 
Circles of the 
Emirate of 
Dikwa 
Number of pro-
Nigerian votes in 
1959 
Number of pro-
Nigerian votes in 
1961 
Nigerian vote 
Increase 
between 1959 
and 1961 
Dikwa North 9091 22765 +149% 
Dikwa Central 7575 28697 +278% 
Gwoza 3356 18115 +439% 
 
Figure 33: Pro-Cameroonian vote in Dikwa Emirate (1959-1961)90 
Circles of the 
Emirate of 
Dikwa 
Number of pro-
Cameroonian 
votes in 1959 
Number of pro-
Cameroonian 
votes in 1961 
Cameroonian vote 
Increase/Decrease 
between 1959 and 
1961 
Dikwa North 11988 10562 -11% 
Dikwa Central 7096 24203 +241% 
Gwoza 6773 2554 -62% 
 
As demonstrated by these figures, the vote went up considerably in favour of 
Nigeria whereas the Cameroonian vote plummeted. It would be necessary to 
recognise that the vote also increased for the pro-Cameroonian vote in Dikwa 
Central but data particularly shows that the two circles which did not choose 
Nigeria in 1959 had the highest increase of Nigerian votes in 1961. Dikwa Central 
and Gwoza overwhelmingly chose to vote for Nigeria which would indicate 
possible malpractice in the second plebiscite. The results of the 1961 plebiscite 
                                            
89 Figures from Report of the United of Nations Commissioner for the Supervision of the 
Plebiscites in the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, (T/1491), p.85. 
90 United Nations, Report of the Trusteeship Council (A/3595). 
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clearly proved that Dikwa North and Gwoza were the two circles where the 
voting patterns dramatically changed. 
Precise village-level figures available in the United Nations report of 1959 
were not available from 1961. As a consequence, it would be difficult to draw 
either a geographic or an ethnic pattern showing the precise evolution of the 
vote. However, the disappearance of the results at village level would also lend 
credit to the theory of plebiscite rigging. 
It would be difficult to answer this specific question but the role of the British 
officers is not to be underestimated during the second plebiscite. 
The best example of a personally implicated British officer was David 
Muffett. The latter was the Resident of the Northern Cameroons from 1960 to 
1961 based in Bama.91 As a personal friend of Ahmadu Bello, leader of the NPC, 
he was directly involved in attempts to influence the Northern Cameroonian to 
vote for the Nigerian option.92 His involvement in the rigging of the plebiscite was 
such that his name “Muffett” became a Hausa word which still in 2010 was 
synonymous with personal political cooperation with the Emirs of Northern 
Nigeria.93 
Percy Wyn-Harris, the British Plebiscite Administrator also sought to favour 
Nigeria as he maintained court decisions condemning supporters of the 
Cameroonian option. For example, Suleiman Salihu, Organising Secretary of the 
North Kamerun Democracy Party (NKDP) at Jada, was imprisoned for one year 
because of his opposition to Nigerian politicians.94 Neither Muffett nor Wyn-
Harris was impartial in this case. Politicians campaigning for the Cameroon 
option were either imprisoned or fined for diverse reasons. The active role of the 
British somehow contradicted their previous so-called “subversive actions” as 
mentioned by Ahmadu Bello. Their partiality became obvious when they raised 
administrative barriers against the proponents of the Cameroon proposition. In 
                                            
91 In 1942, the British moved the capital of the Emirate to Bama for its more central location, S. J. 
Hogben and Anthony Kirk-Greene, The Emirates of Northern Nigeria: a Preliminary Survey of Their 
Historical Traditions (Oxford University Press: London, 1966), p. 352. 
92 Chem-Langhëë, The Paradoxes of Self-Determination, p. 165. 
93 Interview with Anthony Kirk-Greene, Oxford, 4 May 2010. 
94 Chem-Langhëë, The Paradoxes of Self-Determination, p. 161. 
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the Mubi and Cubanawa-Madagali District, the pro-Cameroon supporters were 
denied twelve out of 35 permits to gather for political meetings. Their pro-
Nigeria opponents were only denied two out of 86 permits.95 
As a result, 65% of the inhabitants of Dikwa Emirate chose to join Nigeria. 
This was a clear victory for the proponents of the Nigerian option. As in 1959, it 
would be possible to distinguish between the villages which clearly chose to 
become Nigerian and those which opted for the Cameroonian alternative. Most 
inhabitants of Dikwa North wanted to become Nigeria. In Dikwa Central, the 
precise figures available for the first plebiscite were never published by the 
United Nations. Thus, the argument of a strong but not overwhelming Bornoan 
irredentism expressed in a voting pattern will remain hypothetical. 
Furthermore, the United Kingdom was taken to the International Court of 
Justice by the Republic of Cameroon in 1961. The newly independent country 
blamed the British administration for not separating the Nigerian administration 
from its Northern Cameroonian counterpart. According to the League of Nations 
and United Nations, the two administrations should have been distinct.96 
However, this Cameroonian criticism was not totally new in 1961. 
As early as 1929, issues were raised by the Permanent Mandates 
Commission of the League of Nations. To those who complained that the British 
Cameroons administration was not distinctly separated from the Nigerian 
administration, the British Government replied: "It may be stated with 
confidence that no such tendency exists”.97 The example of Borno however tends 
to show that the remarks of the Permanent Mandates Commission were well 
founded. 
The very division between Southern and Northern Cameroon was, according 
to the Republic of Cameroon, a deliberate British strategy to annex the Northern 
Cameroons to Nigeria. To answer criticism, the British Special Representative to 
the Trusteeship Council wrote in 1958 that the “British could not assume the 
                                            
95 United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Report of the United Nations Commissioner (T/1556), 
pp.205-207. 
96 International Court of Justice, ‘Memorial of the Government of the Federal Republic of 
Cameroon’. 
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responsibility of artificially tearing away Northern Cameroons from the Northern 
Region.”98 But in its report, the Visiting Commission before the first 1959 
plebiscite even specifically stated that “the dispositions taken to administer these 
populations by binding them to Northern Nigeria replaced them in their own past 
administrative system”.99 The British tried to prove that their Mandates of 
Cameroons were an “artificial creation” whereas the Northern Region of Nigeria 
was more coherent. Consequently, the British administration was morally 
obliged to ensure that ties between Northern Nigeria and Northern Cameroons 
were not severed. 
In 1962, the British replied in a Counter-Memorial to the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ). Against the legal argument offered by the Cameroonian 
administration, the British used a historical argument. As in 1916, they repeated 
how the Emirate of Dikwa was the “part of the empire of Bornu which was 
included in the mandated territory”.100 They even reminded the ICJ of its 1924 
report to the League of Nations: "It need scarcely be said that the policy of 
indirect administration can and must be applied in a variety of forms and 
degrees. The highly organized state of Dikwa cannot be dealt with on the same 
lines as the primitive hill pagans who are still in a state of savagery.”101 
In 1963, the ICJ ruled the case in favour of the United Kingdom: the Court 
“found that it could not adjudicate upon the merits of the Republic of 
Cameroon.”102 The Cameroonian government with the help of France underlined 
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the historicity of the territory of Cameroon as the independent Republic of 
Cameroon inherited its territory from the German colony of Kamerun. To this 
historical argument, the British government answered with the pre-colonial 
historicity of the territories of Adamawa and Borno.103 
The whole ICJ case did not only revolve around historical questions.104 
However, both governments stressed the historicity of their claims. For obvious 
reasons, they did not emphasise the same period of time but the interesting fact 
was that the existence of the nineteenth-century territory of Borno became once 
again a legal argument in the dispute. The historicity of Borno first used in the 
1890s by the British in their border negotiations with the French echoed once 
again at an international level. 
Thus, the Scramble for Borno started at the end of the nineteenth century 
was not finished until the early 1960s. The British and the French still argued for 
the control of some parts of the territory as in the 1890s. However, the 
arguments used at the end of colonial rule were more refined. The British in 
particular benefitted from the empirical studies led by the colonial 
administrators. As shown in the previous chapter, historical and legal arguments 
were constantly intermingled to favour a certain Bornoan irredentism which 
would lead to the reconstruction of what was understood as nineteenth-century 
Borno. 
To a certain extent, the two plebiscites of 1959 and 1961 transmitted the 
quarrel between the former British and French colonial powers to the two 
postcolonial States of Nigeria and Cameroon. For instance, the Cameroonian with 
the direct help of French lawyers submitted their memorials to the ICJ.105 More 
importantly, the territorial legitimacy that the British sought was directly 
transferred to the new Nigerian State. The ICJ case was an opportunity for the 
British to affirm their commitment to Nigerian unity. As historically, the territory 
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of Dikwa was Bornoan, it should, according to the British, be part of the 
independent and unified Nigeria. If recognised by an international institution 
such as the ICJ, it would give more credence to Bornoan unity and hence Nigerian 
unity. Nigerian historian, Anene, who wrote about the Nigerian boundaries at the 
time of the plebiscites detailed: 
The plebiscites of 1959 and 1961 finally restored to Nigeria the 
effective frontiers of the kingdom of Bornu.106 
Thus, the recreation of Borno had a direct impact on the nature of the State 
that the British desired to transmit to Nigeria. The question of territorial 
legitimacy as during colonialism became once again preponderant. The 1950s 
were the decade when the British tried to hold Nigeria together for its 
forthcoming independence. 107  The territorial legitimacy of Borno even if 
relatively marginal at the Nigerian scale could be considered as one of the 
founding stones of Nigerian legitimacy. 
Indeed in the 1950s, Nigeria was still considered as a “geographical 
expression” according to the politician Obafemi Awolowo. The latter even wrote 
that the term “Nigerian” was used to designate those living within the borders of 
the country. In other terms, it did not have any meaning.108 If the north-eastern 
borders of Nigeria were those of nineteenth-century Borno, or if at least, they 
were perceived as such, the Nigerian State would have been legitimate in the 
eyes of those living in this part of Northern Nigeria. The case of Dikwa, despite its 
small importance, revealed the British attempts to establish rational-legal 
authority in Nigeria. 
The British tried to transmit a “given territory” to the future State of Nigeria. 
When considering Borno, the British tried to transmit a nineteenth-century 
territory contained within the borders of Nigeria. In the colonial eyes, Nigeria 
would thus become a conglomeration of different regions, some of them being 
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historically coherent, others being more recently engineered by the colonial 
administrators such as the south-east part of Nigeria.109 The whole of Nigeria 
could not be a federation of coherent territories such as the ancient kingdom of 
Borno, however, when and where it was possible, the case of Borno proved that 
territorial legitimacy was very much sought after by the British. 
 
Conclusion 
Dikwa was a perfect example of the British endeavour to recapture the 
legitimacy of a nineteenth-century territory within Nigeria. As during the 
beginning of the Scramble for Borno in the 1890s and 1900s, the British adapted 
their rhetoric to favour the power of the State whether it be colonial or 
postcolonial. In this logic, capturing the legitimacy of Borno could only be 
beneficial for the British or Nigerians. Dikwa showed clearly how the British 
sought to establish continuity between their own rule and that preceding 
colonisation.  
This continuity was sought after with tools offered by the League of Nations 
and subsequently the United Nations. The territory of Dikwa seemed to 
correspond particularly well to the Wilsonian ideals of self-determination for 
peoples throughout the world. Callahan’s argument stating that the mandates 
had an impact on the colonial policy could be applied as well to a certain extent. 
According to the British, the concept of borders created around homogenous 
communities could be applied to Borno. As demonstrated in this chapter, the 
British continually used historical arguments to defend their position in favour of 
the reconstruction of nineteenth-century Borno. Consequently, the territory of 
Northern Cameroons was conceptually linked to the territory of Northern 
Nigeria. Through British actions, they became inseparable both in practice and in 
theory. 
However, Dikwa proves to what extent the British were ready to absorb a 
territory which should have been administratively separate from the rest of 
Nigeria. The choice of the Shehu of Dikwa as Shehu of Borno in 1937 and the 
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rigging of the 1961 plebiscite demonstrate the methods used by the colonial 
rulers. Did the “Sacred Trust”, modify the British policies as Callahan argued?110 
Where were the promises of democracy made by the British Prime Minister 
Harold MacMillan when he supposedly finalised his “Wind of Change” speech 
while visiting Northern Nigeria in January 1960?111 Did Gawain Bell, governor of 
Northern Nigeria in 1961 really believe that “Britain gave Nigeria care, 
protection, guidance, an example of enviable integrity and finally liberty” as he 
wrote in his autobiography?112 It seems that Dikwa is a perfect example of the 
British policy towards their mandate as they publicly claimed to be influenced by 
their new “Sacred Trust” but for them, the end justified the means. Dikwa had to 
become Nigerian at all costs. Britain’s “integrity” was not so “enviable” after all. 
At the end of the nineteenth century, the British were among those eager to 
invade and partition Africa. Paradoxically, throughout the twentieth century, they 
never ceased to rebuild the territory of Borno within their colony of Nigeria. This 
apparent contradiction illustrates the complexity of the “colonial episode”. The 
case of the small Emirate of Dikwa showed the extent to which the colonisers 
needed ancient structures to implement their rule. The constant British battle to 
re-adjust the borders of the province of Borno to their nineteenth-century 
perimeter demonstrated how the ancient territory was essential to them. As the 
colonial officials in Maiduguri were also scholars of the history of the kingdom, 
they reiterated the concept of a Bornoan space invaded by Rabih and dismantled 
by the European conquest. Historically and thus logically, Dikwa and Borno 
should be reunited. 
Moreover, the case of Dikwa revealed another aspect of British colonial rule. 
In the 1900s, it seemed obvious that the British would need the territory of 
Borno to implement Indirect Rule in their remotest part of the Nigerian colony. In 
the 1950s, after more than 50 years spent in Borno, the British still needed 
Bornoan legitimacy to rule the north-east of Nigeria. There could be two different 
types of explanation for this. 
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One interpretation would be that the colonial State was never strong in 
Nigeria. The alliance between the colonial rulers and the local elite was essential 
throughout these 58 years spent in Borno. This argument would thus be very 
close to Ronald Robinson’s concept of an alliance between the African elite and 
the Europeans.113 The fact that the British were eager to re-create the territory of 
Borno would be a proof of the British alignment with the Bornoan politics. To a 
certain extent, this would show the weakness of the British position in north-
eastern Nigeria as the latter needed the framework of Borno until the end of 
colonial rule. 
Alternatively, the apparent weakness of the colonial State could in fact be 
interpreted as a genuine attempt to rule Borno through its local space and 
borders. The cooperation of the British colonial officials and the Bornoan elite 
could be understood as an attempt to rule north-eastern Nigeria through an 
existing framework. Why would the British have done otherwise? As the borders 
and the territory already existed in the Bornoan conceptualisation of space, it 
made administrative and financial sense to recycle the pre-existing framework. 
Pragmatism would thus be the key in understanding the reconstruction of Borno. 
No theoretical framework, but a loose reinterpretation of nineteenth-century 
history seemed to have prevailed. This last argument seems the most likely. 
After 1960, independent Nigeria never forgot this territorial engineering. The 
next chapter will analyse how the postcolonial State of Nigeria inherited these 
practices from British colonial rule. To what extent did Nigeria recycle the British 
policies? Did the Nigerian government free itself from its predecessor’s 
inheritance? The question of territorial engineering, spacing and respacing in 
postcolonial Nigeria will thus be the main focus of the final chapter of this 
thesis.114 
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6. Postcolonial Borno: from a Spatial to a Cultural 
Identity (1960-2010) 
 
A civil war, ten coups and counter-coups, four republics, thirty-six states, 
more than two-hundred and fifty ethnic groups, religious strife between 
Christians and Muslims: since it became independent on 1st October 1960, 
Nigeria has more often been described as a “divided country” than a coherent 
State. Indeed, in Nigeria, the centrifugal forces seem stronger than the centripetal 
ones. However, the potential balkanisation of Africa feared in the decolonisation 
years has not yet occurred in Nigeria. As its existence can “not be taken for 
granted”1, is Nigeria more than a “mere geographical expression” as Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo2 put it in 1947? Is Nigeria yet an “imagined community”3 or a 
nation? 
Analysts and historians who focused on postcolonial Nigeria often tended 
to enumerate Nigerian failed achievements. For example, Nigeria is supposed to 
be one of the best examples of an African failed State.4 The British amalgamation 
of Nigeria in 1914 would be one of the culprits explaining the existence of this 
failure. For instance, nearly a century after the amalgamation, Richard Olaniyan 
edited a book offering historical and political arguments about the results of 
Lugard’s actions.5 The methods employed by the colonisers to create a viable 
constitution in the 1950s were also decried by many commentators.6 
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The list could be long; however, one ghost is haunting the whole of 
Nigerian historiography: the Biafran War. In 1967, seven years after its 
independence, Nigeria started a war against its former Eastern Region, known as 
the Republic of Biafra. This civil war, which caused the death of more than one 
million people, is considered as the climax of regional rivalries in Nigeria. 
However, despite all the cultural or religious differences in the country, this war 
contributed to the construction of a national psyche in Nigeria. As a consequence, 
it marked deeply the production of History. For example, the influence of the 
Biafran civil war can easily be found in the writings of a Nigerian historian, Obaro 
Ikime. For Ikime, historical research should always try to analyse the roots of 
ethnic tensions in order to prevent civil wars.7 
Furthermore, there is a plethora of bibliographic elements dealing with 
the question of nationalism or federalism in Nigeria. This country has attracted 
some of the most prolific journalists, analysts and historians with a focus on 
African politics. The mere survival of the Nigerian State remains an intellectual 
enigma for many commentators. This chapter does not intend to contribute 
towards this immense bibliography in a general sense but will assess the 
question of spatial identity in modern-day Nigeria. 
The previous chapters of this thesis showed how the British recycled the 
borders and territory of Borno in colonial Nigeria. This chapter will focus on the 
territorial practices of the Nigerian State in the north-eastern region of Borno. 
Per se, Borno can be considered as one of the least studied areas of modern-day 
Nigeria. Located in the north-east of the country on the shores of Lake Chad, 
Borno is a semi-arid region with one of the lowest incomes of the whole country.8 
Administratively divided into Borno and Yobe States since 1991, the historical 
region of Borno is part of the “Nigerian North” where the various states have 
applied Sharia law since 2000. Borno and Yobe States would form part of the 
independent Northern Nigeria that Muammar Gaddafi evoked in March 2010.9 
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Borno and Yobe States are thus part of a larger geopolitical environment fuelling 
speculation on the fragmentation of Northern Nigeria. 
Recently, the fundamentalist religious sect, Boko Haram has claimed 
responsibility for attacks and bombings in Northern Nigeria. 10  Generally, 
journalists and political scientists have focused on the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism in this region, a phenomenon which has had a consequence on 
the scholarship of Borno. Indeed, the postcolonial history of the region have been 
neglected so far by other scholars in favour of immediate history. American, 
European and Nigerian analysts thus focused on the introduction of the Sharia 
law or on Boko Haram, the Nigerian self-styled “Talibans”, a situation easily 
explained by the redefinition of the research agenda after 9/11.11 
However, the vitality of Nigerian universities is not to be neglected. 
Logically, the University of Maiduguri has fostered memoirs or dissertations on 
the colonial and postcolonial history of the region.12 In Borno too though, the 
historical production has recently shifted towards a more religious vision of 
history. However, economic or political history has not been totally ignored. The 
Annals of Borno intermittently published since 1984 by the University have 
proved a valuable tool. The bibliography created by Wilhelm Seidensticker and 
Gizachew Adamu was also helpful as it listed essays and dissertations submitted 
to the University of Maiduguri.13 However access to such material was difficult. 
This chapter will deal with one aspect of Borno postcolonial history. It will 
tackle the question of territoriality in Borno while taking into account the specific 
Nigerian political context. It will first analyse the administrative divisions of post-
independence Nigeria with a focus on Borno. Secondly, this chapter will analyse 
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the question of double nationalism in Borno and will argue that Bornoan 
nationalism is being reshaped by Nigerian nationalism. This instrumentalist 
approach will stress how modern Nigerian politics of belonging redefined a more 
ancient Bornoan sense of identity. In this sense, this chapter will highlight how 
the territorial form of nationalism present in Borno since the nineteenth-century 
is becoming a more cultural phenomenon. The territorial continuity explored in 
the previous chapters will thus give way to the transformation of the meaning 
attached to the borders and territory of Borno. 
 
6.1. The Rise and Fall of Borno? 
 
The first section of this chapter will illustrate the concept of a long 
Scramble for Borno. It will be argued that the British policy towards Borno was 
continued after the end of the colonisation. The legitimacy of the territory of 
Borno was sought after by the different Nigerian governments who never ceased 
to use the borders and territory of Borno to suit their political agenda. 
Symmetrically, political leaders of Borno also used the Bornoan territorial 
framework to pursue their goals. This first section will thus analyse the power 
structure of Borno and its relationship with the rest of the federation of Nigeria. 
 
 
 
6.1.1. The Rise of Borno: the Creation of Borno State 
 
Sources available to study the history of postcolonial Borno are sparse. 
Written material should be open to public after 25 years but, in practice, many 
documents are still held by the Nigerian government under a longer period of 
closure.14 As many contemporaries of the early postcolonial years were still alive 
when this research was undertaken in 2010, this section will rely on oral sources. 
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At the time of writing of this thesis, many witnesses were still keen to discuss the 
events of the last decades. Hindsight and selectivity are naturally part of the 
narratives offered by the informants, but, it is hoped that a careful treatment of 
the information will shed a light on the process of territorial recycling described 
earlier.15 
According to various political scientists, the administrative history of 
independent Nigeria is a long and inexorable fragmentation with no tangible 
results. For instance, the political scientist Henry Alapiki considered that “the 
fissiparous or disintegrative tendencies bearing on the Nigerian national polity 
negate the intention of using state creation to achieve national integration and 
local autonomy and make it a false hope.”16 
First a simple subdivision of the Northern Region from 1960 to 1967, 
Borno became the core component of the North-Eastern State from 1967 to 1976. 
The structure of these new states was nearly always based on the former 
provincial framework. Thus the Northern Region was divided into six new states 
which gathered different colonial provinces. The new North-Eastern State was a 
combination of the colonial provinces of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno and Sardauna. 
Comprising 14% of the Nigerian population, the North-Eastern State was also the 
largest federal State of the country with an area of 268 579 km2.17 
Maiduguri, until then the capital of the province of Borno became the 
capital of the North-Eastern State. New prerogatives emerged for the city which 
had only been a provincial capital since its creation in 1907.18 Musa Usman, first 
military governor of the new State expressed his optimism when he officially 
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inaugurated it on 1st April 1968. His speech entitled, ‘The Coming of Age’ was a 
very political statement in the civil war atmosphere.19 
We in this State are a very mixed community of diverse tribes and 
customs. This however is nothing new since barely a year ago 
when we belonged to the larger political unit of Northern Region 
we lived happily and freely, and fully co-operated with our other 
fellows of differing background in a much larger unit. The 
differences that existed in that wider context are now greatly 
reduced in our present restricted geographical location and will 
be further reduced as the Government intends to decentralise as 
much of its services as possible in all the provinces and thus bring 
people still closer to their Government.20 
However, Maiduguri, despite being the State capital, did not come to 
dominate the rest of the State. Kenneth Barbour, a geographer at the University 
of Ibadan even doubted the viability of this state because of its size and political 
diversity. According to him: 
It is not easy, however, to see why the inhabitants should feel 
involved or interested in the intermediate unit of the North-
Eastern State, which corresponds neither to their intimate local 
loyalties nor to the sense of nationhood…21 
It was not until 1976 that Borno became a State. This reform can be 
considered as a typical attempt of the Nigerian State to allay the fears of 
secession by dividing the existing regional blocs. Officially, in 1967 at the eve of 
the Biafran war, the rationale behind the creation of new states was that no state 
should dominate the other members of the federation. In 1976, General Murtala 
Mohammed proclaimed that: 
[…] the supreme military council has accepted that Nigeria's future 
political stability would be enhanced by the creation of states. The basic 
motivation in the exercise is to bring government nearer the people 
while, at the same time, ensuring even development within a federal 
structure of government. It has also been necessary to avoid in the 
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process, a proliferation of states which will make no-sense [sic] of the 
whole exercise. The creation of states as far as this administration is 
concerned, is a one-time operation and future agitations on this matter 
will not be tolerated.22 
Economic, ethnic and political motives are often advanced to explain this 
state fever. In 1976, the Nigerian income was shared according to a formula 
called Distributable Pool Account.23 In order to allocate the revenues generated 
by the oil-rich south-east, more states were created. Ethnic groups via their own 
political parties campaigned for the creation of new states. Thus, at first glance, 
the creation of Borno state in 1976 does not appear to be motivated by a strong 
irredentist movement but by political calculations at a national level. 
Indeed, apart from the Borno Youth Movement and the Borno State Union 
of the 1950s, no Bornoan political party expressed its opinion in spatial terms.24 
However, it is noticeable that the state created in 1976 corresponds exactly to 
the British province of Borno. Thus, independent Nigeria recycled a territory in 
borders inherited from the British. Jean-François Bayart already stressed the 
need to understand the historicity of regions and territories in Africa. Limiting 
ourselves to the simple statement that all the territories inherited from 
colonisation were pure fabrications would be counterproductive.25 
One could understand the creation of Borno State as recognition of the 
existence of the old kingdom of Borno within the Nigerian framework. The fact 
that the Kanuri were separated from the other ethnic groups present in the 
North-Eastern State could be an example of the ethnicisation of politics in 
Nigeria.26 As the State was created during the democratic transition which led to 
the creation of the second Nigerian Republic, it could be suggested that the 
creation of Borno state was the result of a democratic wish of the Bornoan. The 
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phenomenon of the creation of the State of Borno could even be understood as an 
oppositional nationalism within the borders of Nigeria. Facing an emerging 
Nigerian nationalism, Bornoan nationalism perhaps had an historical aura that 
Nigeria lacked. However, this hypothesis seems unlikely as the Nigerian state 
would not have offered a power base to local nationalists. 
However, the post-civil wars constitutions of Nigeria have changed a 
fundamental aspect in the ethnic politics of Nigeria. In the postcolonial context of 
the competition for resources taken from the federal state of Nigeria, the 
different states have to struggle to obtain a part of the federal wealth at the 
centre and no longer from the centre. This competition is the result of what 
Ladipo Adamolekun called the Nigerian federal ‘bastardisation’ or ‘hyper-
centralisation of Nigerian federalism’.27 The creation of Borno State can thus be 
understood as a means to benefit more fully from the resources at the centre of 
the Nigerian federation. As a result, Bornoan patriots were thus tied into the 
structures of Nigeria. Identically, the former provinces of Bauchi, Adamawa and 
Sardauna all part of the North-Eastern State were as much eager as Borno to 
obtain their own State.28 
The concept of spatial recycling developed earlier would give an 
explanation on the process at stake. Firstly, the Nigerian State inherited an 
administrative framework from its colonial predecessor. Even if the Regions 
were modified in 1963, the borders of the provinces were hardly modified by the 
following administrations. Thus, the fossilisation of past borders was not the 
prerogative of the British. The Nigerian administration inherited not only 
provinces but also territorial practices from the British.  
For some young African states eager to have their national borders 
recognised internationally, the regional borders were not a priority. Nonetheless, 
in Nigeria regional borders were the skeleton of the federation. It was mainly 
within some borders inherited from the colonisation that the Eastern Region 
                                            
27 Ladipo Adamolekun, ‘The Nigerian Federation at the Crossroads: The Way Forward’, Publius., 
35 (2005), 383. 
28 Toyin Falola, The History of Nigeria, The Greenwood Histories of the Modern Nations (London: 
Greenwood Press, 1999), pp.190-1. 
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seceded from Nigeria under the name of Biafra.29 In independent Nigeria, it was 
behind these colonial limits that political factions were entrenched. The whole 
balance of the federation did not depend on the international borders which 
were uncontested but on the question of the multiplication of regional borders. 
In the same logic, in 2011, a Sudanese provincial border created by the British 
became the international boundary separating North Sudan and South Sudan. 
The current dispute over the Sudanese province of Abyei shows to what extent 
the question of the regional borders is fundamental.30 
Consequently, the modification of borders for a Region, state or province 
would have been counter-productive for the central government unless it felt 
threatened by the political power behind them or it needed some political 
support in the newly created administrative regions. The creation of new regions 
corresponded to the “divide-and-rule” political strategy. In this case, the creation 
of Borno state corresponded to this axiom. 
Furthermore, this state was created within the colonial provincial 
borders. To replace an existing framework, the Nigerian State used another one. 
The debates which took place in 1976 revealed the motivations of the Bornoans 
in favour of state creation.  
The territory of Borno as it was preserved by the British was a perfect 
example of spatial fossilisation. The creation of Borno State in 1976 could thus 
have been conceived as postcolonial adaptation to the British administrative 
legacy. However, British spatial engineering left a deep mark in independent 
Nigeria. The territorial legitimacy sought after by the colonisers became part of 
the political game at a national level. Borno State totally embodied the quest for 
territorial legitimacy undertaken at a political level and not only at an 
administrative level. 
Instead of only attributing the creation of new states to external or 
internal factors, it is possible to apprehend it in a historical manner. It was the 
whole federation of Nigeria which inherited spatial practices from the British 
                                            
29 Hiribarren, Les frontières du Biafra de la colonisation à 1970. 
30 Douglas Johnson, When Boundaries Become Borders: the Impact of Boundary-making in 
Southern Sudan’s Frontier Zones (London: Rift Valley Institute, 2010). 
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administration. Factional politics had a role to play at a national level. This same 
phenomenon happened again in 1991 when Yobe State was created. 
 
6.1.2. The Fall of Borno? The Creation of Yobe State (1991) 
 
On 27 August 1991, the military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida felt 
the need for the creation of nine new States for the federation. To the junta in 
power, the creation of these States was required for five reasons: 
A. The re-alignment of boundaries of the old colonial provinces as 
at 1960/61, where such re-alignment is considered inevitable to 
achieve the objectives as outlined by the Political Bureau. 
B. The expressed wishes of the peoples and communities based 
on such objective factors as common socio-cultural ties and 
institutions. 
C. The historical associations of the communities at the time of 
independence from colonial rule. 
D. Geographical continuity, especially the need to avoid the 
“divide-and-rule” syndrome inherent in the present power 
structure and resource allocation. 
E. The need to achieve a measure of relative balance in population 
and resource distribution.31 
 
                                            
31 Daily Times, 28 August 1991, British Library, Colindale, MC1796 NPL. See full text in Appendix 
F. 
242 
 
 
Figure 34: The 36 Nigerian States in 1996. Localisation of Yobe and Borno States. 
 
In the hope of maintaining his military regime in power, Babangida 
offered their own State to communities ready to support him.32 Depicted as a 
political attempt to topple his opposition, this state creation was a pure exercise 
of clientelism according to some commentators.33 Some religious, social or ethnic 
minorities saw in this quest for support, an opportunity to ask for the creation of 
their State. 34  The opportunity to create a new public service with its 
infrastructure was an essential motivation for the new States’ proponents.35 
The historian Attahiru Jega argued that the creation of new States in 
Nigeria was also due to the economic climate in the 1980s and 1990s. According 
to him, Structural Adjustment Programmes were particularly responsible for the 
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“resurgence of politics of identities” in Nigeria as such reforms weakened the role 
of the Nigerian state. As a result, pre-existing ethnic or religious identities were 
mobilised to assume the role played by the central State before the introduction 
of the Structural Adjustment Programmes.36  
The creation of Yobe State would correspond to this renewal of identity 
politics which partly led to the Nigerian Civil War in 1967. Thus, local politicians 
would have been eager to gain political power at a moment when the central 
State was becoming weaker at the centre. 
This is exactly what happened in Borno State. The western part of the 
State which was less predominantly inhabited by the Kanuri ethnic group was 
separated from the rest of Borno. More specifically, the Fulani, Hausa, Ngizim, 
Bole and Karekare minority populations seized this opportunity to petition for 
the creation of their own State. The new State took the name “Yobe” after the 
river Yo. 
At first glance, it would seem that by creating this new State, the Nigerian 
administration was officially breaking up the province of Borno created by the 
British in 1902. On 27 August 1991, the structure of Borno so diligently re-
engineered by the British was discarded by Babangida regime. The same logic 
which led the Nigerian administration to preside over the creation of a Borno 
State in 1976, led to its split fifteen years later, in 1991. 
Officially, Yobe State was created because of the size of Borno State. 
Judged too large for efficient political and administrative management, Borno 
State was divided into two parts. According to an official document of Yobe State: 
The agitation that called for this creation out of the former Borno 
State was largely due to its total neglect. This large part of the 
defunct Northeast geo-political zone of the country was left 
undeveloped. The area was noted for its expanse of harsh terrain 
to the Northern part characterized by desert encroachment and 
                                            
36 Attahiru Jega, Identity Transformation and Identity Politics Under Structural Adjustment in 
Nigeria (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2000), pp. 18-19. 
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Sahel to the South that made the presence of past Governments 
hardly felt due to its inaccessibility and thus was left rural.37 
The official position was that to facilitate the development of its western 
half, Borno State was split into two parts. The creation of Yobe State was thus not 
triggered by ethnic strife. The choice of the capital of the new State seemed to 
reveal the underlying local conflicts however. In 1991, the main city of the new 
State, Potiskum was mainly inhabited by Ngizim, Bole and Karekare populations. 
Nonetheless, Damaturu, another town, whose population was predominantly 
Kanuri, was chosen as the new capital of Yobe State. 
The Shehu of Borno, Mustapha Amin was particularly displeased with the 
creation of Yobe State.38 As he inherited the Kanemi throne, he was the main 
spiritual and political authority willing to safeguard the territorial integrity of his 
legacy. The preference of Damaturu as the capital of the new State can thus be 
explained by the pressure of members of the political elite of Borno State to 
preserve a Kanuri grip on Yobe. The choice of Damaturu can thus be seen as a 
compromise from the Babangida administration willing to offer some form of 
compensation to the defendants of Borno State. 
The similarity between Borno and Sokoto in 1991 is noticeable. When 
confronted with the threat of having Sokoto State divided, the Sultan of Sokoto 
opposed the Babangida regime. The Sultan was not the only opponent to this new 
State but his intervention contributed to the victory of the unitary movement.39 
This tends to prove the political weight of what the Nigerian administration calls 
“traditional rulers” and of the Sultan of Sokoto in particular.40 Nonetheless, the 
latter’s victory was short-lived as the creation of the new State was only 
postponed until 1996 when Sokoto State was divided into Sokoto and Zamfara 
                                            
37 Yobe State, Yobe State Economic Reform Agenda, no publisher mentioned, 2004, p.5. < 
http://www.ng.undp.org/documents/SEEDS/Yobe_State.pdf> [accessed16 September 2011]. 
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States. The Bornoan case was not an isolated one as the “northern emirs” could 
still voice their opposition. The importance of the Sultan of Sokoto or Shehu of 
Borno should not be overestimated. After all, they could not stop the creation of 
new States within their own territory. However, their role in modern-day 
Nigerian politics is not to be neglected either.41 
The creation of Borno State in 1976 and Yobe State in 1991 illustrated the 
extent to which new States could be more than simple administrative divisions. It 
was not only his power that Shehu Abubakar was holding on to when he 
complained about the creation of Yobe State: he was also reiterating the image of 
a Bornoan territory. The fact that the British reconfigured and modified the 
territory was only one step in the re-engineering of space. The territory of Borno 
as it existed in the 1990s was still very much the repository of State legitimacy 
for many of its inhabitants. In terms of power relationship within Nigeria, this 
phenomenon can thus show the importance of the “Scramble for Borno” 
mentioned earlier. 
In this very specific case – contrarily to some other Nigerian States – the 
States of Borno and Yobe illustrated the concept of a territory of Borno. 
Therefore, “territory” refers here to a historical and political space imagined by 
the Bornoan political elite. In 1938, the geographer Maurice Halbwachs 
recognised the importance of symbolic territories. According Halbwachs, political 
groups can express their demands in spatial terms because of the symbolic value 
they attribute to space.42 The territory of Borno is thus intertwined within the 
strategies of the Bornoan political elite. 
With a defined territory such as Borno, constructed and re-constructed by 
the British and Nigerian administration, it could be tempting to raise the question 
of Bornoan nationalism. 
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42 Maurice Halbwachs, Morphologie Sociale (Paris: Colin, 1938). 
246 
 
6.2. The Postcolonial Survival of a Nineteenth-Century 
Nation 
6.2.1. The resilience of Borno 
 
The fact that the ancient empire of Kanem-Borno strode across 
postcolonial borders was partly responsible for a certain cultural revival in the 
Lake Chad basin. This could be considered as a typical case of colonial boundaries 
cutting pre-existing polities. For example, the Nigerian scholar Anthony Asiwaju 
often refers to the Kanuri as victims of the colonial Scramble for Africa. To a 
certain extent, the Kanuri are emblematic of the “Partitioned Africans” described 
in Asiwaju’s book’s title.43 
Twentieth-century examples of cooperation across international borders 
between Kanuri would tend to demonstrate that Borno still has an influence on 
its former empire. The Kanuri and Kanembu living in the area once dominated by 
the empire of Kanem-Borno have a clear sense of belonging to an assumed 
Kanuri nation. Ade Adefuye, a Nigerian historian found that a certain “Kanuri 
factor” is responsible to explain the Nigerian interventions during the Chadian 
civil war.44 Indeed, Nigeria supported a Kanuri Chadian, Aboubakar Abdel 
Rahman, in 1977 when the latter founded the “Third Liberation Army”. According 
to Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Maiduguri’s airport was even used by 
Gaddafi’s planes to bomb N’Djamena in 1980. According to Thompson and Adloff, 
the Nigerian authorities in Lagos were unaware of this military help.45 
Moreover, Bornoan people of Kanuri origin today tend to refer to 
themselves as belonging to the Kanuri Nation as well as belonging to Borno. The 
concept of the Kanuri nation is especially widely used by academics, who, across 
Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad borders have developed links under this 
umbrella term. For example, the conference entitled the “Kanem Borno 
                                            
43 Asiwaju, Partitioned Africans. 
44 Ade Adefuye, ‘The Kanuri Factor in Nigeria-Chad Relations’, Journal of the Historical Society of 
Nigeria, 3/4 (1984), 121-137. 
45 Jeune Afrique, 10 November 1980 quoted by Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Conflict in 
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Millennium and Yerwa Centenary” gathered academics from the Chad basin 
willing to underline the achievements of their shared history.46 The term “Kanuri 
nation” is not only used as a term to remember a prestigious past but also to 
impose the cultural predominance of the Kanuri in the region. For example, Kyari 
Tijani argued that without the European colonisation, there would exist 
nowadays a “borderless seamless” Islamic State centred on the Lake Chad basin 
and Borno.47 Thus, the proponents of a Kanuri nation never totally disappeared 
from the academic and political discourse. Bounded territoriality was never 
substituted for ethnicity. 
Indeed, some Kanuri-speaking inhabitants of Niger and Cameroon tend 
also to recognise themselves in this transnational cultural identity. The term 
‘identity’ is used here on purpose for its vague meaning as the Kanuri-speakers 
present in the neighbouring countries recognise cultural links with Borno. For 
example, in 2009, Kanuri delegates from Cameroon, Chad and Niger attended the 
coronation of the new Shehu of Borno and recognised Shehu Abubakar Ibn 
Garbai as their historical overlord.48 The transborder links evoked above always 
refer to a vague and distant past when the kings of Kanem-Borno ruled over the 
whole Lake Chad basin. In the words of the historian Kyari Tijani: 
This international boundary which today purports to firmly 
divide the citizens of Niger Republic on one side, from those of 
Nigeria on the other, in effect [...] divided a people with a common 
history, culture and tradition, a people who had once belonged to 
the ancient Kanuri Kingdom of Kanem-Borno.49 
                                            
46 Isa Umar Gusau, “Borno Empire marks 1000 years”, The Daily Trust, 13 November 2007, 
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The memory of a glorious distant past is thus entertained by 
Cameroonian, Chadian and Nigerien citizens regardless of the nineteenth-century 
history of Borno. As they were once part of the kingdom, the ancient political 
links can be re-activated in the name of a common history and culture. The fact 
that these regions were no longer part of the Kanemi kingdom during the 
nineteenth century is not relevant. Borno is no longer a region or a state but has 
become a cultural area with all the vagueness that entails. A certain form of 
ahistorical territoriality is thus promoted across the twenty-first century 
borders. 
The “Shugaba affair” of 1980 perfectly illustrates this ancient relationship 
between Kanuri across the border. This affair revolved around a Nigerian-born 
politician, Shugaba Abdurrahman Darman who was a Kanuri, son of a Nigerian 
woman and a Chadian father. Shugaba entered Nigerian politics in 1953 and was 
elected the head of the Borno House of Assembly with the Great Nigeria People’s 
Party (GNPP) in 1979. He was a political opponent of the National Party of 
Nigeria (NPN) which controlled the central government. As a result, Shehu 
Shagari’s government had him deported to Chad. Because of his political views, 
Shugaba was declared an alien. This political affair became rapidly known as the 
“Shugaba affair” by the media of the one-year old Nigerian democratic Second 
Republic.50 For the Nigerian ruling party, Shugaba was a Kanuri whose links with 
the rest of the Kanuri in Chad made him a foreigner. For Shugaba’s supporters, 
the latter was not a foreigner but a genuine Nigerian politician with deep roots in 
Borno.51 
Shugaba went to the High Court of Maiduguri and challenged the decision 
of the Nigerian federal government. The plaintiff won the case and became the 
political symbol of ethnic minorities split across international boundaries. For 
scholars such as Adigun or Asiwaju, this affair epitomised the resistance of 
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ancient ethnic solidarities across international boundaries. 52  However, the 
Shugaba case also proved that Nigerian national politics could foster a real sense 
of Nigerian belonging for many politicians. Shugaba was not only a Kanuri with 
links on various sides of Lake Chad; he was also a Nigerian eager to participate to 
Nigerian politics. Most authors eager to stress how artificial these borders were, 
forgot to mention that the Shugaba affair also demonstrated a strong sense of 
belonging to the Nigerian nation. Shugaba himself in front of the Court declared: 
that my Nigerian Nationality and my Kanuri origins had never been 
doubted or questioned in the political and social life in Borno State and 
beyond […] that in 1969, I was an inaugural member of the Association for 
the preservation of Kanuri culture.53 
As analysed earlier, the regions cut off by the colonial borders had not 
been within Borno’s grasp for at least two hundred years. The affiliation with the 
Kanem-Borno empire was used as a pretext to accuse Shugaba of being an alien. 
The political motivations behind these accusations were obvious for many an 
observer. The Nigerian lawyer, Ajayi stressed how fallacious these attacks 
were.54 The Kanuri sense of belonging even if real, is also complementary with a 
genuine Nigerian sense of belonging. 
The fact that Borno shares transborder links with other regions across the 
border was also used economically to promote exchanges between Niger, Chad, 
Cameroon and Nigeria.55 As in the case of the “Shugaba affair”, there is no 
denying that Borno shares cultural and economic links with its Kanuri 
neighbours. 
It could be argued that smuggling has existed for a long period in the 
border zones. The boundaries of Nigeria have been subverted by Kanuri trading 
with their ethnic fellows across the borders. As in the case of Ghana studied by 
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Nugent, “contraband trade has helped to render the border more legitimate”.56 
Smuggling can only exist if a population uses the opportunities offered by the 
presence of the border. Thus instead of rejecting it, border-dwellers would accept 
the boundary. Peter Sahlins already noticed this phenomenon in the French and 
Spanish borderlands. In his study of the Cerdanya region in the Eastern Pyrenees 
from 1659 to 1868, he argued that local populations felt as much attached to 
their local villages as to their respective States, namely the kingdoms of France 
and Spain. Sahlins proved that the presence of a border separating an ethnic or 
culturally homogenous society would not automatically entail a rejection of the 
border.57 
Could we argue the same about Borno and its neighbours? Interviews on 
both sides of the borders in the villages of Banki in Nigeria and Amchidé in 
Cameroon seem to reach the same conclusion.58 Not only did people from both 
sides of the borders benefit from the presence of the border, but they also 
demonstrated a sense of Cameroonian and Nigerian national identity. This does 
not mean however that a sense of belonging to Borno is disappearing. The 
geographer, Karine Bennafla studied the economic links in the area and 
emphasised the extent to which Bornoan rich families profit from the border 
trade in Banki.59 
The main legal commodities are so-called “French” products from the 
Cameroonian side whereas the illegal Nigerian products overflow the 
Cameroonian market. From the Cameroonian side, traders legally and illegally 
import into Nigeria soap and rice. Strikingly, electricity is smuggled from 
Cameroon into Nigeria. Thus, instead of being connected to the notoriously 
unreliable Nigerian Electricity network, Banki obtains its electricity from the 
                                            
56 Nugent, Smugglers, Secessionists & Loyal Citizens on the Ghana-Togo Frontier, p.7. 
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Cameroonian network.60 From the Nigerian side, traders smuggle into Cameroon 
petrol called “zoua-zoua”, cigarettes and overwhelm Cameroon with Nigerian 
products. It has been estimated that two thirds of Cameroonian petrol is actually 
Nigerian.61 Thus, borderland dwellers seem to profit from the opportunities 
offered by their position. 
As mentioned above, borderland dwellers also demonstrate an important 
feature. Despite their common Kanuri, Shuwa or Fulani background, all 
interviewed witnesses stress their nationality as being an integral part of their 
borderland life. As Flynn already proved on the Benin-Niger segment, local 
communities also tend to assimilate with their national States.62 Thus, the 
interviewees on both sides of the border stressed their symbiotic relationship 
with the border. Amchidé on the Cameroonian side especially demonstrated a 
deep attachment to the boundary as the settlement was founded around 1960 to 
profit from trading opportunities offered by the Nigerian border.63 
Moreover, it can be argued that this borderland twin-town attracted 
populations which were not until recently present in the area. Obviously traders 
from Western Africa but also money changers often travel to Banki-Amchidé.64 A 
more permanent population is also to be taken into account as the Cameroonian 
and Nigerian customs employ citizens from other parts of Cameroon and Nigeria. 
Interviewed custom officers always underlined their belonging to the wider 
nation of either Cameroon or Nigeria.65 The 1990s and 2000s frictions between 
both countries can also explain the presence of a large number of soldiers in the 
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area.66 Of course, this last phenomenon is fairly recent and before the 1990s, it 
could be argued that the official presence of both States was not as strong. 
However, even if important, this part of the border population is not 
preponderant. As mentioned above, there is still a strong sense of belonging to 
Borno in this region. 
Analysts who argue that ethnic ties are stronger than national ones often 
tend to forget that economic exchanges are creations from above by national 
governments.67 It would seem that transborder economic exchanges increased 
because of stimuli from national governments. Thus, the “Kanuri factor” in the 
exchanges across the Nigerian borders seems to be more an answer to external 
factors than a specific Kanuri commercial atavism. This does not mean that the 
links between some ancient parts of Kanem-Borno were entirely re-discovered 
by inhabitants of Niger, Cameroon or Chad. Yet, it would seem that the trade 
corridor going from Ghana to Chad along the northern Nigerian border is fairly 
recent. The term “Kanuri factor” would only be used to qualify a segment of 
transborder trade determined from above and not from below. 
The promotion of the Kanem-Borno ties in a certain historiography would 
thus correspond to the re-invention of tradition. The “Kanuri factor” seems to be 
a postcolonial understanding of a vague cultural identity. Economically and 
politically, Borno has been dependent on Northern Nigeria since colonial times.68 
The territory of Borno was absorbed mentally and administratively by the 
colonial administrators. Whether for economic or political reason, there was no 
reason for this situation to entirely change from 1960 to 2010. Thus, the “Kanuri 
factor” is historically genuine but it was reconstructed by national governments 
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and the inhabitants of the border regions eager to benefit from new 
opportunities. The scale of this re-invention seems limited but real. 
Some politicians eager to obtain support from their voters did not hesitate 
either to call on Kanuri feelings. The most striking example is the governor of 
Yobe State who, in 2001, desired the rise of a Kanuri nation. The Lagos 
newspaper, This Day reported: 
The widely reported call by Yobe State Governor, Bukar Abba Ibrahim on 
the Kanuri nation to arise and unite in order to come into her rightful 
position in the land (This Day, January 9, 2001, page 4) constitutes a 
landmark pronouncement at a time like this when the massive North that 
the Sardauna built, of which the Kanuri nation is an integral part, faces the 
greatest challenge to its unity and influence. 
Governor Bukar Abba Ibrahim said the unity he envisaged would accord 
due recognition to the Kanuri heritage of a superior civilisation, 
bequeathed by the Kanem-Borno Empire which should fire the spirit of 
the descendants and promote the socio-economic advancement of the 
Kanuri nation of today, and of generations unborn.69 
In the Nigerian context, this grandiloquent call for a “Kanuri nation” could 
be nothing more than a political gamble from someone using ethnic politics. It 
might be suggested that this “nationalist” sense of belonging could be created by 
politicians. Would Bukar Abba Ibrahim have claimed that the Kanuri were a 
“superior civilisation” if the latter did not have to vote for him? Some politicians’ 
demagogy could thus explain how the term “nation” can be used in Yobe and 
Borno. 
Furthermore, academics can also be seen as eager to foster a certain kind 
of Bornoan nationalism. Benedict Anderson and Marie-Anne Thiesse stressed 
academics’ role in the shaping of European national identities in the nineteenth 
century.70 The Nigerian politics of belonging tend to foster the creation of 
powerful universities in each State. As an indirect result, the University of 
Maiduguri maintains this nationalism which in turn is manipulated by politicians. 
                                            
69  Ola Amupitan, This Day, 22 January 2001, 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/nexis/docview/getDocForCuiReq?lni=4263-0JT0-0040-
T3DW&csi=8320&oc=00240&perma=true [accessed 19 September 2011]. 
70 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism., 
10th edn (London: Verso, 2000), and Anne-Marie Thiesse, La Création Des Identités Nationales : 
Europe  XVIIIe-XXe Siècle (Paris: Seuil, 1999). 
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The conference “Kanem Borno Millennium and Yerwa Centenary” was a perfect 
example of this symbiosis between politicians and academics when in his speech, 
the governor of Borno State, Ali Modu Sheriff promoted the study of the history 
of Kanem-Borno.71 The precise relationship between politics and academics in 
Borno and Yobe still remains to be explored. However, the previous examples of 
scholarly-minded colonial officers prove that the usage of history by academics 
and politicians is not unheard-of in Borno. 
Nonetheless, the role of academics and politicians in this domain should 
not be exaggerated as Bornoan people also recognise themselves as part of the 
Nigerian nation. Obviously, facing this primordialist Bornoan nationalism, 
Nigerian nationalism would appear as a very modern artificial construction. The 
case of different belongings in an African State is not specific to Nigeria. However, 
Borno nationalism is neither a sub-layer of Nigerian nationalism nor an old-
school nationalism facing a new Nigerian nationalism trying to build a nation-
state. 
The ethno-nationalism described above is one of the consequences of the 
politics of belonging in Nigeria. This phenomenon, which was already widely 
studied in 1950s Nigeria, reinforced some of the pre-existing ethnic identities. 
The Borno Youth Movement mentioned before was an example of these ethnic 
politics. Political parties could only hope to obtain power if they based their 
discourse on ethnicity. 
In 1991, the newly created Yobe State was still culturally part of Borno. 
The creation of the new State of Yobe could indicate that Bornoan nationalism 
was not strong enough to maintain the existence of the State of Borno as a whole. 
Paradoxically, one could argue the opposite. A certain form of Bornoan 
nationalism still prevails in this Yobe State as clearly demonstrated by the Emir 
of Damaturu. The latter, like his counterpart in Maiduguri, is also an heir of the 
nineteenth-century rulers of the kingdom of Borno and styles himself Shehu. In 
addition, titles from the Shehu’s court in Maiduguri were duplicated in Damaturu 
and Dikwa. 
                                            
71 This Day, 22 January 2001. 
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Figure 35: Localisation of Damaturu and Maiduguri 
 
When Sani Abacha created a new presidential system in 1995, he 
suggested that “six key executive and legislative offices” should be attributed to 
six geographic zones in Nigeria.72 In other terms, power should be shared 
according to the geographical origin of the politicians. According to Paden,  one of 
these six geographic zones corresponded to the cultural zone of Borno.73 
However, this  informal North-East region covered the States of Adamawa, 
Bauchi, Gombe, Taraba which were never part of Borno. Nonetheless, it could still 
be argued that the creation of the new Yobe State did not totally destroy the 
cultural framework present in Nigeria as Borno could still exist under a different 
form.74 Even if modified, this unofficial division still exists in 2011 as the 
interests of Borno are represented by this North-East zone. Thus at a federal 
level, Borno still plays a certain role in the informal political zoning of Nigeria. 
                                            
72 Jega, Identity Transformation and Identity Politics under Structural Adjustment in Nigeria, p. 51. 
73 Quoted by Jega, Identity Transformation and Identity Politics under Structural Adjustment in 
Nigeria, p. 60; John Paden, ‘Nigerian Unity and the Tensions of Democracy: The Implications of 
the “North-South” Legacies’  presented at the Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria, Madison: 
University of Wisconsin, 1995). For another version of Paden’s argument, see John Paden, 
‘Nigerian Unity and the Tensions of Democracy: Geo-Cultural Zones and North-South Legacies’, in 
Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria, ed. by Paul Beckett and Crawford Young (Rochester: 
University of Rochester Press, 1997), pp. 243-245. 
74 J. Isawa Elaigwu, ‘Federalism in Nigeria’s New Democratic Polity’, Publius, 32 (2002), 73-95. 
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At a local level, Borno has not disappeared either. In Dikwa in particular, 
the creation of the new Shehu in 2010 involved the recreation of a title which had 
officially disappeared in 1937 when the British made the then-Shehu of Dikwa, 
Shehu of all Borno. The new Shehu of Dikwa, Abba Tor Shehu Masta II, clearly 
expressed his Bornoan feelings in his first official speech as Shehu: 
I [..] give thanks to the Borno State Governor, Senator Ali Modu 
Sheriff, for making it possible for me to become the Shehu of 
Dikwa.[…] "Today every El-Kanemi that you know descends from 
Shehu Al-Amin el-Kanemi; and when el-Kanemi died his three 
sons, Umar, Ibrahim and Hashim ruled. When Hashim died his 
eldest son, Bukar took over as the Shehu of Dikwa; Bukar's first 
son was Shehu Sanda Kyarimi, followed by my father, Shehu 
Masta. So that was my lineage and that explains why there is 
nobody that can claim more legitimacy within the El-Kanemi 
descends to the throne in Dikwa better that myself.75 
 The internal politics of Borno State led to the duplication of titles of 
Shehus. Governor-Senator Sheriff was directly responsible for the re-creation of 
this office.  
In addition, the Emirate of Dikwa was divided into two parts as the new 
Shehu desired to have his palace in Dikwa. The “traditional authority” of Bama 
simply became an “emir”. 
My father was the Shehu of Dikwa in 1927. The colonial master 
came to relocate the headquarters from Dikwa to Bama in 1941. 
But by grace of God his son is taking back that throne to Dikwa.76 
The Emirate of Dikwa’s spatial identity was only resurrected in its 
historical dimension for the new Shehu. The sense of continuity expressed by the 
new Shehu was thus expressed in dynastic but also in territorial terms. The 
source of the Shehu’s legitimacy can thus be traced back to two origins. The first 
one is the nineteenth-century legitimacy of the Kanemi family who ruled over the 
                                            
75  Abba Tor Shehu Masta II, 28 March 2010 in Daily Independent, 29 March 2010 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/nexis/docview/getDocForCuiReq?lni=7Y49-NGM0-Y9KG-
Y201&csi=8320&oc=00240&perma=true [accessed 19 September 2011]. 
76  Abba Tor Shehu Masta II, 28 March 2010 in Daily Independent, 29 March 2010 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/nexis/docview/getDocForCuiReq?lni=7Y49-NGM0-Y9KG-
Y201&csi=8320&oc=00240&perma=true [accessed 19 September 2011]. 
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territory of Borno. The second source is the colonial division between British and 
German Borno which led to the creation of the title of Shehu of Dikwa. Clearly, 
the new Shehu of Dikwa used two different precolonial and colonial historical 
and territorial layers to be promoted Shehu. 
Is the territorial identity of Borno compromised by the creation of a new 
State such as Yobe or a new Emirate such as Dikwa? The endless fragmentation 
of the Nigerian political scene could mean the end of spatial structures created by 
the Europeans. Nonetheless, the creation of new territories is always expressed 
in terms which are directly contained within the pre-existing framework of 
Borno. The new State of Yobe or the Emirate of Dikwa did not cut across the 
borders of the colonial province of Borno, they only recycled some of the pre-
existing borders. Every time these new entities had to express their spatial 
identity, they referred to the Bornoan space. Rhetorically, the reference to Borno 
is omnipresent. Not only because of its history but because of the spatial 
practices inherited from the colonisation and the Nigerian political context, the 
Bornoan political space has survived in the twenty-first century. 
By consequence, the multiplication of states in Nigeria also promoted to a 
certain extent Bornoan nationalism within the federal framework. The Nigerian 
politics of belonging, which promoted the creation of new States to foster the 
idea of a Nigeria nation, paradoxically encouraged a certain form of Bornoan 
nationalism. This is the reason why, Bornoan nationalism is not a mere 
regionalism and is even encouraged by Nigerian politics. However, this 
nationalism seems to lose its spatial aspect because of the fragmentation of the 
political and administrative framework in Nigeria. The next section will argue 
that Bornoan and Nigerian nationalism are complementary under a spatial angle.  
 
 
 
 
6.2.2. The nations of Nigeria and Borno 
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Territorial nationalism is the exact type of nationalism that Nigeria has 
been trying to foster for the last 60 years. This section will show that the 
particular Bornoan form of civic and territorial nationalism has a direct influence 
on Nigerian nationalism. This section will not defend the existence of an 
oppositional Kanuri nationalism but will suggest the continuation of Bornoan 
nationalism in accordance with Nigerian nationalism. It is not an ethnic but a 
civic nationalism which ties Bornoans and Nigerians together. This distinction 
will be relevant as the debate between ethnicity and nationalism can be avoided. 
Thus, this section will not focus its attention on the Kanuri but more on the 
spatial form of Bornoan nationalism within Nigeria. Thus, to become a nation, 
Nigeria captured the territorial heritage of Borno. 
Firstly, it would seem that the political weight of Borno within the 
Nigerian federation is particularly light. Indeed, most political parties present in 
Borno do not show any kind of Bornoan nationalist agenda and are fully part of 
the Nigerian political game. Thus, it would be possible to argue that Bornoan 
nationalism does not constitutionally have any form of political significance in 
modern-day Nigeria. Yet, an analysis of the voting patterns of Borno highlights a 
few singularities. 
Indeed, as far as election results can be considered as trustworthy, it is 
possible to isolate one trend in the electoral results of Borno. For most 
gubernatorial elections, Bornoan voters chose a political party different from the 
main northern political party. Thus, most civilian governors did not belong to the 
major Northern political party. In 1979, Mohammed Goni the first civilian 
governor was from the same political party as Shugaba, the Greater Nigerian 
People’s Party. Only Gongola State voted for the same political party. In 2011, 
Yobe and Borno States were the only two States of the federation to vote for the 
All Nigeria’s People Party. Thus, Kashim Shettima became governor of Borno 
while Ibrahim Geidam was elected as governor of Yobe.77 It could be argued that 
local ballots always tend to be different from national elections. Indeed, in 
presidential elections, Borno always voted for the same candidate as the rest of 
                                            
77  See the results on the official Nigerian website for the 2011 elections: 
http://www.inecnigeria.org/results/gubernatorial/ [accessed 13 October 2011]. 
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the North. The argument of political singularity is thus better understood at a 
regional level. 
The main explanation for this phenomenon is the competition for the 
leadership in the North between Sokoto and Borno. Since the intense political 
competition in the 1950s, Sokoto seemed to have won the leadership race in the 
North.78 Indeed after 1945, Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto was responsible 
for the intense “Northernization” of the politics and administration of the 
Northern Region. In order to secure jobs in the civil service for Northerners and 
not Southerners, he tried to create political and personal links with the 
politicians of Borno. The latter benefitted from these policies as they obtained 
proportionally more jobs than their Northern Nigerians counterparts.79 Thus, it 
would be necessary to insert Borno within a wider Nigerian North. Since the 
British conquest, Borno’s destiny has been linked to the fate of the former Sokoto 
caliphate. However, its position as part of the Nigerian North has always been 
ambiguous. 
The precolonial competition between Sokoto and Borno helped build a 
national Bornoan identity within what became Nigeria. The case of two States 
waging war against each other created rivalries which are still visible. Both the 
Sultan of Sokoto and Shehu of Borno became “first-class” emirs within Northern 
Nigeria. However, the former had the priority over the latter in the official Chiefly 
Order of Precedence.80 As Ahmadu Bello proved it in the 1950s and 1960s, Borno 
can be sometimes considered as politically separate from the rest of the North. 
The historian, John Paden even described Borno as still a “world apart unto itself” 
in 1956.81 
Nonetheless, these differences should not be exaggerated. According to 
the last 2006 census in Nigeria, Kanuri account for more than 6% of the 
population of Nigeria. The Kanuri seem to have provided Nigeria with more 
                                            
78 Richard Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second 
Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 146. 
79 Paden, Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto, p. 341. 
80 Alhaji M. Yakubu, ‘Coercing Old Guard Emirs in Northern Nigeria: The Abdication of Yakubu III 
of Bauchi, 1954’, African Affairs, 92 (1993), 595. 
81 Paden, Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto, p. 340. 
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statesmen than their share of the Nigerian population would indicate. As 
mentioned above, in the context of the “Northernization” of politics in the 1950s, 
numerous Bornoans were part of the civil service. How can we explain the 
disproportion between the relatively high number of Kanuri holding positions in 
Nigeria and their minor demographic importance? The first explanation offered 
by Paden was that the presence of Kanuri civil servants assured the continued 
loyalty of Borno for the “North” of Ahmadu Bello.82 The presence of Bornoans in 
the Nigerian administration and army was not only a phenomenon of the 1950s. 
Other Kanuri from Borno such as Kashim Ibrahim, Ibrahim Imam, Baba Gana 
Kingibe or Shuwa Arabs such as Musa Daggash83 distinguished themselves in the 
recent history of Nigeria. It is possible to argue that a statesmanship tradition 
exists in Borno because of the prolonged existence of a State in the Chad basin. 
However, in the absence of detailed studies of these politicians, this argument 
only remains a hypothesis. 
Moreover as a minority within Nigeria, the Kanuri can be perceived as 
potential rulers for the whole country. Instead of choosing a member of one of 
the three main ethnic groups (Hausa, Igbo or Yoruba) the Nigerians can choose to 
support a member of a relatively small ethnic minority. This already happened 
with Yakubu Gowon (1966-1975) who was from the Ngas ethnic group in the 
Plateau State. The Kanuri represent a possible political alternative to other 
Northerners such as the Hausa. The attitude of Bornoan political leaders during 
the civil war was emblematic of this situation. As members of an ethnic minority, 
Bornoan politicians were eager to maintain the unity of the country. A Shuwa 
Arab from Borno, Musa Daggash was for example working in Lagos during the 
Civil War. While working in various Federal Ministries, he was one of the 
Northerners sent to Lagos as set out by the policy of Nigerianisation undertaken 
since the 1950s.84 Major-General Joseph Garba remembered Daggash: 
                                            
82 Paden, Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto, pp. 341–342. 
83 Yakubu Mukhtar, Musa Daggash: The Story of a Shuwa Arab Boy (Ibadan: Heinemann 
Educational books (Nigeria), 2002). I would like to thank the author who gave me a copy of his 
book. 
84 Mukhtar, pp. 147–188. 
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But his action not only shows why people have held Daggash in 
high esteem for his fair-mindedness, but it even more importantly 
shows the commitment of senior Northern civil servants in Lagos 
to keeping the country one.85 
It is by consequence impossible to totally disaggregate Bornoan 
nationalism from a wider Nigerian nationalism. In this specific case, two factors 
play an important role in the Nigerian politics of belonging: the fact that a strong 
Bornoan statesmanship exists and the active role of ethnic minorities such as the 
Kanuri in maintaining Nigeria as a whole. 
Indeed, the Nigerian government attempted to foster a national identity in 
Nigeria for Nigerian citizens. When Gowon created in 1973 a National Youth 
Service Corps, he meant to create a national identity for all the new graduates 
from the Nigerian universities. Measures to promote Nigerian and no other forms 
of citizenship were also used by Presidents Mohammad and Obasanjo. The 1977 
Festival of Black and African Arts and Culture (FESTAC) wanted to promote 
Nigerian identity while showcasing the so-called ‘traditional’ Nigerian cultures.86 
The ‘civic’ form of nationalism was thus introduced for Nigeria as a whole. 
Bornoan nationalism was used to promote Nigerian nationalism as Kanuri 
horsemen were displayed in a great parade in Kaduna.87 According to Major-
General Haruna, chairman of Nigeria’s National Participation Committee for 
FESTAC, this parade was meant to imitate twelfth-century Kanem-Borno when 
“the mai Dunama Humaimi [the forerunner of the Shehu of Borno] could put 
100,000 horsemen and 20,000 infantry and an impressive personal guard into 
the field”.88 The link between ancient Borno and modern Nigeria was thus 
operated under a cultural angle. More specifically the military might of the 
twelfth-century kingdom of Kanem was projected onto 1977 Nigeria. 
                                            
85 Joseph Garba, Revolution in Nigeria: Another View (London: Africa Books, 1982), p. 70, quoted 
by Mukhtar, p. 147. 
86 Andrew Apter, The Pan-African Nation: Oil and the Spectacle of Culture in Nigeria (Chicago: 
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As in the case of the Gold Coast taking the name of Ghana or Dahomey 
choosing the name Benin, historical precedence was used by postcolonial Nigeria 
to assert its position. As for Ghana or Benin, the kingdom of Kanem was not 
exactly located within the borders of the state claiming its inheritance. It did not 
matter for the Nigerian leaders eager to obtain territorial legitimacy just as the 
British had during the colonial period. The same causes produced the same 
effects. Why would the Nigerian federal state shun such an opportunity for 
historical legitimacy? 
The attitude of the Nigeria government in the 1990s and 2000s was 
symptomatic of this phenomenon. Indeed, the redefinition of the international 
border between Nigeria and Cameroon from 1992 to 2002 proved to what extent 
Bornoan and Nigerian nationalism were linked. 
The events which proved the strength of this tie did not find their origin in 
Borno but in the south of Nigeria, in Bakassi. Cameroon and Nigeria fought over 
the oil-rich Bakassi peninsula located hundreds of kilometres away from Borno. 
Indeed, the 2002 ruling of the International Court of Justice principally dealt with 
the Bakassi Peninsula located at the south of the Nigeria-Cameroon border 
segment.89 However, the resolution of the conflict concerned Borno as the 
Cameroonian and Nigerians exchanged a few villages located in present-day 
Borno around Lake Chad. This meagre compensation for the loss of the Bakassi 
Peninsula revealed an aspect of Bornoan nationalism. 
Indeed, most interviewed Bornoans strongly supported the position of 
Nigeria in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). An environmental phenomenon 
is the main cause for this support. As Lake Chad was shrinking in 1990s Borno, 
the drought provoked an internal emigration of fishermen who simply followed 
the lake.90 These Nigerian fishermen had thus crossed the pre-2002 border and 
created tensions between Cameroon and Nigeria. Besides, as the ICJ judgment 
put it, the Nigerian federal State and Borno State “manifest[ed] sovereignty” in 
these areas. According to the Nigerian counter-memorial sent to the ICJ, the 
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Nigerian federal State and Borno State conducted censuses, raised taxes, 
appointed local rulers, built hospitals and schools.91 
The Nigerian federal State even argued: 
[If ruled by Cameroon] the people and the territory would [...] be torn 
from their traditional cultural communities, as well as their traditional ties 
to and rule by His Royal Highness, the Shehu of Borno.92 
 
The map itself implies that the territories used to be part of Borno. 
 
 
Figure 36: Borno in the nineteenth century according to the Nigerian Government 
in 1999.93 
 
Therefore, because Nigeria owns Borno, these villages should be part of 
Nigeria. This historical syllogism proves the degree of collaboration between the 
two forms of nationalism. On the one hand, Bornoan nationalism reinforces 
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Nigerian nationalism. On the other hand, Nigerian nationalism defends the right 
for the Bornoan nationalism to exist because it suits the Nigerian interests. 
As in 1959 and 1961, the Bornoan territory was utilised as a historical 
argument for the International Court of Justice. The reappropriation by Nigeria of 
the British spatial practices is thus significant. The comparison between the 
arguments submitted to the ICJ is eloquent. In 1961 and 1999, the territory of 
Borno was a historical given for the British and Nigerian administration. 
 
Conclusion 
The trajectory of the territory of Borno is atypical in Nigeria and Africa. As 
its territory already existed in the nineteenth century and during the colonial 
times, Borno did not totally disappear from the map of postcolonial Nigeria. The 
survival of the territorial framework was undertaken at two different levels. The 
first one was at a purely administrative level with the creation of one and later 
two States claiming their ancient Bornoan heritage. Secondly, the territory of 
Borno is also part of nationalist strategies of the ancient Bornoan elite, 
politicians, academics and Nigerian politicians who successfully combined 
Bornoan and Nigerian nationalisms. 
Since 1960, Bornoan nationalism has nearly always operated within the 
Nigerian federal framework. As in the case of borderlands studied by Peel, 
Sahlins, Flynn or Nugent, the issue of Borno being part of Nigeria or not was 
nearly never questioned. The creation of new States and the defence of the 
Nigerian territory engineered a new relationship between the Nigerian and 
Bornoan nationalisms. This relationship heavily relies on the Nigerian political 
environment but also on the strength of Bornoan nationalism. 
However, how should the very specificity of Borno in independent Nigeria 
be described? If one considers the fact that Borno became a State in 1976 but was 
divided into two parts in 1991, Borno would just be a classical example of the 
fragmentation of the Nigerian federation. This means that the Nigerian political 
game is currently modifying the spatial matrix inherited from the nineteenth 
century. This process started by the Europeans was thus not interrupted by the 
decolonisation of Nigeria. 
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Pragmatism seems the golden rule when considering the Nigerian attitude 
towards the territory of Borno in the end of the twentieth century. The territory 
inherited from the British could be promoted to the rank of State but could also 
be split into two parts. The borders of nineteenth-century Borno could once 
again be summoned in a judicial battle against the Cameroonian neighbour. This 
pragmatic attitude could lead on the one hand to the disappearance of the 
territory of Borno but on the other hand to the reappropriation of Bornoan 
spatial practices. In other terms, the territory and borders of Borno might 
become Nigerian but the federal State would inherit the nineteenth-century 
borders of Borno as its own. 
Is the territory of Borno disappearing in the federation of Nigeria or is it 
surviving in another form? Is the territory so diligently recomposed by the 
British falling apart? Fifty years after the end of the British colonisation, the 
situation is not clear. It seems that the territory of Borno is becoming more a 
cultural region than a territorial entity for three main reasons. 
Firstly, as seen previously, politicians and academics are prone to 
instrumentalise the territory and Borno when it suits them. This situation leads 
to a fragmentation of political power but also to the promotion of the symbolic 
power of the heirs of a certain vague past when Borno was the master of the 
Chad basin. 
Secondly, this discourse leads to the transborder fantasy which would 
analyse all political and economic events in Borno in the light of the transnational 
links between Kanuri speakers. This section will thus argue that it is possible to 
evoke the existence of a “Kanuri factor”. However, this phrase is too vague to 
explain the complex economic, political and ethnic relationship of the Lake Chad 
basin. It is its usage for political or academic reasons which is fundamental. 
Thirdly, Bornoan nationalism even if contained within Nigerian 
nationalism tends to become more cultural than a territorial. The trajectory of 
this nationalism is thus peculiar. More territorial in the nineteenth century and 
the colonial times, this nationalism has evolved in independent Nigeria. 
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In 1998, Christopher Clapham argued that the main feat of the African 
postcolonial States was their constant struggle for survival.94 Survival is the 
keyword. Entities such as Borno should also be included in this statement. 
Indeed, Borno is a complex geopolitical structure which has survived until the 
beginning of the twenty-first century. Of course, as with any other territory, 
Borno is a construction, but the construction even if modified by the British, the 
Nigerians and the Bornoans themselves still stands. It can be argued that the 
survival of states such as Nigeria partly depended on the survival of other 
territorial entities such as Borno in their midst. 
                                            
94 Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival 
(Cambridge University Press, 2002), introduction. 
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Conclusion 
 
One of the initial findings of this study was that two twenty-first century 
segments of the Nigerian borders were directly inherited from the nineteenth-
century polity of Borno. Thus, the Nigerian border on the Komadugu Yobe river 
was already the border of Borno in the nineteenth century. Moreover, the 
boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria corresponds to the former limits of 
Borno proper at the end of the nineteenth century. In other terms, in this specific 
case, the Nigerian borders were neither artificial European creations nor were 
they totally arbitrary. 
However, this thesis does not argue that every twenty-first century border 
of Borno matches rigorously its late nineteenth-century ancestor. This study does 
not deal with geographical accuracy but with the transmission of concepts about 
border and territory as it demonstrates that the colonial borders of Nigeria’s 
north eastern area were always conceived as the borders of Borno. Right or 
wrong, this assumption led presumed nineteenth-century borders to be adopted 
within the Nigerian colonial framework before becoming the borders of the 
independent State of Nigeria. 
The territory and the borders of Borno are the protagonists of this study. 
Just as Braudel chose to analyse the Mediterranean Sea rather than Philip II, this 
study focuses more on spatial phenomena than on political figures or events. This 
thesis does not have the pretention to rival Braudel’s scope but rather tries to 
emulate the latter’s attention to longue durée.1 Thus, this research spans over two 
centuries (1810-2010) and reveals the extent to which these borders were not 
totally invented by the Europeans when they colonised the Lake Chad basin. Its 
ambition is to create an “intellectual history of ideas” of space and borders in 
Borno to paraphrase Robert Darnton.2 
                                            
1 Fernand Braudel, La Méditerranée Et Le Monde Méditerranéen [ L’époque De Philippe II (Paris: 
Colin, 1949). 
2 Robert Darnton develops the concept of “The social history of ideas” in Robert Darnton, The kiss 
of Lamourette: reflections in cultural history (London: Faber, 1990), pp. 219-252. 
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This study is thus concerned with the continuity of Bornoan spatiality but 
tries also to highlight historical turning points for the history of the kingdom. 
Nineteenth-century Borno created the blueprint for the future Nigerian province 
but did not entirely pre-determine the shape of colonial Borno. The colonial era 
was not a “simple episode” of Bornoan History either as it was the period which 
transformed the conception of Bornoan space. Postcolonial Nigeria did not totally 
inherit spatial practices from its predecessor as it also modified the semantic 
value attached to the former nineteenth-century kingdom. In other words, longue 
durée does not mean determinism. 
In 1970, Anene was right when he wished that further studies of the 
historical layers behind the Nigerian borders should be written.3 One important 
conclusion of this current study was that Europeans could take some African 
borders into account when needed. The idea is not to justify or defend the 
existence of these borders but to explain their origin. This argument is neither 
totally new nor an isolated case. Touval had already stressed this phenomenon in 
1966.4 According to the latter, the British and the French took into account local 
borders when they created the border between Nigeria and Dahomey.5 Nugent 
also highlighted how the border separating Ghana and Togo followed a 
nineteenth-century “geopolitical logic”.6 Thom also argued that the Europeans 
were ready to modify their borders when they tried to respect the extent of the 
caliphate of Sokoto.7 Geographically, this present study fills the space between 
Sokoto and Lake Chad by demonstrating that the British and the French 
considered local borders along the Nigeria-Niger border in their negotiations. 
More importantly, this treatment of the local borders was prolonged on the 
southern shores of Lake Chad where the British, French and Germans were in 
search of the legitimacy of the territory of Borno to delimitate their colonial 
possessions. 
                                            
3 Anene, The international boundaries of Nigeria, 1885-1960, p. XVI. 
4 Touval, 'Treaties, Borders, and the Partition of Africa'. 
5 Gooch and Temperley, British documents on the origins of the war 1898-1914, I, 141. 
6 Nugent, Smugglers, secessionists & loyal citizens on the Ghana-Togo frontier, p. 46. 
7 Thom, The Niger-Nigeria boundary 1890-1906. 
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At an African scale, Touval already proved that the Nigerian case was not 
totally idiosyncratic either.8 For instance, he mentioned the 1890 modification of 
the border between Kenya and Tanganyika which attempted to respect the 
British claims on Taveta and the German demands on Chagga. In 1964, the 
historian A.J. Wills also stressed the importance of the kingdom of Barotse in the 
British-Portuguese boundary negotiations of 1891. As both countries could not 
find an agreement, the king of Italy had to arbitrate the conflict and had to 
estimate the actual extent of Barotseland. In this logic, the Barotse kingdom 
became part of Northern Rhodesia while its supposed borders separated it from 
the Portuguese colony of Angola. The Europeans thus tried to define political 
territoriality in the Upper Zambezi region.9 
Would Borno be another Barotseland? It is true that it would be tempting 
to describe the colonisation of Borno as a typical European endeavour to obtain 
territorial legitimacy in their colony. Borno would thus be an extreme but not 
exceptional case of European thirst for territorial legitimacy. 
Furthermore, as demonstrated in the first chapter of this study, the main 
difference between Borno and many other parts of Africa was that Bornoan 
inhabitants had a distinct sense of borders and territoriality in the nineteenth 
century. The empire of Kanem-Borno was no more but its successor had in some 
areas clear-cut borders. In addition, it would be difficult to deny that a strong 
territorial structure existed in nineteenth-century Borno. This thesis argued that 
this nineteenth-century structure was key to understanding the attitude of the 
nineteenth and twentieth-century invaders. No case-study should be generalised 
to the rest of Africa. Nonetheless, nineteenth-century Borno could join the small 
group of nineteenth-century African polities with a clear sense of territoriality 
such as Asante10 or Buganda.11 Borno thus illustrates perfectly the great variety 
of political entities existing in Africa at the eve of the European colonisation. 
                                            
8 Touval, ‘Treaties, Borders, and the Partition of Africa’. 
9 Alfred Wills, An Introduction to the History of Central Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 
1964), pp.161-165 and Achim von Oppen, “Bounding villages. The enclosure of locality in Central 
Africa, 1890s to 1990s”  Habilitationschrift: Humboldt University of Berlin, 2003), chapter 3. I 
would like to thank the author for communicating his Habilitationschrift. I am also grateful to 
Wolfgang Zeller who helped me find this reference which is currently under review of Palgrave. 
10 Wilks, Asante in the nineteenth century. 
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Furthermore, when analysing chronologically the various invaders, a 
pattern appears as the latter repeatedly recycled the territory of Borno for their 
own benefit. Thus, Rabih saw himself as the successor of the Shehus of Borno; the 
French, Germans and British all tried to reinstitute an El-Kanemi heir at the head 
of Borno. Instead of destroying a pre-existing structure, every single invader 
tried to use the territory of Borno for its own benefit. Like cuckoos laying their 
eggs in the nests of other birds, Rabih and the Europeans profited from the 
habitat provided by Borno. 
The simple idea that conquerors might not systematically destroy pre-
existing structures is not totally new. After all, the debate on the last Chinese 
dynasty considers to what degree the latter was absorbed by the Chinese 
framework. Indeed, when in 1644 the Manchu Qing dynasty overthrew the Ming 
dynasty, the new emperors preserved the territorial framework inherited from 
their predecessors. This military conquest did not lead to a total destruction of 
the Chinese territory despite the modification of its borders.12 Similarly, in 
Merovingian Gaul, the freshly-arrived Frankish dynasty of the sixth century used 
the Roman administration to promote its own interests. Why destroy useful tools 
of administration?13 This study tries to replicate this transmission of spatial 
knowledge in Borno. Examples of different geographic areas or different time 
periods could be multiplied and it seems that Borno was no exception and could 
fit into this continuity model. 
The issue thus is not to question the existence of this model but the very 
modalities of this territorial continuity. In this regard, the Scramble for Africa 
was different from seventeenth-century China or sixth-century Gaul. Nineteenth-
century travellers and explorers were fascinated by the ancient kingdom of 
Kanem-Borno and did not consciously prepare the way for European 
colonisation. However, this thesis has shown that their work was repeatedly used 
                                                                                                                             
11 Reid, Political power in pre-colonial Buganda and Green, 'Ethnicity and Nationhood in 
Precolonial Africa: The Case of Buganda'. 
12 For a full discussion see the chapter on the governance of the Qing dynasty in William Rowe, 
China’s Last Empire: The Great Qing, History of imperial China (London: Belknap, 2009), pp. 31–62. 
13 Ian Wood, “Administration, law and culture in Merovingian Gaul,” in The Uses of Literacy in 
Early Mediaeval Europe, ed. Rosamond McKitterick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), 63-81. I would like to thank the author for his comments. 
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by later colonial administrations to justify their authority. Thus, this study always 
tried to draw a line, albeit a thin one, between exploration and imperialism. More 
importantly, these explorers perceived space in a way which largely influenced 
their colonial successors. As they understood the Bornoan spatial framework as 
being similar to the European medieval structure, they created an image of the 
borders and territory of Borno that the colonial authorities were eager to 
capture. 
Thus, with the pre-existing concept of a bordered territory and the 
powerful theoretical framework of Indirect Rule, the British maintained the 
kingdom of Borno within their colony of Nigeria. Moreover, the survival of the 
Bornoan territory was as much a diplomatic undertaking at the European scale as 
an intellectual endeavour at the European and African scale. This phenomenon 
only occurred because the collaboration between the Bornoan elite and the 
British codified the relationship between Borno and its former vassals and 
territorialised nineteenth-century personal relationships. Thus, even if the 
territory and borders of Borno were partly reused by the British, Borno did not 
remain unscathed. 
Indirect Rule, though often described as the “fossilisation” of nineteenth-
century Africa did modify the borders and territory of Borno. However, this 
modification was based on a sometimes loose, sometimes accurate conception of 
the territory and borders of Borno. The motivations for the adoption or rejection 
of this pre-existing model depended strongly on an elitist perception of the 
territory of Borno. Strikingly, the British colonial officers were directly involved 
in this phenomenon as they could obtain some personal gains from these policies. 
After all, Hewby, one of the first Residents of Borno was himself “king” in Borno 
according to Lugard.14 
The British adopted the territorial language of Borno at the beginning of 
colonial rule. This may have seemed logical as the colonisers did not have a clear 
picture of the geopolitical balance of what would become Northern Nigeria. Why 
would they have discarded a pre-existing structure? This could be interpreted as 
simple common sense but would be better understood as an intentional attempt 
                                            
14 Niven, Nigerian kaleidoscope, p. 150. 
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to gain legitimacy in the first years of colonisation. However, this adoption of 
nineteenth-century territorial claims was not limited to the first colonial decade 
but was illustrated throughout the 58 years of colonial rule in Borno. The borders 
of Borno did not vanish into the colony of Nigeria once the conquest was assured. 
On the contrary, the colonial authorities paid specific attention to these borders 
from 1902 to 1961. 
Moreover, this interest was not limited to the international borders of 
Nigeria as the British paid particular attention to the regional boundaries of their 
province in the 1910s. Strikingly, the former limits of nineteenth-century Borno 
which did not become international borders did not disappear either. The new 
regional boundaries of Nigeria were inherited from nineteenth-century Borno. 
Thus, the western and southern segments of the borders of Borno became the 
limits of the colonial province of Borno. The British attempted to reconstitute the 
kingdom of Borno within their colony and not only on its periphery. Considering 
only the international borders of Nigeria would thus be misleading. Even if fewer 
sources about the regional borders of Borno are available, the reconstitution of 
Borno would not be complete without its western and southern borders with the 
former Sokoto Caliphate. To understand current Nigerian regional politics, it 
would thus be necessary to refer to the reasons behind the creation of the 
regional blocs. The historical origin of regional borders does not seem to have 
fostered an intense scholarship as yet but would be worth exploring in the 
future.15 
This focus on the regional borders coincided with the conquest of German 
Borno in 1916 which enabled the British to reunify the kingdom of the Shehus. 
Subsequently, from 1916 to 1961, the British never ceased to promote the idea of 
a reunited Borno until the end of their Trusteeship on Northern Cameroons. The 
interest in the borders of Borno was not an epiphenomenon; it lasted throughout 
the colonial period. It could thus be argued that the Scramble for Borno did not 
stop in 1902. This “Long Scramble for Borno” was a lengthy process which 
reached a pinnacle in 1961 when Dikwa became officially Bornoan again. The 
                                            
15 Shain, ‘The Salt that Binds: the Historical Geography of a Central Nigerian Regional Identity’, in 
The spatial factor in African history, pp. 245-59. 
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partition and reconstruction of space in Borno seems thus to be more a process 
than an event. Literature about the Scramble for Africa always tends to consider 
that the cards were dealt once and for all at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. Subjects of Trust Territories such as the inhabitants of Dikwa might have 
thought otherwise.16 
Moreover, the British always considered the Bornoan territory as a whole, 
a phenomenon not to be dismissed out of hand. If Nigeria were a gigantic jigsaw 
puzzle, Borno would be one of its pieces. It would be possible to trim its edges 
but still, Borno was one of the essential elements of the colonial framework. 
Separating the boundaries which became regional borders from those which 
became international borders would be partly artificial. Borno was considered as 
a bloc. Obviously though, the international borders were considered as more 
problematic and strategic because of the endemic problems of tax evasion or 
smuggling and the presence of the French colonial power in Cameroon and Niger. 
The regional borders were never the subject of such administrative diligence. 
Nonetheless, the British created a political structure based to a certain 
extent on former polities. Moreover, Borno a geographic cornerstone of colonial 
Nigeria, never ceased to count in the geopolitical balance of postcolonial Nigeria. 
Admittedly, the post-1960 fragmentation of the federation led to the creation of 
Borno State in 1976 and Yobe State in 1991. If at first glance it would seem that 
the territory and borders of Borno were disappearing within Nigeria, a strong 
sense of belonging still exists. This thesis argued that this regional sense of 
belonging comes partly from the way the British reused the nineteenth-century 
framework of Borno. 
Bornoan nationalism seems to stem from this territorial origin. The 
double legacy of the precolonial State and British territorial engineering meant 
that its borders and territory were transmitted from 1810 to 2010. However, this 
transmission was not totally innocuous. It was the result of a calculated policy 
from the colonial and postcolonial authorities eager to facilitate their 
administration. Whether the borders and territory were the same as during the 
                                            
16 Peter Yearwood, “Great Britain and the repartition of Africa, 1914–19,” The Journal of Imperial 
and Commonwealth History 18, no. 3 (1990), 316–341. 
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nineteenth century was irrelevant. What counted was the imagined and 
reconstructed space of Borno as seen by the British and the Nigerians. 
However, Borno province did not come out of the blue. Originally, its 
shape was inspired by the mental map of Borno transmitted by the elite in place 
in Maiduguri. The acquisition of Dikwa in 1916-1921 and 1961 was the best 
example of this policy. However to what extent was this image of Borno as a 
whole inspired by the Bornoan people themselves? The question of African 
agency tackled throughout this thesis remains. It is a fact that the Bornoan elite 
influenced the international border negotiations and the treatment of Dikwa. 
Previous chapters argued that they had an impact on British policy as long as it 
suited the interests of the Residents in Maiduguri. If some of the modalities of 
this transmission are clear, the perception of non-elite Bornoans remains in the 
dark most of the time. One thing is certain: the survival of the territory of Borno 
was due to the relationship between the British and Kanemi elite. The question of 
the exact balance in this relationship still seems difficult to grasp. 
Two opposed viewpoints could be considered. On the one hand, would it 
be productive to consider that the British cynically instrumentalised the 
nineteenth-century territory of Borno? On the other hand, by recognising a 
certain degree of African agency, would this thesis exaggerate its romantic 
aspects in African History?17 There is an obvious parallel between the lengthy 
literature about African ethnicity and the construction of territoriality in Borno. 
The case of Borno is an excellent example of the “constructivist” school of 
thought. In other terms, Borno was reshaped by the colonial powers but the 
Europeans were inspired from previous models of territoriality. To paraphrase 
Thomas Spears, Borno was neither “easily fabricated [nor] manipulated”.18 As a 
process, the construction of the territory and borders of Borno had started before 
the colonisation and even before 1810. In his 2011 article, historian Richard Reid 
                                            
17 Sean Hanretta, Islam and Social Change in French West Africa: History of an Emancipatory 
Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
18 Spear, 'Neo-Traditionalism', 3. 
275 
 
stressed the importance of “enduring cultural reference points” in African 
history.19 Would not the Bornoan territory be a perfect example? 
It might be impossible to answer these questions without considering 
their outcome. Whether they were genuine or not, the Bornoan or the so-called 
Bornoan borders have survived until 2010. The survival of these nineteenth-
century borders and territory has nearly nothing to do with geographic accuracy. 
It is the pure product of a historical and social construction. The archaeology of 
the borders’ history should thus not be limited to the simple study of their 
position over time.20 The fact that the Bornoan elite and the British conferred to 
these limits a historical meaning assured their survival. As seen in the last 
chapter, the Nigerian State inherited these very practices from its colonial 
predecessor who obtained them from the nineteenth-century elite of Borno. 
Moreover, by arguing that the British Residents cooperated with the 
Bornoan local elite, this study linked the margins of the British Empire with 
London. Indeed, Borno was not only a Nigerian borderland, par excellence, it was 
also an imperial borderland. This interaction was the result of a territorial 
phenomenon which meant that even the smallest area of the empire could find its 
way to Whitehall. Thus Borno was already a borderland in the Nigerian colony 
and the same applied to Dikwa which was a borderland within Borno. This 
constant mise en abyme could be another example of Kopytoff’s ideas about 
borderlands. According to the latter, societies living on the periphery of a polity 
tend to reproduce the society at the core of the polity. Thus, borderland societies 
would not be different from their central counterparts. Kopytoff used this theory 
to explain the similarities between Bantu societies but would it be possible to 
apply the same concept to Borno as a borderland? Once again, Kopytoff’s model 
does not apply to a stable polity such as Borno. 
It seems that the construction of the Bornoan space by the British was an 
attempt to bring legitimacy to their colony of Nigeria, a phenomenon reproduced 
by the postcolonial Nigerian government. However, Borno never adopted the 
ideological mindset of London, Lagos or Abuja. Kopytoff’s argument might not 
                                            
19 Reid, Political power in pre-colonial Buganda, p. 150. 
20 Foucher, Fronts et frontières, introduction. 
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seem to work in this case. Nonetheless, the fact that the same spatial practices 
were transmitted from one government to another and reapplied endlessly from 
London to Lagos, and from Lagos to Maiduguri pleads in favour of this 
transmission of knowledge described by Kopytoff. However, strikingly, this was 
not a one-way transfer. The local conditions in Borno also informed and modified 
decisions taken in London. 
This is the main argument stressed in a recently published book entitled 
Territoires Impériaux where it is argued that the interaction between the local 
and global scales favoured the construction of colonial space.21 The different 
contributors suggested that colonial territories were not mere European 
creations as the local African context had to be taken into account. Authors often 
referred to terms such as “hybridisation”, “transmission” or “circulation”. This 
type of intellectual history of space is very much a work in progress. 
African spatial history is still in its infancy but this study of Bornoan 
borders and territory points to a different understanding of this ancient kingdom. 
Borno was not a simple stage for imperial history. Neither is it simply a political 
or administrative arena for the operation of the Nigerian postcolonial State. 
Writing about the history of borders and territory leads to the elaboration of a 
genuine cultural history. As a mentally constructed phenomenon, Borno was 
preserved by the Bornoan elite and the British. Borno is an idea which depends 
on a certain understanding of the history of the Lake Chad area. Once again, the 
question of the authenticity of this history is not at stake. It is what the British 
colonial officers and the Nigerian politicians did with this history which 
mattered. 
The historian Paul Carter has stressed the role of British settlers in the 
creation of the Australian space. According to him, numerous scholars have 
considered Australia as a simple island where historical events unrolled in “the 
illusion of a theatre”.22 In this epic setting, the white settlers colonised the land of 
the Aborigines in a series of events which led to the foundation of Australia. It 
                                            
21 Hélène Blais, Florence Deprest, and Pierre Singaravélou, Territoires impériaux: Une histoire 
spatiale du fait colonial (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2011), introduction. 
22 Paul Carter, The Road to Botany Bay: An Essay in Spatial History (London: Faber and Faber, 
1987), p. XV. 
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could be argued that, Bornoan scholars and in particular, British colonial officers, 
reproduced the same epic in Borno, without the presence of European settlers. 
However, the Kanemi elite and the British and Nigerian administration always 
intentionally preserved the nineteenth-century framework. In this sense, the 
latter were actively involved in its survival. The question of the active choice of 
the African elite and the British authorities is thus essential. As with the spatial 
history of Australia, the study of Borno is very much a history of intentions.23 
This is because successive invaders chose to maintain the spatial framework of 
the kingdom. 
In this sense, any historical study such as this thesis might fall into the 
same trap as the early Australian historians. The introduction to this thesis 
detailed fears of spatial determinism but would it be possible to use Borno as a 
simple stage for the Scramble for Africa or the creation of Nigeria? Borno was 
more than the landscape that the Europeans explored in the nineteenth century. 
In the European boundary treaties, Borno was a genuine factor to consider. By 
ascribing such a role to this territory, France, Germany and the United Kingdom 
also gave it an important place in the Lake Chad basin and in Nigeria. Borno as a 
territory was thus more than the  scene where the events of the Scramble for 
Africa unrolled. 
In contrast to Carter’s Australia, Borno was endlessly recreated by the 
Bornoans and the British. It has been argued that the actors of this thesis 
manipulated and recreated the borders and territory of Borno. The kingdom was 
even objectified by the colonial authorities through boundary treaties and 
cartographic tools. The re-creation of Borno by the British authorities 
corresponded to a certain perception of the Lake Chad area. Maps in particular 
were a fundamental tool of this re-appropriation of the Bornoan territory by the 
colonial authorities as they visually created a powerful testimony of Borno’s 
territory. 
Furthermore, this image of Borno’s territory was also shaped by the 
British colonial officers themselves who became figures of authority in both 
meanings of the term. Indeed, Borno became the subject of scholarly enquiry by 
                                            
23 Carter, The Road to Botany Bay, conclusion. 
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career-minded political officers. The Kanemi kingdom was thus the centre of 
academic attention by men in charge of the province. As a consequence, the 
figure of the scholar-officer became preponderant in the history of the kingdom. 
As the latter produced numerous studies of Borno, their work can be considered 
as major secondary sources for the kingdom. On the other hand, the outcome of 
their administrative tasks such as surveys or reports can be perceived as classical 
primary sources for the colonial period. From a methodological point of view, 
Borno was thus an excellent example of colonial-orientated research as the 
administrative reports written by these officers contained many references to 
lengthy studies undertaken by their predecessors. In other terms, the line 
between primary and secondary sources was extremely thin in Borno. It could be 
suggested that, while not being specific to Borno, the figure of the scholar-officer 
was exceptionally well represented within the province. 
Their academic endeavour was a perfect illustration of what was dubbed 
the European imperial mindset. This thesis proved how much the colonial 
officers found their inspiration in European history, whether medieval for the 
nineteenth-century explorers or ancient for the twentieth-century colonial 
officers. However, this perception was already distorted by centuries of distance 
and the modern literature. These colonial officers turned the kingdom of Borno 
into what they thought constituted an imperial frontier kingdom. 
These colonial officers were particularly responsible for the survival of 
Borno as they transformed the nineteenth-century kingdom into a Northern 
Nigerian province. This transformation ensured that the Bornoan State whether 
independent or colonial would be present again in the region of Borno. The 
survival of the territorial framework of Borno can thus be explained by the 
relationship between State and territory. It is true that colonial Borno was in 
some aspects totally different from its nineteenth-century predecessor; however, 
the presence of the State ensured that Borno would survive. 
More specifically, the provincialisation of the kingdom led to the cultural 
redefinition of its territory and borders. As the colonial State needed the territory 
of Borno, they also tried to capture its legitimacy by maintaining the Kanemi 
dynasty or by reunifying its territory. Independent Nigeria never ceased to 
redefine the cultural definition of the territorial framework of Borno in the 
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context of the post-Civil War fragmentation of the federation, which required the 
provinces to redefine their relationship with the central government. The 
evolution of the meaning conferred to the borders and territory has thus not 
ceased. The borders and the territory of Borno are dynamic cultural objects 
conjointly engineered by the Bornoans and the British during the colonial period. 
The Nigerian government only took up the torch in 1960. 
Nonetheless, the Bornoans still think of themselves as inhabitants of 
Borno even after 58 years of British colonisation and half a century of 
independence within Nigeria. There is though a need to put Borno into 
perspective. For most of its inhabitants, Borno is one spatial scale among others. 
A multi-scalar approach reveals that the interaction between Britain, Nigeria and 
Borno constantly reinforced the territory and the borders of Borno while 
modifying them at the same time. This systematic approach to space explained 
how the territory and borders of Borno still existed within Nigeria. It is true that 
Borno is not an independent kingdom anymore. It is true it has been successively 
invaded by Rabih, the French, the Germans and the British. It is true that it 
became a part of a wider country called Nigeria. However, the Bornoan scale still 
existed in 2010. 
Borno was already present on sixteenth-century maps of Africa. However, 
its survival is not only in name as twenty-first century Borno still claims to be the 
heir of mai Idriss. The semantic value attached to the word “Borno” has evolved 
over time with a constant and dynamic reconstruction of Borno. This study 
demonstrated how this spatial discourse was fabricated but the artificiality of 
this language cannot ignore a simple fact: the European never destroyed the local 
scale of Borno. This is one clear outcome of this thesis. A nineteenth-century 
polity can survive the European colonisation and half a century of independent 
postcolonial rule. Obviously, the Bornoan case might not be applicable to other 
parts of Nigeria or Africa, but Borno is a strong case of territorial resilience in 
Africa. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: Treaties between Borno and the United Kingdom, 
1851-1852 
Treaty between the Shehu of Borno and the British government represented by 
Heinrich Barth, 1851. Kew, FO 97/13/1 
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Treaty between the English government and the Shehu of Borno, 1852 
Kew, FO 97/13/2 
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APPENDIX B: Boundary agreement between Borno and Bagirmi 
(1900) and correspondence following discovery by the British 
administration (1922-1923) 
 
Baghermi Boundary Copy of Agreement made between the Shehu of Bornu and 
the Ruler of Baghermi (Commonly called relative to Koiranga) (1923), NNAK, 
SNP17/6, Acc No.7587, 5076 
 
The original document in Arabic was no longer to be found in the NNAK in June 
2010. 
Item 1: Translation of the boundary agreement from Arabic 
 
Praise be to God who divided mankind among the four quarters of the Earth, and 
gave them Justice as an administration and warning against all harm, and 
directed Kings and Sultans to show brotherly goodwill as the foundarion of their 
Administration among the pious: 
Thanksgiving and Peace be on our Lord, Muhammad the guide ad upon his 
relations and companions who perfected true prosperity. 
This is an agreement between the Sultan son of a Sultan, Muhammad Abd ur 
Rahman Kori son of the deceased Muhammad Abd ul Kadir Sultan of Bagirmi, and 
the Sultan son of a Sultan, Sheikh Umar son of the deceased Ibrahim son of the 
deceased Sheikh Muhammad al Kanemi, sultan of Bornu. May God protect them. 
Amen.  
After that:- they have made known their rights pertaining to their kingdoms and 
made by this writing a final and complete agreement, and fixed the river Shari, 
the well-known river, as a common boundary between their territories: and in 
addition to that, they agreed on the one hand that Buguman and its subject lands 
and villages between (the) Logone and the Shari as also the towns of Gulfei and 
Shawi and Makari and all their lands should belong without question to the 
kingdom of the Sultan of Bagirmi: and on the other hand that Logone and Kusseri 
and their lands and villages, and the land lying between (the) Logone and the 
Shari which belongs to Kusseri should be, without question, in the kingdom of the 
Sultan of Bornu. 
They swore by the Name of God most exalted, and by His Noble Book, that they 
would mutually carry out this agreement. [The second page was lost in the 
National Archives of Kaduna but available in Arewa House, Kaduna, John Lavers’s 
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papers, 1/7/69] This important act was done at Kusseri on the 26th day of the 
month Shawal in the year 1317 A.H. [Tuesday 27th February 1900]. 
 
Item 2: Handwritten note: The effect which this document would have on the 
recent proposals would be to put forward a strong case for including Logone and 
Kusseri within the British sphere. 
 
Item 3: Letter from the Resident of Bornu, Herbert Richmond Palmer to the 
Secretary Northern Provinces, Kaduna, 27th December 1922, received 19th 
January 1923 in Kaduna. 
 
Sir, 
1. I have the honour to enclose with an English translation, an 
Arabic copy of an agreement as to the boundaries between Bornu and 
Baghermi, which was entered into between the present Shehu of Bornu 
and the ruler of Baghermi (commonly called Koiranga) at the time when 
the former was made Shehu of Bornu by the French after the death of 
Rabeh at the battle of Kousseri. 
2. The Shehu states that this agreement which is in due form and 
sealed with the seals of Bornu and Baghermi – was made with the 
knowledge and approval of the French leader – presumably M.Gentil. 
3. It would appear therefore that had this document been brought to 
light sooner, it would have been an unanswerable proof as to what 
constituted ‘German Bornu’ under the terms of the Anglo-French 
agreement as to the Cameroon boundary. 
4. To make the terms of the document more clear a sketch map is 
attached – the detail being based on information collected by the D.O. 
Dikwa (Mr.Patterson) as to what villages belonged to the several towns 
mentioned as being Baghermi enclaves to the west of the Shari. 
 
Item 4: Letter from the Secretary Northern Provinces, Kaduna to the Chief 
Secretary to the govt Lagos, 9 February 1923 
 
1. I am directed by the Acting Lieutenant-Governor to forward copies of 
documents received from the Resident Bornu, relating to an agreement 
entered into by the Shehu of Bornu and Ruler of Baghermi about the year 
1900. 
2. Even, if this agreement, is not of sufficient importance to secure the 
acquisition of the large tract of country to which it refers, it should prove 
useful in negotiating for other portions of the Cameroon elsewhere as 
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outlined in the Govenor's despatch of the 25 March 1922. 
3. In this connection I would refer you to paragraph 9 of African West No 
1054a Confidential dated 20th June, 1917, where the acquisition of this 
tract of country was suggested though not favourably received and it was 
finally decided in your telegram No.N.C.100/1919 dated 7 March 1922, 
that there would be no question of claiming anything East of the River 
Lebait. 
 
Item 5: Extract from Minute Paper n.2775/1923: Report on that portion of 
the mandated territory of the Cameroons included in the administration of 
the northern provinces of Nigeria 
 
18. XIX. International boundaries. (a). In paragraphs 56-65 dealing with the 
Dikwa emirate, it is urged that the past and present boundaries are a cause of 
injustice and hardship to the tribes of Bornu and Dikwa who have been cut off 
from their fellow subjects of the ancient Sultanate of Bornu as it existed at the 
time of the first partition of these territories among the European Powers. Since 
these paragraphs, an important Arabic document has come to light. An 
Agreement as to the boundaries between Bornu and Baghermi (commonly called 
Koiranga) at the time when the former was made Shehu of Bornu by the French 
after the death of Rabeh at the battle of Kusseri. The Shehu states that this 
agreement which is in due form and sealed with the seals of Bornu and Baghermi 
was made with the knowledge and approval of the French leader – presumably 
Mons.Gentil. It would appear that had this document been brought to light 
sooner, it would have been unanswerable proof as to what constituted “German 
Bornu” under the terms of the Anglo-French Agreement as to the Cameroons 
Boundary. A copy of this agreement in Arabic and an English translation is 
attached. 
From this Agreement, it is clear that the areas of Woloje, Logone and Kusseri 
lying East and South-East of Dikwa historically and at quite a recent date formed 
part of the Sultanate of Bornu. 
If the rulers and people of Bornu legitimately regret the loss of their former 
territory, the same feelings are no doubt entertained by the inhabitants of 
Mandara who have suffered a similar loss by the transfer of a portion of their 
country to the British sphere. Signed: E.J. Arnett 
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APPENDIX C: German « Letter of Protection » for Shehu Sanda of 
Dikwa, 1903 
NAK, S.N.P10-262p/1916. Gerhard Muller-Kosack who found this document 
allowed me to reproduce it in my thesis. 
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APPENDIX D: The British choice of the Shehu of Dikwa as the 
next Shehu of Borno in 1935 
 
Arewa House, 11085, 1/17/112, Confidential 97/35, Resident of Bornu to the 
Secretary Northern Provinces, 14 February 1935. 
 
Succession of Shehu of Bornu 
Amalgamation of Bornu and Dikwa 
 
With reference to your confidential Memorandum No. 11085/16 of the 1st May, 
1934 I find previous instructions by my predecessors to the effect that in the 
event of the death of the Shehu of Bornu the Shehu of Dikwa should be rushed 
into Maiduguri by car as the doyen of the ruling family and should be installed as 
ruling Shehu pending the receipt of confirmation of his appointment from the 
Governor. Further, in a minute by Mr Palmer, it is admitted that in the 
circumstances anything in the nature of an election must be, to say the least of it, 
perfunctory. 
One of the minor difficulties about this scheme is that for part of the year the 
road from Dikwa is impassable by motors, and we cannot guarantee that the 
Shehu of Bornu will die when the road is open – nor for that matter that the 
Shehu of Bornu will die first. 
But a more serious objection to such procedure is, to my mind, that it appears 
contrary to the principles by which Nigeria is governed; Bornu is not an easy 
country to administer and to start a new regime with a somewhat spectacular 
coup d'etat which would by no means be welcomed by all parties concerned 
would not tend to produce that smoothness of working and the general loyal co-
operation which is essential if Bornu is to progress, not merely on the surface but 
in reality. 
It must be remembered that the reunion of Dikwa and Bornu, though possibly 
desirable in itself, is only a very inconsiderable step towards the unification of 
the former Bornu Empire, which included for instance, Damagaram and I feel that 
we should not allow sentiment to obscure the real point at issue which is the 
successful administration of the Bornu Emirate. 
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It is admitted, even by these who made the proposal originally, that the 
appointment of the Shehu of Dikwa as Shehu of Bornu will not be universally 
popular and I feel that action should be avoided which is likely to strengthen and 
perhaps justify such opposition as there may be. I suggest therefore that in the 
event of the death of the Shehu of Bornu the Shehu of Dikwa should not be 
summoned immediately but that the Bornu Council should temporarily take 
charge of affairs, which I consider them capable of doing, and the traditional 
electors be asked to express their views. If, as appears probable, they make a 
different selection, the desirability of reuniting Dikwa and Bornu under the 
present Shehu of Dikwa and Government's wish that this should be done can be 
impressed upon them, and their own selection, if suitable, could be regarded as 
the next in succession. By this means the Government would learn the real views 
of the selectors and the final selection would be less obviously forced upon them. 
If the opposition of the Council and the electors to the Appointment of the Shehu 
of Dikwa is really strong and determined, the position could be reviewed, though 
I doubt whether this would be the case. 
It is obvious that in the face of really determined opposition the appointment 
proposed would be doubtful of success.  
I consider that the Shehu of Dikwa would be a satisfactory successor but I feel 
that it is unfortunate that when the decision was made it was not communicated 
to those concerned by the officers who had such long and intimate acquaintance 
with Bornu. 
I should be grateful for His Honour's advice on the points raised in this 
memorandum.  
E. Walwyn Resident Bornu 
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APPENDIX E: The Creation of Borno State in 1976 
 
West African Pilot, 3 February 1976,  British Library, Colindale, MC1801 NPL 
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APPENDIX F: The Creation of Yobe State in 1991 
 
The Daily Times, 28 August1991, British Library, Colindale, MC1796 NPL 
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